therefore say, that a man never acts without motive, using the term in this sense we mean only that every volition has its object, or that we never choose without an object of choice. For the justice and propriety of this definition, and explanation of the term, I appeal to the verbal and written use of the word. But,

2. The term motive denotes not only an object of choice, but it denotes the choice of an object. This moralists call the subjective sense of the term. Accordingly, Mary's motive when she embraced Christ, was good; and the motive of Judas was bad: Daniel's motive in fasting, was right; and Jezebel's was wrong.

These are the two senses in which the term motive is frequently used, by those who write and speak with propriety. And if the word be used properly in a third sense, I wish to see it pointed out, and exemplified. Motives are objective and subjective. When they are considered objectively, they only denote those objects or qualities which the agent chooses: And, when they are considered subjectively, they denote the agent's choice of some object. In the former sense, motive imports an object of choice; in the latter sense it imports the choice of an object. In one word, motive sometimes means the object of volition, and sometimes the volition itself. The difference, therefore, between motive in the objective and subjective sense, is as great as the difference between the choice of an agent, and the object which he chooses. For instance, the miser goes a journey to get money; money is his objective motive; and the

choice of money is his subjective motivé. There is, therefore, as great a difference between his objective, and subjective motive, as there is between money and the love of money. Those writers therefore who use the word motive, in moral disquisitions, without marking the precise meaning of it, to say the least, are chargeable with ambiguity and obscurity. For motives, in the objective sense, are destitute of volition, and consequently destitute of morality.

I have only to add, relative to motives, that there is a subordinate motive, an ultimate motive, and a chief motive. In the subjective sense, a subordinate motive is any choice which the agent possesses for the sake of another exercise: An ultimate motive is any choice which he indulges for its own sake: A chief motive is that choice or volition which affords him the most pleasure: and, in the objective sense, of the term, subordinate, ultimate and chief objects, respectively correspond with subordinate, ultimate and principal volitions. For instance, a man purchases a valuable library that he may acquire knowledge, for the sake of being extensively useful to the public.

2. What is the import of the word end, as used by moral writers? having ascertained the different acceptations of the word motive, the import of the term, end, will be easy. For the difference between the motives and ends of an agent, in the same action, is verbal and not real. Accordingly when authors tell us, that their motives in writing are to communicate knowledge, or to gain a reputation, we know their

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ends. When a man says, his motive in going a journey, is to visit a friend, or to secure an estate, we know his end. David's motive and end, in setting Uriah in the front of the battle, were the same. Absalom's motive and end, respecting the kingdom, were the same. But, any other instances are needless. For, by knowing a man's motive we know his end; and by knowing his end we know his motive. A subordinate motive is a subordinate end an ultimate motive is an ultimate end; and a chief motive is a chief end. For every end of the agent either supposes the mere object of volition, or volition itself. And the impossibility of describing any end of an agent which is neither volition itself, nor the mere object of volition, must convince any one who will attend, that ends as well as motives, are only objective and subjective: and, therefore, that the difference between motives and ends is merely nominal and not real. For, what is the end or motive of an agent, which neither consists in volition nor in the object of volition? Who can describe it?

3. What is a moral action? A moral action is an exercise of the will, or heart of man. For, the heart of man is the only source of moral exercise. It is the heart of man which God requires; and with the heart we obey or disobey the divine command. Accordingly saith Christ, "A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good, and an evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that

which is evil. For of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh."

In other words, a moral action is the volition of a moral agent: and, not any animal, intellectual, visible, or external motion. For, the law of God, which is the only standard of moral exercise, requires the heart.

Having ascertained the import of motives,' ends and actions; and shewn that moral actions, motives and ends, are the same things, because they are all the voluntary exercises of a moral agent; Having also shown that objective motives, ends and actions, are destitute of a moral nature, I beg leave to present the following inferences.

SECTION VI.

Containing several obvious Inferences. 1. We infer that Mr. T.'s argument which depends upon "a morality in actions themselves abstractly from their motives," is entirely groundless. For, we have seen that moral actions and motives are the same things. To establish the morality of actions abstractly from motives, he pleads in his sermon, as follows: "The divine law requires that the action itself be right, as well as the motives and ends of it." But it is not less absurd to say, that the law requires that the action itself be right, as well as the motives of it, than to say, that the law requires that the action itself be right, as well as the action itself. For, there is no difference between moral actions and motives. Further,

* Letters, page 10.

he pleads that "There is a right and wrong in action as well as in temper, and principle." He does not surely mean, that there is a right and wrong in temper, as well as in temper: He therefore must mean, if we take his meaning from his words, that there a right and wrong in mere external actions, abstractly from the volition of the agent. He adds further, that "The omission of the external part of duty is in itself sinful, distinct from the want of right ends."* But what is the external part of duty distinct from right ends, or distinct from right volitions, except mere external motion? for, moral ends and volitions are the same.

In the 9th page of his letters he asserts, "That duty consists, in some degree, in the performance of external commanded actions, distinct from the motive or end." Duty, therefore, in some measure consists in mere external motion. For, actions which are distinct from motives, or which are distinct from volitions, are nothing but visible motions. In the 18th page, where he unfolds and displays the contents of his theory beyond what any one has done before him, he has this notable sentence: "What I contend for is, that the voluntary designed performance of something right in itself, and absolutely commanded by God, is an act of duty." This is his definition of the matter of duty. But, what is this something right in itself, the voluntary performance of which is an act of duty? it is not any thing of a voluntary nature. For, the voluntary performance of something voluntary, is a gross absurdity. His Sermon, page 10.