Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons: Hearings Before..., 92-2, July 20, 27; August 2 and 9, 19721972 - 155 pages |
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Page 6
... verification . The provisions of the agreements were developed so that we could rely for verification on such national means . Modern national tech- nical means of verification provide the most practical and effective assurances of ...
... verification . The provisions of the agreements were developed so that we could rely for verification on such national means . Modern national tech- nical means of verification provide the most practical and effective assurances of ...
Page 9
... verification procedures and commitments about nonconcealment and noninterference that are contained in the ABM Treaty . Thus , national technical means of verification , in which we have full confidence , will monitor compliance with ...
... verification procedures and commitments about nonconcealment and noninterference that are contained in the ABM Treaty . Thus , national technical means of verification , in which we have full confidence , will monitor compliance with ...
Page 13
... Verification . Mr. MAILLIARD ( continuing ) . Verification . Again , maybe this is not the appropriate time , but it seems to me if we are going to do an intel- ligent job of trying to sell this whole proposal not only to the Congress ...
... Verification . Mr. MAILLIARD ( continuing ) . Verification . Again , maybe this is not the appropriate time , but it seems to me if we are going to do an intel- ligent job of trying to sell this whole proposal not only to the Congress ...
Page 14
... verification . As for the question you asked about the operation of this com- mission , we do not yet have a charter for it . I think one of the first things we will want to do in the follow - on negotiations is to work up an agreed ...
... verification . As for the question you asked about the operation of this com- mission , we do not yet have a charter for it . I think one of the first things we will want to do in the follow - on negotiations is to work up an agreed ...
Page 20
... verification , technical means of verification at its dis- posal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law . I am not sure I understand that . What do you have in mind , what are you ruling out ...
... verification , technical means of verification at its dis- posal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law . I am not sure I understand that . What do you have in mind , what are you ruling out ...
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Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM interceptor missiles ABM mode ABM radars ABM systems ABM Treaty ABM's Admiral MOORER agree ahead allies Ambassador SMITH anti-ballistic missile approval arms control arms limitation Article attack bargaining chip believe BINGHAM capability Chairman MORGAN Chiefs of Staff committee concerned Congress consider construction CULVER defense budget deployed deterrent discussed evacuation FASCELL follow-on negotiations forces FRASER FRELINGHUYSEN go forward heavy ICBM ICBM launchers ICBM's important increase Interim Agreement Joint Chiefs launch LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC MAILLIARD means of verification ment MIRV MONAGAN Moscow National Command Authority national technical means NATO non-ABM nuclear offensive weapons operational Party undertakes phase position posture President prohibited question ratification retaliatory Russians SALT agreements SALT II SALT talks Secretary LAIRD Secretary ROGERS Senate side SLBM SLBM's Soviet Union strategic arms strategic ballistic missiles strategic offensive arms TELLER test ranges Thank tion Trident U.S. Delegation United warheads warning Washington WHALEN WOLFF ZABLOCKI
Fréquemment cités
Page 116 - Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Page 35 - Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and determined to continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 115 - The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 102 - ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.
Page 121 - ... the US. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The US Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces.
Page 116 - XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that Article. Article VII The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations. Article VIII 1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon...
Page 121 - ... after they had entered into force This understanding would continue to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the US statement 3.
Page 115 - For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
Page 111 - Declaring their Intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective.
Page 102 - In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles...