Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons: Hearings Before..., 92-2, July 20, 27; August 2 and 9, 19721972 - 155 pages |
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Page 16
... kind of international agree- ments to stop or limit proliferation of nonnuclear weaponry and lastly , is the Nixon administration prepared to aggressively seek such agreements ? Secretary ROGERS . I think you are correct . Among the ...
... kind of international agree- ments to stop or limit proliferation of nonnuclear weaponry and lastly , is the Nixon administration prepared to aggressively seek such agreements ? Secretary ROGERS . I think you are correct . Among the ...
Page 18
... kind of agreement . Secretary ROGERS . That is right . THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN . It is not clear to me , either , about the way the Standing Consultative Commission will work . I think Ambassador Smith ...
... kind of agreement . Secretary ROGERS . That is right . THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN . It is not clear to me , either , about the way the Standing Consultative Commission will work . I think Ambassador Smith ...
Page 21
... kind of on - site inspection might be acceptable ? Secretary ROGERS . Certainly not any kind of international inspection , no . After a while we didn't press for on - site inspection . That was a sub- ject of great discussion in ...
... kind of on - site inspection might be acceptable ? Secretary ROGERS . Certainly not any kind of international inspection , no . After a while we didn't press for on - site inspection . That was a sub- ject of great discussion in ...
Page 23
... kind of hazard the present submarine may be exposed to . I am not in favor of abandonment of the Trident program but in favor of a stretch - out . Leaving our intention clear , but saving our tax- payers money . But the Secretary wants ...
... kind of hazard the present submarine may be exposed to . I am not in favor of abandonment of the Trident program but in favor of a stretch - out . Leaving our intention clear , but saving our tax- payers money . But the Secretary wants ...
Page 27
... improve our relations with the People's Republic of China . At the moment , we haven't thought it proper to enter into this kind of discussion for the reasons I mentioned . Ambassador SMITH . I think you know , Mr. Wolff 27.
... improve our relations with the People's Republic of China . At the moment , we haven't thought it proper to enter into this kind of discussion for the reasons I mentioned . Ambassador SMITH . I think you know , Mr. Wolff 27.
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Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM interceptor missiles ABM mode ABM radars ABM systems ABM Treaty ABM's Admiral MOORER agree ahead allies Ambassador SMITH anti-ballistic missile approval arms control arms limitation Article attack bargaining chip believe BINGHAM capability Chairman MORGAN Chiefs of Staff committee concerned Congress consider construction CULVER defense budget deployed deterrent discussed evacuation FASCELL follow-on negotiations forces FRASER FRELINGHUYSEN go forward heavy ICBM ICBM launchers ICBM's important increase Interim Agreement Joint Chiefs launch LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC MAILLIARD means of verification ment MIRV MONAGAN Moscow National Command Authority national technical means NATO non-ABM nuclear offensive weapons operational Party undertakes phase position posture President prohibited question ratification retaliatory Russians SALT agreements SALT II SALT talks Secretary LAIRD Secretary ROGERS Senate side SLBM SLBM's Soviet Union strategic arms strategic ballistic missiles strategic offensive arms TELLER test ranges Thank tion Trident U.S. Delegation United warheads warning Washington WHALEN WOLFF ZABLOCKI
Fréquemment cités
Page 116 - Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Page 35 - Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and determined to continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 115 - The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 102 - ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.
Page 121 - ... the US. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The US Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces.
Page 116 - XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that Article. Article VII The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations. Article VIII 1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon...
Page 121 - ... after they had entered into force This understanding would continue to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the US statement 3.
Page 115 - For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
Page 111 - Declaring their Intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective.
Page 102 - In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles...