Agency, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The President has asked me to concentrate on the relationship of the agreements to the defense of the United States. In doing so, I will emphasize the critical importance of proposed U.S. strategic programs to the viability of the agreements already reached, and the continued importance of these programs to the follow-on negotiations which could begin this autumn. In my view, the national security requirements of the United States make it urgent that: (1) the Senate ratify the ABM Treaty; (2) the Congress approve the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons; and (3) the House and Senate reinforce these initiatives for arms limitation with strong support for the President's defense budget proposals. SUPPORTS SALT AGREEMENTS As you know, the limitations contained in the SALT agreements were brought about through carefully prepared, lengthy and intensive negotiations. We did not pursue a course dictated by wishful thinking, but rather a course based on the realities of the existing strategic balance and the potential inherent in ongoing programs. As a result, the agreements reflect the fruits of our successful national security programs upon which realistic negotiations were based. I believe the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons now before the Congress move us closer to our ultimate goal— a world system in which peace is a universal practice rather than a hope. These agreements enable us to sustain our confidence in the effectiveness and realism of our strategic deterrent and to maintain a position of strength-the essential foundation for successful negotiations. I am confident that the provisions of these agreements can be verified by national means. NEED FOR A STRONG DEFENSE POSTURE In my view, the opportunities for enhanced security embodied in the SALT agreements would be nullified and our national security jeopardized in the long term unless there is continued strong support for an adequate defense budget. The success of SALT and prospects for ultimate peace depend on sustained strength. I believe the majority of the Members of Congress and the majority of all American citizens agree on the need for a strong defense posture. The programs that we are recommending in the defense budget now before Congress will provide this strength. The President reported upon his return from Moscow that Mr. Brezhnev and his Soviet colleagues had made it absolutely clear that they intended to go forward with programs in the offensive area that are not limited by these agreements. It should be no surprise when I report to you that this is precisely what they are doing. Both as a Member of Congress and when I became Secretary of Defense, I thought it was essential to apply the brakes to the onrushing Soviet strategic weapons momentum. With ratification of these agreements, we will have accomplished this objective. As a legislator and as a member of the executive branch, I have always felt that it is essential for us to maintain technological superior ity. With approval of the President's budget request, this crucial objective also will be sustained. The defense programs that are before the Congress are needed to preserve the effectiveness of our deterrent, both with and without SALT. Without the current agreements before you, we would be forced to take further measures to protect our deterrent capability. With the agreements, we can continue our programs in prudent fashion as we move into follow-on negotiations in SALT II. REQUIREMENT FOR TRIDENT AND B-1 BOMBER Let me briefly summarize the basis of our need for the major programs which are included in the revised defense budget for fiscal year 1973. We need Trident at the earliest possible date. Last year we made the decision to accelerate Trident as the most appropriate new initiative to preserve the sufficiency of our strategic deterrent for the future. As you know, Trident is presently planned as a replacement system. It should be noted that our programs will not get the first Trident submarine into operation until after the scheduled expiration date of the Interim Agreement. Even though an increase from the present 41 to 44 boats is permitted, the United States total number of operational SLBM submarines will not increase during the period of this agree ment. We also have an urgent need to keep the development program for the B-1 bomber on schedule. This program is designed to provide us an option to deploy the first aircraft in the late 1970's. THE NCA ABM DEFENSE With regard to the defense of the National Command Authority (NCA), we can fund the NCA defense in fiscal year 1973 and still reduce the budget request for ABM by $650 million. As I have reported to the Congress, system components originally slated for defense of Minuteman sites will be continued with the objective of using these components at Washington. During fiscal year 1973, we propose to continue studies of NCA defense, continue advanced site preparation, and retain options for specific NCA defense configuration. The actual request on the NCA when these preparations have been made would not be included until the 1974 budget request. The prototype development program for site defense preserves the option to deploy a terminal defense of U.S. ICBM's should that become necessary. This prototype program is permitted by the treaty and it will provide for earlier availability of developmental hardware, earlier development of software, and earlier test and demonstration. REVISED SATELLITE BASING PROGRAM The revised satellite basing program accelerates the funding for improved facilities at our strategic bomber bases and makes these facilities available in a more timely fashion. Our bomber alert force will be able to use inland bases at an earlier time period and existing main operating bases will have added launch facilities sooner than initially planned. 82-108-72 -4 SLCM AND COMMAND/CONTROL SYSTEMS The development of a submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) system is necessary to assure that we have options for increasing our strength in the future, if the need arises. The funding we are proposing will allow more intensive study of the SLCM system and initiate the development of propulsion and guidance components, some of which may challenge the existing technology. The Soviets, as you know, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, now have significant numbers of SLCM's deployed on nuclear boats and an active production program for the SLCM within the Soviet Union. The SALT agreements, in my view, underscore the importance of having reliable, effective command, control, and communications systems. We are recommending additional funding in fiscal year 1973 to the Department of Defense to improve the degree of secure communications with the airborne command post; advance our technology using satellite communications; improve the survivability features of data systems, especially those associated with advanced computers; conduct system engineering studies of the worldwide military command and control system. These are all included in the 1973 presentation which has been made to the Armed Services Committee in the House and Senate and to the Appropriations Committees of both the House and the Senate. We are also requesting moderate increases in funding to move forward with work on improved reentry vehicles for our ballistic missiles. Clearly, adequate and effective verification capabilities are necessary. We have such capabilities now and are proposing moderate increases in funding to assure that verification of the provisions contained in these agreements will remain adequate in the future. All of these particular items requiring authorization of the Armed Services Committee were included in the bill which was enacted in the House of Representatives as reported from the House Armed Services Committee. STRONG CONVICTIONS ABOUT SALT AGREEMENTS I want to repeat what I told the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in testimony last month: We enter these agreements with the following interdependent strong convictions: Our security will be enhanced. We have applied brakes to the momentum of Soviet strategic missile deployments. We have adequate means of verification. Congress will support, I am confident, the strategic programs we have proposed and will propose. We have taken the initial steps and have laid a solid foundation for further arms limitation and potential arms reductions in the future. As you note, we need the help of the Congress, which is a full partner with coequal responsibilities in providing for the defense and the security of our Nation. The executive branch cannot succeed alone. I urge your support of these agreements and continued support of the programs necessary for the future sufficiency of our forces. With them we can, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, continue to preserve our security and to negotiate successfully from a position of strength as we move into the follow-on negotiations in SALT II in this very important strategic area. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Admiral Moorer, you may proceed, sir. STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, U.S. NAVY, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Admiral MOORER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss with you today the SALT agreements and their interrelationship to our strategic force posture. The Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and our strategic forces have been designed to serve a common purpose-to preserve peace. The Joint Chiefs of Staff share with all the people of the United States a sincere desire to relieve mankind of the burden and terror of modern weapons. On October 23, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised President Truman that they *** regard it as of great military importance that further steps *** be promptly and vigorously pressed * * * in an effort to forestall a possible race in atomic weapons *** At that time the Joint Chiefs of Staff further suggested, as a matter of immediate importance, measures for * * * restricting or outlawing the use of atomic weapons and for encouraging the full development of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, recognized in 1945 and still maintain today that a credible strategic deterrent is indispensable to peace. For that reason, no task is more important, from a military standpoint, than that of maintaining and protecting such a force. Our strategic nuclear weapons have but one essential purpose-to deter conflict. The real objectives is that these weapons never be used. Arms control agreements, to be either enduring or effective, must mutually enhance the security of both parties. We must, in order to survive as a Nation, retain the power needed to deter aggression, not as a symbol of national aggrandizement but as an essential shield for the preservation of our security. It is in this context that the treaty, the agreement, and the U.S. strategic posture must be viewed. JCS REPRESENTED ON SALT DELEGATION The Joint Chiefs of Staff were officially represented on the SALT delegation and were consulted prior to signature. If we press forward vigorously with our programs designed to protect against a degradation in national security posture, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the deterrent capability of our strategic forces will not be impaired, that the peace of the world may be enhanced, and that the undertakings will be in the best interests of the United States. There are two essential ingredients in any analysis of the strategic consequences of these undertakings: first, the relative balance between the U.S.S.R. and the United States projected over the life of the agreement; and second, drawing upon that analysis, a discussion of the essential continuing steps we must take to preserve U.S. security and the stability of international order as we move into the future. THE STRATEGIC BALANCE It is necessary that we examine a little of the past in order to understand the present and to put the future in perspective. In discussing the fiscal year 1971 budget with the Congress, Mr. Laird and I both said that the United States no longer had clear superiority in strategic nuclear weapons. In the course of considering our relative military posture during the fiscal year 1972 budget hearings, I reported that the "balance is tenuous." This year my report to the Congress reflected that the balance is turning against us in quantitative terms and that short of an effective agreement on strategic arms limitations, the momentum of the Soviet strategic force buildup would likely carry Soviet forces well beyond the level planned for United States forces in the mid- or late 1970's. This momentum resulted from the fact that the U.S.S.R. has had an active ICBM and SLBM construction and deployment program since the mid-sixties, while in a quantitative sense, the United States remained static-concentrating instead on qualitative improvements. We, therefore, must examine the impact of these agreements on the basis not only of what they freeze, but also upon what they forestall. I would like now to briefly analyze the strategic military balance and project it into the future in order to describe how the Strategic Arms Limitations (SAL) undertakings affect that balance. I will address specifically those forces affected by the undertakings: ICBM's, SLBM's, and ABM's. In addition, the three general quantitative measures which have been used to summarize the overall strategic military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union-numbers of delivery vehicles, megatons, and warheads-will be discussed. Turning now to the numbers of United States and Soviet ICBM launchers, the U.S.S.R. is expected to have approximately 1,550 ICBM's on launchers by July 1 of this year. They have been deploying ICBM's at the rate of about 250 per year. Thus, if unconstrained, they could have had by midyear 1977 well over 2,000 such missiles on launchers. The number of ICBM launchers projected for the Soviets under SAL is between 1,600 and 1,400, depending on how many they choose to convert to SLBM's. In the SAL environment, we actually consider the lower number of ICBM launchers to be the more severe threat. The reason for this apparent anomaly is that a lower number of ICBM launchers reflects the phaseout and replacement of older missiles with modern SLBM's. It should be noted, however, that the maximum numbers of ICBM's and SLBM's that the Soviets could have had without the constraints of the undertakings were much in excess of those permitted by the agreement. United States ICBM's as projected in our 5-year defense program would not have increased beyond the current level of 1,054. |