about missile defense and whether missile defense is effective or not is a debatable question. I, myself, am doubtful on this point. I am arguing that deployment of such a defensive system around Washington will teach us more about this ability. About civil defense I have no doubt. It is the cheapest, the most peaceful, the most obviously justified. The safeguarding of the lives of people and this defensive system we have neglected to the extent that we are spending no more than one mill out of each civil defense dollar. Our civil defense spending is less than one-thousandth of our total defense expenditures and that certainly is_wrong.

Mr. WHALEN. I conclude from your comments that your rationale for going ahead with the Washington site is the advancement in the state of the art which it will provide?

Mr. TELLER. This is precisely what I meant to convey.

ABILITY OF U.S. BOMBERS TO PENETRATE USSR

Mr. WHALEN. In your comments a few moments ago, you stated the ability of our bombers to penetrate Russia's defense is doubtful. In your opinion, in view of that, should the Congress go ahead with both the Trident and B-1 systems? Do we need both?

Mr. TELLER. Sir, to the extent I can answer, I believe the answer is yes. However, I do not consider myself an expert on the subject. I do not want you to pay a great deal of attention to my answer, which is a slightly educated guess.

SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

Mr. WHALEN. Dr. Teller, I was quite surprised by your reference to the Russian civil defense document, which I have not read. You indicated, I believe, if the plans are carried out that the loss of life would be approximately 4 percent?

Mr. TELLER. The maximum possible loss of life will be 4 percent. However, if the Russians succeed in their antisubmarine warfare efforts, if they catch our missiles on the ground, if in some crash program and in violation of the present treaty, they deploy missile defense, if their counter measures against our bombers are successful-and they are making efforts in all these directions-then their losses may be cut to a completely negligible number.

Mr. WHALEN. So, the 4-percent figure is based on a combination of defensive actions rather than just civil defense?

Mr. TELLER. No; the 4-percent figure is based on civil defense alone and on the assumption that our retaliatory strike is fully successful. Mr. WHALEN. This retaliatory strike-how long would it take from a launching pad here in the United States to one of the cities in Russia? Mr. TELLER. I believe in the order of 30 minutes.

Mr. WHALEN. So, this could be accomplished successfully in 30 minutes at a cost of at most 4 percent?

Mr. TELLER. The estimate of the Russian casualties, if we launch everything we can launch and if the Russian defense measures are essentially unsuccessful, but if they will have evacuated

Mr. WHALEN. According to plan?

Mr. TELLER. According to plan then their losses, as far as I know, will be limited to 4 percent, and that is the best estimate I could find.

Now, the estimate may be wrong. It may be 5 percent; it may be 3 percent; but it is in that order. It goes with the assumption that the only thing that has worked for them is civil defense.

Mr. WHALEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Kazen.

Mr. KAZEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TIME FRAME FOR PROTECTING POPULATION

Doctor, to continue with this line of questioning, I understood you to say earlier that the evacuation under the Russian plan was based on 48 hours' notice; was I correct in that?

Mr. TELLER. You are accurate.

Mr. KAZEN. Then if it only takes 30 minutes to deliver a retaliatory strike, wouldn't the casualty figure be a lot higher than the 4 percent? Mr. TELLER. In that case, the casualty figure would be much higher than 4 percent. I made one assumption and one statement. I assume that the United States will not engage in a first strike. I assume that the Russians will not strike us without having put their population into a safe position and, finally, I don't assume but I argue that, indeed, we must never plan on a first strike. This would be the greatest crime that I can imagine.

Mr. KAZEN. The converse of that would be any evacuation plan that we would have would not be effective against an unknown first strike or without any lead time or notice to our people?

Mr. TELLER. This is true and it is true that an evacuation plan, I would rather say a counter evacuation plan, an evacuation which occurs because the Russians have started first

Mr. KAZEN. After the first strike?

EXAMPLE: HURRICANE EVACUATIONS

Mr. TELLER. No. After their evacuation. If we notice the Russians are evacuating, we should start evacuation, also.

Mr. KAZEN. I see your point.

You were talking of the various hurricanes we had and the success of evacuating people. There we had advance notice.

Mr. TELLER. We have 24-hour notice; we have 48-hour notice. Such notice is essential. I do not want to tell you that if we have a counterevacuation plan, then we shall be safe. We are living in a dangerous world and complete safety is not something that I know how to achieve. But we can provide against the most plausible of dangers and the most plausible of dangers is a Russian threat or a Russian plan to attack us under conditions where they put their people into safety first.

Mr. KAZEN. I see.

FREEZING U.S. DISADVANTAGES

Now, Dr. Teller, these agreements freeze our present disadvantage, according to your statement, and we are agreeing that we are frozen in a disadvantageous position?

Mr. TELLER. Yes.

Mr. KAZEN. The agreements have left the door open for the Russians to catch up with us and surpass us in any field where we are still

ahead?

Mr. TELLER. That, I think, is correct.

Mr. KAZEN. So, the only justification, then, for approving the agreements is that in the absence of treaties and agreements the Russian advantage would grow faster if we didn't do it?

Mr. TELLER. That is correct.

Mr. KAZEN. That, to me, sounds like possibly these agreements are not in our best interest.

COSTS OF THE ALTERNATIVE COURSE

Mr. TELLER. Sir, there is an alternative course. Appropriate at least $10 billion per year for deployment of additional aggressive weapons. I don't think you will do it; I do not recommend strongly that you should do it; it is a very serious step to take and in view of this alternative I agree with those who say that we should be satisfied with the quantitative disadvantage that we now have.

Now, let me make another point.

It is often stated that we are engaged in an arms race and one usually thinks of an arms race where one can count arms on one side and the other side and compare them. We are only partly engaged in an arms race. We are much more engaged in a technology race, in a race of ideas.

Instead of spending $10 billion per year on things that we already know how to do, I would rather spend two billion, two additional billion dollars a year on finding out how to behave better and more appropriately.

I argue for that not only because of increased safety but also because that research will strengthen our civilian economy, as well.

Mr. KAZEN. I agree fully we should put more money in research and not cut back on defense research because of the various reasons you give and, in addition to others that exist. But when we do find whatever the results are from this research, it will then take many years to implement the findings of that research, will it not? Mr. TELLER. That is correct.

Mr. KAZEN. And by that time, if we are putting it on the basis of advantages, the Russians would be way ahead of us. I don't believe we are ever going to have the lead time that we had in World War II to gear up. That time has gone.

Mr. TELLER. That, unfortunately, is correct.

Mr. KAZEN. Then the only salvation that we would have is to find new ways and this means increase our research programs.

Mr. TELLER. This is, indeed, one of the points which I am strongly recommending.

Chairman MORGAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Thomson.

Mr. THOMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DIRECTION OF U.S. DEFENSE RESEARCH

In that same line, Dr. Teller, who would you recommend to direct and conduct the research you are recommending?

Mr. TELLER. The man in charge of defense research and engineering is John Foster. He has occupied that position for 7 years. He is a dedicated man. He is a highly intelligent man. He has this responsibility and he should retain that responsibility.

Mr. THOMSON. You are suggesting the Defense Department should come before Congress and ask for more money for advance research?

Mr. TELLER. The Defense Department has come before Congress and their research requests that were formulated prior to the treaty at the time when the argument for it was less, has been cut back by half a billion dollars.

The first thing to do is to put the half billion dollars back.

The second thing to do is to ask John Foster to come and talk to you and explain to you why he hasn't asked for more. I think you will hear an interesting story from him.

Mr. THOMSON. Thank you very much, doctor.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Wolff.

PROBLEMS OF EVACUATION

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I must say, Dr. Teller, yours is a very provocative statement and the answers you have given to our questions are certainly thoughtcompelling.

I must say, as well, that I want to compliment you on your confidence in the Members in Congress in being able to receive certain information that we have not been privy to in the past.

I have some reservations, however, on the thoughts you have of evacuation. I wonder whether or not you have been in a traffic jam in Washington or New York City or a weekend traffic jam in the way of trying to evacuate in 48 hours the cities of our Nation. It would prove a difficult task, I am afraid.

Mr. TELLER. Sir, I am not one of the truly exceptional individuals who have never been in a traffic jam.

I would also say, however, that while we are evacuating cities, we should prohibit practically all in-coming traffic. That alone

Mr. WOLFF. Wouldn't that cause our whole machinery of government and economy to fall apart at that point?

Mr. TELLER. If we are on the point of an immediate threat of a Russian attack, a lot of things will fall apart and the question is what still hangs together.

NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL AND SMALLER POWERS

Mr. WOLFF. One of the points that you make that I think is a very important one is the question of nuclear blackmail.

This treaty we are signing between ourselves and the Soviets, we have not included the Chinese. One other area that hasn't been mentioned is, with the spread of breeder reactors, the creation of large amounts of excess plutonium. This will make available to smaller

countries of this world the ability to become a member of the nuclear club.

How do you feel about the whole question of these small powers and the availability of or the potential they will possess?

Mr. TELLER. We have a nonproliferation treaty which the Chinese have not signed, which some others haven't signed, and which may not be observed by every country which has signed it.

I am worried about smaller powers and this is, indeed, one of the very important reasons why missile defense must be established around Washington, D.C.

Mr. WOLFF. When you talk of missile defense and you are talking of the improved safeguard system, isn't it true the radar acquisition can be blinded for a period of time by decoys, chaff, or something of a like nature? The system is absolutely useless in the event you have either a MIRV attack or a large concentration attack?

Mr. TELLER. Indeed, if we are going to receive a very massive attack, then the defense system that is now permissible according to the agreement would not be sufficient. Washington will not be defended against the Russians.

THE MEANING OF NUMBERS

Mr. WOLFF. Isn't that contradictory to the statement you made that the numbers don't mean anything?

Mr. TELLER. Sir, I am glad I have not made an oversimplified statement that was completely free of all minor contradictions.

Numbers do mean something. When I compare a 50-percent advantage of the Russians in the number of missiles or even a fourfold advantage, I do say 50 percent means nothing and the fourfold advantage means practically nothing.

But when you talk about a small power or even the Chinese, there the numbers we will have to face will be and will remain for a number of years considerably smaller and those numbers have an important meaning. For at least the next decade-if I am optimistic, I might even say for the rest of the century-we might hope to be able to handle the attack by the amount of defensive power in our hands. Other nations will not challenge us very soon.

ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

Mr. WOLFF. On one point of the smaller nations, it has been bandied about that Israel possesses nuclear capability.

Would you comment on that?

Mr. TELLER. I have visited Israel on several occasions. I have, of course, not discussed with them any classified material and I made it perfectly clear to my friends that anything that they will tell me will not be held in confidence. I found out precisely nothing about the subject that you mention.

Chairman MORGAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Steele.

Mr. STEELE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.