mained to be addressed by the negotiators. The main issues were two: how much limitation of offensive forces could be agreed, and how to formulate mutually acceptable specific limitations on ABM's.

SALT AGREEMENTS: CONTRIBUTE TO STRATEGIC BALANCE

The two agreements reached as a result of the ensuing year of negotiating on these difficult questions will contribute to maintaining a stable strategic balance and thereby reduce the likelihood of nuclear

war.

In the ABM Treaty, both sides have committed themselves not to build nationwide or heavy ABM defenses. The importance of this undertaking is fundamental. It places both sides in a position where neither will have a substantial defense against major missile attacks. In effect, we agree to maintain mutual deterrence.

I am convinced that the possibility of nuclear war has been dramatically reduced as a result of the ABM Treaty.

BASIC PROVISIONS REVIEWED

I think it would be useful now, Mr. Chairman, for me to run through some of the basic provisions of the two agreements. I will not go into detail since the committee has before it the documents transmitted by the President, which include a detailed article-by-article analysis.

As I said at the beginning, at the conclusion of my remarks, Ambassador Smith will be glad to join with me in answering questions. Our aim in both agreements has been-where necessary-to put detailed obligations in the texts of the agreements themselves.

If one of the sides had a preference for including clarifying material or elaboration in agreed interpretations, and this was sufficient, that approach was used.

The agreed interpretations include initialed statements and other common understandings. They have been included in the President's transmittal package to the Congress.

The transmittal package also included formal unilateral statements of U.S. views in certain cases where agreement could not be reached. There are, Mr. Chairman, and I want to make it clear there are no secret agreements.

What we have submitted to the Congress represents the agreements that were reached between the Soviet Union and the United States.

THE ABM TREATY

Let me start with the ABM Treaty. It is a definitive agreement of unlimited duration, the central feature of which is the commitment by both sides to no more than a low level of ABM defenses, at two small and widely separated locations.

The treaty permits deployment of one ABM complex in an ICBM deployment area, and one for defense of the National Command Authority. There can be no more than 100 ABM launchers and an equal number of associated interceptors at each complex, for a total of 200. Strict limitations are placed on ABM radars, a matter of particular importance since radars are the long leadtime item in deployment of an ABM system.

Important limitations are also placed on deployment of certain nonABM radars to contain their potential for application to an ABM role.

Because of the tehcnical complexity of the radar issues, intense and protracted negotiation was required to resolve them.

QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON ABM'S

The commitment to low ABM levels is further enhanced by several important qualitative limitations. We and the Soviet Union have agreed not to develop, test, or deploy:

1. ABM systems or components that are sea based, air based, space based, or mobile land based;

2. Automatic or semiautomatic or other similar systems for rapid reloading of ABM launchers;

3. An interceptor missile with more than one independently guided warhead; and

4. An ABM launcher capable of launching more than one interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, or to modify launchers to give them such a capability.

Such undertakings are important. It may be of even greater importance that both sides have agreed that future types of ABM systems based on different physical principles, for example, systems depending on such devices as lasers, that do not consist of ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars, cannot be deployed even in permitted areas. So there is a limitation on what may be employed in the ABM systems now in operation and it prohibits the deployment of new esoteric systems in these areas.

I might note, Mr. Chairman, that limiting ABM's to these low levels will increase the deterrent value of each of our offensive missiles for retaliatory purposes. In the long term it should be possible to achieve greater deterrence at a lower cost.

One of our principal aims in SALT has been to reduce tensions, uncertainties, and high costs which go hand in hand with an upward spiralling strategic arms competition.

We could have maintained a strong strategic posture without the SALT agreements, but in that event, beyond continued expenditures for maintaining a sufficient defense posture in the circumstances of a very low level of Soviet ABM deployment, there would have been heavy pressures as a result of unconstrained arms competition to spend additional billions of dollars for widespread ABM systems and greater offensive forces.

COST SAVINGS FROM SALT AGREEMENTS

Cost savings from these first SALT agreements will be limited initially. It is not possible to predict when particularly significant savings can be achieved, but this is certainly our aim.

The agreements which have been achieved will result in break in the cycle of action and reaction in the strategic arms area, which, until now, has been a principal factor in pushing the strategic arms race. In the agreements there is a general undertaking not to provide an ABM capability to non-ABM systems. One important aspect of this

prohibits the upgrading of antiaircraft systems to provide them with an ABM capability.

Conversion or testing of non-ABM systems, or components of such systems, to perform an ABM role is prohibited. This further reinforces the prohibition on a nationwide ABM defense.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

In order to monitor compliance with the undertakings in the ABM Treaty, and in the Interim Agreement, it has been agreed to rely on national technical means of verification.

The provisions of the agreements were developed so that we could rely for verification on such national means. Modern national technical means of verification provide the most practical and effective assurances of compliance.

Mr. Chairman, we have full confidence that we can adequately verify the agreements by the use of our national technical means of verification.

I believe it important to point out the very basic commitment that each side not interfere with the other's national technical means of verification and not use deliberate concealment to hinder or impede the effectiveness of these means of verification.

I have mentioned the importance we attach to a continuing and developing strategic dialog with the U.S.S.R. to lend support to what has been achieved, and to assist the effort to place additional limitations on strategic arms in the future.

A manifestation of this is another significant "first" in AmericanSoviet arms control.

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

A Standing Consultative Commission to be established under the treaty will consider, on a regular basis, such matters as the operations of the treaty and questions of compliance.

Also, the commission will have as one of its tasks to consider proposals to enhance the viability of the treaty.

Although the ABM Treaty is of unlimited duration, it contains a withdrawal clause under which either party can withdraw on 6 months' notice if it ever decided that extraordinary events relating to the subject matter of the treaty had jeopardized its supreme interests.

An appreciation of the impact of the ABM Treaty obligations is fundamental to a sound judgment of the merits of the two agreements looked at together.

Achieving limitations on strategic offensive forces in conjunction with the ABM Treaty assuredly enhances the importance of the overall achievement.

THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

The interrelationship between limitations on both the offensive and defensive sides of the strategic equation, which we have continued to stress, is reflected in the intention expressed in the agreements to con tinue active negotiations to limit strategic arms.

U.S. views as to the particular importance of the offense-defense relationship were contained in a formal statement made by Ambassador Smith, which set forth the position of this Government that if an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within 5 years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized, and should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

This right of withdrawal protects U.S. security interests if the follow-on negotiations do not succeed and if the strategic situation should develop in such a way that we felt the need to exercise our withdrawal right.

Before turning to the Interim Agreement, I want to make one point which is perhaps not fully appreciated.

NEED FOR PROCEEDING WITH NCA ABM SYSTEM

Questions have been raised as to the need for proceeding now with the second ABM site-that is, at the NCA-permitted under the treaty.

The administration believes we should move forward now with that site. We believe it prudent, as early as possible, to have this form of insurance against a situation where, because of our inability to assess the nature of an attack and thus to make timely decisions, an unwanted nuclear exchange could be triggered.

This is not a population protection defense. Its mission would be to protect the national command authority against an unauthorized or accidental strike. Its radars would also afford additional warning in case of a general nuclear attack.

THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOL

Let me now, Mr. Chairman, briefly discuss the Interim Agreement and its associated protocol. The Interim Agreement essentially freezes for up to 5 years the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers on each side.

This curbs the momentum of the Soviet offensive missile launcher buildup, but places no limitations on ongoing or planned U.S. offensive programs.

Under the agreement, the future effectiveness of our retaliatory deterrent can be insured. The Interim Agreement freeze is limited in duration and scope.

However, it provides time and creates a good basis for further negotiations. It is our hope that it will be replaced well before 5 years by a more comprehensive agreement.

The agreement includes a basic undertaking not to construct additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers, and not to convert launchers for light or older ICBM's into launchers for heavy or modern ICBM's. Thus, the numbers both of light and heavy IBČM launchers cannot be increased.

The fact that the agreement does not specify the number of ICBM's operational and under construction when it was signed is not of importance, since the construction of even one new ICBM for operational purposes is banned.

When we made clear to the Soviet Union that we consider their number of ICBM's to be 1618, they did not dissent. But the point is that no further ICBM launchers may be constructed.

LIMITS ON SLBM LAUNCHERS

SLBM launchers are frozen at present levels, except that additional such launchers can be built so long as they replace older strategic launchers on a one-for-one basis.

A ceiling on operational modern submarines-Y-class nuclearpowered submarines for the U.S.S.R. has been set at 62. A ceiling for SLBM launchers for the U.S.S.R. has been set at 950, to include all launchers on nuclear-powered submarines-Y-class and H-class submarines, and modern launchers on older submarines-G-class dieselpowered submarines.

The Soviets are permitted no more than 740 launchers on nuclearpowered submarines of any type, operational and under construction, except as replacements in accordance with agreed procedures for other older strategic launchers.

The figure 740 is a negotiated figure; it establishes a clear and unambiguous baseline which avoids uncertainty or debate over the definition of "under construction."

Thus, the first SLBM launcher after the 740th launcher must be a replacement. The older ICBM or SLBM launcher being replaced will have to be dismantled beginning no later than the date on which the submarine containing the 741st launcher begins sea trials.

Launchers for modern SLBM's on the G-class diesel-powered submarines would also have to be included in the 950 SLBM launcher ceiling.

Both sides may improve their missile forces through modernization and replacement. The restriction against converting launchers for light or older heavy ICBM's to launchers for modern heavy ICBM's, however, places significant restrictions on the U.S.S.R.

Conversion of our ICBM launchers to handle Minuteman III missiles and conversion of Polaris submarines to handle Poseidon missiles by contrast, is not prohibited.

Modernization may relate both to launchers and missiles. There is an agreed interpretation that the dimensions of launchers will not be significantly increased through modernization, and a further understanding that the word "significant" prohibits an increase in a launcher dimension greater than 10-15 percent.

AREAS NOT COVERED BY AGREEMENTS

We were unable to reach agreement on a definition for a heavy missile. In the end, our delegation made a formal unilateral statement that the United States "would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM."

The Interim Agreement does not cover all strategic delivery vehicles. For example, aircraft are not limited. Mr. Chairman, the United States has a very large advantage in this area. The Interim Agreement also does not cover systems not presently in existence. An