SOVIET MISSILE NUMBERS FROZEN BY PACT

Ambassador SMITH. I would like to say, Mr. Steele, we have not provided through this agreement that the Soviets will have more missiles.

This is a fact of life that existed on the 26th of May when the agreements were signed. I think it should be made perfectly clear that we have not, by agreement, set a definitive limitation on the number of Soviet missiles.

We agreed to a freeze, that they could not build more. At the time, they had more launchers than the United States in the ICBM field. If they wanted to reduce that margin in the ICBM field, they could modernize their forces by building more SLBM's. In the MIRV field, we tried to get agreement there but were not successful.

We sought the freeze arrangement in order to continue negotiations on the offensive side. As I told Mr. Fraser, we have not received any definite guidance as to what we will be going for, but perhaps we can get further restraints, possibly including MIRV's.

In the meantime, even if this agreement went to its full term, 5 years, which I hope it will not, I hope it will be supplanted by a treaty long before that. It is my belief the Soviets, not yet having tested a MIRV, are going to be far from MIRVing their entire force by the end of the 5 years, and we will retain an advantage in that respect during the whole period of 5 years.

Mr. STEELE. We are betting our assessment is right. If it is not right, it could be a problem, could it not?

IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET MIRV'S

Secretary ROGERS. It could be a problem. I think basically no matter how many MIRV's the Soviets have, the American total deterrent is going to remain integral and firm.

The Soviet MIRV's are important from the point of view of Minuteman vulnerability. They are not important from the point of view of submarine survival capability.

No matter how many submarines they have, the American Poseidon, with Minuteman and our tremendous advantage in manned bombers will together preserve the integrity of our deterrent.

Mr. STEELE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Culver.

NEED FOR PUBLIC INFORMATION ON ARMS CONTROL

Mr. CULVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Smith, I also would like to join in the tributes paid to you this morning for your most dedicated work in this area and also to commend you and your able staff on these painstaking and protracted negotiations and their ultimate fruition in these agreements being recommended to the Congress.

I don't think you will have any difficulty recalling on March 9 before this committee we had a rather spirited exchange concerning the adequacy as viewed by some of us on this committee and the effectiveness of the public relations program of your agency.

I think Mr. Bingham indicated the concern we have essentially is that the American public be afforded the opportunity to be edu

cated in this field in some comparable way with the type of information they have been exposed to in the entire postwar period from the defense establishment of our national government.

I know you provided information for the record.

I was a little concerned when I was in Europe following our discussions on this subject. I had the opportunity to meet your most charming daughter. She approached me in a hotel in Brussels. She said, "You are Congressman Culver, aren't you?"

I said, "Yes," and I was rather startled, not being a common household word in this country, that she recognized me there or anywhere else.

She came up and said that she had attended one March hearing and wasn't used to having her father talked to in that fashion. I felt particularly badly that after several years of tough negotiating with the Soviet Union, she should feel my remarks with you on that occasion merited that distinction.

Secretary ROGERS. I wish you could meet my daughter. [Laughter.]

STUDIES ON NUCLEAR ATTACK CONSEQUENCES

Mr. CULVER. One question by way of followup on the adequacy and, indeed, the availability of reports or studies done on the subject of trying to scientifically assess the political, the ecological, and social train of events which might plausibly follow from the detonation of just one megaton bomb in just one modern city in this country or in the world.

It seems we have relatively reliable estimates of what might ensue in the first few hours in terms of physical destruction and megadeaths, but there is nothing, I understand, available on the social and economic disintegration.

At this point, ignorance and unsupported speculation seems to descend on all of us. It seems to me, in view of the fact that nuclear power has been with us some three decades, that it is an appropriate time for your agency to try to help educate the American people and, indeed the world, on this most vital subject and perhaps it would be appropriate if studies were initiated into the kind of degree of society left if the bombs did go off.

I think this would serve to enforce the vital and critical importance of the work involved. Here, I would be interested to know if you have that kind of information or have given any kind of attention to that

area.

DIFFICULTY WITH BARGAINING CHIPS

I also share the difficulty that you have already heard expressed this morning by Mr. Bingham and others on bargaining chips.

What appears to be the basic inconsistency in the proposed SALT agreements and in the 1973 Defense budgets? I know you have been asked that but I am still uneasy about the answers the committee has been provided with.

The real issue is how can we justify the arms limitation agreements and at the same time asking Congress for greater and more weapons systems. It seems you say one thing in favor of the arms accord and then turn around and say quite the opposite for more weapons systems.

How do you now come before the Congress and ask for more weapons programs, not before but after the Moscow agreements which was supposed to be won from a bargaining chip strategy, although the Russians by your own agreements have the momentum on their side 5 years hence minus the SALT agreements?

I noted in response to your answer to Mr. Bingham's question you talked about the ABM being a bargaining chip of sorts against their superior missile capabilities and so on. I am troubled by the nuances of this kind of exchange, frankly.

I start with a more fundamental assumption that the name of the game is a creditable deterrent capability and that we assess the strength and credibility of that on the basis of our capacity to withstand the first strike and still enjoy the capacity to inflict even greater death and destruction on any adversary who would be so foolish or unwise either by design or accident to launch an attack on us.

OVERKILL AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW SYSTEMS

It seems to me that is the conventional consideration, the fundamental one, and I am a little troubled at what I sense is a very basic inconsistency here if we have, as most of us are led to believe through our briefings, fortunately, a degree of overkill, the capacity to inflict many times over this kind of deterrent consequence on any kind of enemy in the world.

Why, then, are we talking about the acceleration in all these new systems at these staggering costs as needed to maintain this edge?

I was concerned when Mr. Rogers talked, in response to Mr. Fraser's question, about sufficiency and equivalency. I don't think those two terms in the context of nucelar arms discussions should be confused or be interpreted to mean the same thing.

Sufficiency is the key, not equivalency, whether we are talking about a quantitative or qualitative superiority. You mentioned yourself you were persuaded the U.S.S.R. was not going for a first-strike capability. In fairness, I will let you elaborate on that, but I thought that was the case.

Mr. Rogers said the rest of the world has to look and see whether instability will be created if they feel the Soviet Union is developing this superior margin.

Well, the Soviet Union could not be more sophisticated in their intelligence on our true capability.

SMITH TO BRIEF ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

I was also concerned when you said you never appeared before the House Armed Services Committee; is that correct?

Ambassador SMITH. I believe that is correct.

Mr. CULVER. It is also disturbing if we are going to try to have this correlation which I think we must have in our efforts for a meaningful reduction in the arms race and have a meaningful regulation to the Defense budget.

Ambassador SMITH. I understand I have an invitation to appear next week.

Mr. CULVER. I hope so. I would suggest to the committee it be extended if you don't have it.

Could we talk about this bargaining chip business? I have rambled on too much, but maybe there is something there you could respond to. Secretary ROGERS. I am not sure I can add to what I said.

NEEDS FOR EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC POSTURE

Ambassador SMITH. As I answered Governor Thomson, Mr. Culver, I don't like the term "bargaining chip." I don't think I have used it. I think we have sufficient forces in being and in prospect to do two things:

One, to be sure that there is an adequate capability for retaliatory action after a first strike; and the other to be capable of such action in the eyes of our allies and third countries around the world. There are two functions-military and psychological.

I think the questions with regard to new systems relate to the fact this is a dynamic situation.

We today have survivable forces, and I think as a result of the ABM Treaty they are going to have greater penetration capability than would have been the case had the Soviets deployed a large ABM system.

That represents an extraordinary increase in our security. The penetration problem is largely gone. The question is survivability, and we have that now in our forces. Will we have it in the 1980's?

We are not talking about developing forces like Trident for operation in the 1970's. We have to prepare for the longer range future, and I understand that is the purpose of these new programs.

PRESIDENT'S ESTIMATES OF SOVIET FORCES

Mr. CULVER. In his press conference in late June, President Nixon said, had the Moscow agreements not been reached he was prepared to ask Congress for a $15 billion, I believe, crash program for nuclear strategic weapons.

Such an increase would have pushed the 1973 defense budget over $100 billion, in that neighborhood. The reason the President gave for this startling figure was that had there been no arms agreements the Soviets called for an increase in their ABM's of 1,000 over the next few years and the arms agreements limit them to 200 as it does us.

Had there been no arms control agreements-this is, the most important part-in terms of strategic weapons, the Soviet Union-that has not passed us-they would have built 1,000 more over the next 5 years. Where did the President get his figures, 1,000 ABM interceptors, over 90 subs, 1,000 more offensive missiles?

Were these figures backed up by intelligence and so forth?

Ambassador SMITH. I understand that on the offensive side these were straight extrapolations of past Soviet building rates and are well within the Soviet capabilities.

I think on the ABM side this was derived from intelligence estimates of the past.

Mr. CULVER. Can you tell us what was the national intelligence estimate for the next 5 years, for these three systems for the Soviet Union? Ambassador SMITH. Not in open session; no, sir.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We will have an executive session.

Mr. CULVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Whalen?

THE WASHINGTON ABM SITE

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Secretary, I would like to pursue further this question of the Washington ABM site.

It seems to me the agreement reached in Moscow was designed to accommodate two varying concepts of the utilization of ABM systems. The administration already rejected one of these concepts, and I quote in part from President Nixon's statement made on March 14, 1969. It says:

The heaviest defense system we considered, one designed to protect our major cities, still could not prevent a catastrophic level of U.S. casualties from a deliberate Soviet attack.

In discussing the ABM sites, has the U.S. changed its views?
Secretary ROGERS. No.

Mr. WHALEN. If a population-protection system is deemed ineffective, it is difficult for me to see why the Washington site is proposed. Certainly, I think there is no objection to including this in a treaty if the Soviets want to use this concept. But I don't think it is necessary that we go ahead if, indeed, we find a population-protection system ineffective, as the President stated in March of 1969.

Secretary ROGERS. What the President said at that time was that it would not be totally effective. But we think as we did then that the NCA would be effective in the event of an accidental launch or certainly would be effective in detecting a major launch because it would give us more radar capability.

NCA OFFENSE NOT TO SAVE POPULATION

Mr. WHALEN. You mention this on page 21 of your statement. Let's talk first of the detection.

Don't we have adequate detection devices, devices which, indeed, can detect a missile launch almost from the time the launch is made? It seems to me this rationale would be redundant.

Ambassador SMITH. Mr. Whalen, if I may go back to your other question, the President in 1969 was talking about a general defense of the United States and concluding that it was not possible to protect the population of the United States.

The NCA defense that we are talking about here is not aimed at defending the population of Washington.

Mr. WHALEN. It is aimed at defending people, not just the Pentagon?

PROTECTION AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED LAUNCH

Ambassador SMITH. No; it is aimed at protecting the command and control system for a short period, to permit prudent decisions to be made if an attack is the result of an unauthorized launch of a few missiles.

If Washington is destroyed, a decision might be made to go to general nuclear war, which would be a catastrophe. The purpose of this system is to buy a short amount of time during which the com