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Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Monagan?

Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I am delighted that we have reached this stage in these negotiations and certainly there could be no more significant objective for the major powers than to bring about some control of the use of nuclear weapons and I also want to express my appreciation as a Member of Congress for the dedicated efforts of Ambassador Smith through this whole long period of negotiations.

I think that he has made a great contribution to the Nation in this work.

POSSIBILITIES FOR LAUNCHER IMPROVEMENT

This communication to the Congress from the President says that the agreement provides for restriction of 5 years on strategic offensive missile launcher deployments.

I think it is true, however, that this does not act as a complete straitjacket on the Russians, isn't that so?

There are certain things they can do under this agreement?
Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Zablocki referred to the mobile launchers. You said that Mr. Brezhnev indicated that they were going to go ahead with certain developments. What was he referring to at that time, specifically?

Secretary ROGERS. He was referring to the fact that they intend to continue construction of their offensive weapons within the limitations prescribed by the Interim Agreement.

We didn't go into the details, of course; what he is saying, in effect, is, you understand that there are limitations on the construction of offensive weapons and we are going to continue to do what we can within those limitations.

We indicated we would, too.

LIMITATION ON NUMBERS OF LAUNCHERS

Mr. MONAGAN. Now, there is a limitation on the overall number of launchers, is that so?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Mr. MONAGAN. Within that limitation, is it a fact that the heavy launchers are at a stage where that number can be increased?

Secretary ROGERS. No.

Mr. MONAGAN. There is no leeway between the number that exists at the present time and the limitation?

Secretary ROGERS. On the ICBM launchers, they cannot start any new construction of those launchers. They can improve within the present system so they could increase the number of warheads on a missile but they cannot build or start construction on any new ICBM silos.

Mr. MONAGAN. The number of warheads could be increased by modernization?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, just as we can.

Mr. MONAGAN. Is that a serious defect in this whole agreement? Secretary ROGERS. It is not a defect in the agreement, it is a recognition that we have not reached a comprehensive agreement on offensive weapons yet.

That is why we are going to have a second phase of the SALT talks. Mr. MONAGAN. It does, in your opinion, leave something further to be desired in a substantial way?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sure.

INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIETS

Mr. MONAGAN. Also involved in this whole matter, I think, is the credibility of the negotiators. There are indications and activities elsewhere of the U.S.S.R. that clearly show that they are willing to move ahead in rather dangerous proceedings.

Ambassador, what is your appraisal?

Do you believe there is a serious, bona fide desire on the part of the Government of the U.S.S.R. to bring about real progress in controlling these weapons?

Ambassador SMITH. Yes, I do, Mr. Monagan.

I think that regardless of what Soviet policy in other areas is, and hopefully it will be more constructive after the summit meeting than before, they do have a purpose to control strategic arms with us.

They have, I think, succeeded in compartmenting to some extent their strategic arms policy and I think they realize it is in their interests to avoid a completely unlimited competition in strategic arms.

Mr. MONAGAN. And the civilian aspect of the Government of the U.S.S.R. is effective in persuading the military that this is an objective that should be pursued?

Secretary ROGERS. We are not sure how they do it, but we are sure of the conclusion Ambassador Smith just mentioned. I don't think there is any doubt about that conclusion.

Mr. MONAGAN. I am delighted that that is the appraisal and I certainly want to express my hopes that we will move ahead and into the other areas and that we can continue to achieve concrete results. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. du Pont?

VERIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENTS

Mr. DU PONT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, some of the other Members have touched briefly on the question of policing and I think some of the questions I have had best wait for an executive session.

But, in article 5 of the Interim Agreement on the limitation of offensive arms, and I believe in some other places, the phrase crops up concerning verification, technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

I am not sure I understand that. What do you have in mind, what are you ruling out when you are talking about generally recognized principles of international law?

Secretary ROGERS. This was the subject of long debate. I will let Ambassador Smith answer that.

Ambassador SMITH. Perhaps one example will answer your question. There is a technical means of verification which you will recall as being designated the U-2. I think the use of U-2's over the So

viet Union would not be considered in accordance with international law.

Secretary ROGERS. Does that make it clear?

Mr. DU PONT. Yes.

The other question in the same phrase, maybe I am hung up on semantics, but we keep talking about national technical means. Secretary ROGERS. That is opposed to on-site inspection. Mr. DU PONT. Or opposed to international?

NO ON-SITE INSPECTION

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, I suppose, but what we are really talking about is that there is no on-site inspection provided for. But we think the systems we have now for inspection are adequate without on-site inspection.

Mr. DU PONT. Was there any feeling on either side that international inspection or any kind of on-site inspection might be acceptable?

Secretary ROGERS. Certainly not any kind of international inspection, no. After a while we didn't press for on-site inspection. That was a subject of great discussion in previous negotiations. We didn't press it because we don't need it at the moment.

Mr. DU PONT. I have several other questions, but, Mr. Chairman, I think they would be best asked in an executive session.

Will an executive session be held to consider some of these questions? Mr. ZABLOCKI (presiding). I understand there will be an executive session.

Mr. DU PONT. Thank you.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fraser ?

SECRETARY LAIRD'S POSITION ON AGREEMENTS

Mr.FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, first I want to express my appreciation for the work and the success which has crowned that work in bringing these agreements to completion.

I think there are some minor problems with the agreements but I can't find any basis on which I could justify their rejection.

I think both are important agreements. I guess my concern is about the statements by Secretary Laird in which he said if the United States does not go forward on an accelerated program on the Trident or the new B-1 bomber, he would oppose these agreements.

That would be in violation of the agreements. It is possible that he is doing this for the internal politics of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I don't know, but I can't find anything in these agreements that justifies an accelerated program for the B-1 bomber or the Trident.

Can you throw any light on this?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, Mr. Fraser, I testified on this at some length in the Senate. What I said essentially was this: That, as I said a moment ago, it was understood by both the Soviet leaders and by the President and those of us on our side that we would proceed within the limitations permitted under the agreements.

In other words, proceed to construct those offensive systems we thought necessary for our national security as long as they didn't violate the Interim Agreement.

We do think that is important to do. We would not want to convey the impression to the Soviet Union that now that we signed these agreements we would not maintain a strong national defense capability.

We think it is important to proceed to maintain our strength until there is a more comprehensive agreement.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Secretary, let me phrase the question this way: What you are arguing or saying on behalf of the administration is we should proceed with whatever our security requires insofar as it is not in violation of the agreement?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

SECURITY REQUIREMENT FOR OVERKILL CAPACITY

Mr. FRASER. Now, since defensive capabilities have been sharply limited and since even those limited defensive capabilities are not constructed yet in the Soviet Union, the only ABM system they have is around Moscow and it is only partially completed; as I understand it, half the payload of one submarine could completely exhaust that defense capability and still have enough missiles in that one-half pavload to incinerate Moscow.

Since that is the situation, why do we have to build additional submarines and why do we have to build bombers since we have the capacity to impose on them virtually total destruction?

What is the security requirements for what one would call further overkill capacity?

Secretary ROGERS. I think to have the balance necessary for our security and also for continuing negotiations, we should maintain what we refer to as sufficiency, which means an equivalent to that the Soviet Union has.

Now, it is not easy to determine exactly what that should be, but we do think the programs that we advocate are in that order of magnitude and therefore we strongly support them.

A "BARGAINING CHIP" ARGUMENT

Mr. FRASER. May I just make the observation that you are now shifting your ground somewhat or adding a new basis?

You are now arguing that we also need this for bargaining purposes?

Secretary ROGERS. For both purposes: yes.

Mr. FRASER. I want to understand the first-that is what you originally said and I think we should pursue it. Why do we need additional submarines and a new bomber in view of the capacity we have now to destroy the Soviet Union?

Secretary ROGERS. Because we are convinced the reason we have been able to make progress in these negotiations and in the world situation generally, and one of the reasons we think the visit to Moscow succeeded, and one of the reasons we think the visit to the People's Republic of China was possible; that is, because we did maintain a defense capability that was sufficient to convince the world we were not going to fall behind the Soviet Union and we think it is important not to create any impression that we are behind, that we have become

a second-rate military power. Therefore, within the limitations of the agreements, we want to proceed with our defense capabilities.

No. 2, we also think that position will be helpful in our further negotiations. Otherwise, if the Soviet Union thinks we are in effect going to curtail our defense capabilities unilaterally, then there will be no particular incentive on their part to do it by a reciprocal arrangement.

That would add further to their zeal to move ahead in the offensive field and they would say:

Why bother working out a comprehensive limitation as long as it is happening anyway? We are moving ahead in this field, we are getting a lot stronger, the world can see what we are doing. The United States is standing still, why should we bother with an agreement?

Mr. FRASER. In both parts of your answer you come back to bargaining table. You have not indicated, since we have the power to destroy the Soviet Union, you have not answered why we need these additional weapons; you come to the bargaining chip in both cases. Why wouldn't you get that with a more protracted Trident development?

For instance, if we went ahead with the long-range missile development, if we stretched it out from a 7-year program to a 12-year program, for one thing, we don't know what we are building into the Trident in the way of providing a capability to avoid a vulnerability to our present submarine force which does not now exist.

In other words, we don't know why the Poseidon equipped submarine might be vulnerable or how. It isn't now. We don't know how it might become so. We are talking about a bigger submarine, bigger missiles, and we don't know what kind of hazard the present submarine may be exposed to.

I am not in favor of abandonment of the Trident program but in favor of a stretch-out. Leaving our intention clear, but saving our taxpayers money. But the Secretary wants a crash program. This is what I have difficulty understanding.

IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING SUFFICIENCY

Secretary ROGERS. I think it is important to keep in mind the fact. that we have been able to maintain what we contend is a balance or sufficiency; I think that has been an important point in diplomacy and brought a fair return.

If the other nations in the world, and the Soviet Union especially, came to the conclusion that they are way ahead of us militarily, it would be destabilizing.

Obviously I am not speaking of any particular program, whether it should be 5 years or 7 years. I see your point on that.

But I think the programs we have advocated are reasonable programs and I think in view of the fact we are succeeding in foreign affairs and we certainly are succeeding in our negotiations with the Russians, it would be a mistake to change our policy, to indicate now that we are prepared to be less than strong or that we are prepared to fall behind a bit.

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