The Reykjavik Process: Preparation for and Conduct of the Iceland Summit and Its Implications for Arms Control Policy : Report of the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-ninth Congress, Second SessionU.S. Government Printing Office, 1987 - 30 pages |
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Page 2
... weapons by the year 2000 in three stages , with the first stage ( 1986-1994 ) resulting in elimination of long - range INF ( LRINF ) missiles in Europe . The Soviet proposal also dropped their previous demand for compensa- tion for ...
... weapons by the year 2000 in three stages , with the first stage ( 1986-1994 ) resulting in elimination of long - range INF ( LRINF ) missiles in Europe . The Soviet proposal also dropped their previous demand for compensa- tion for ...
Page 4
... weapons from the " European zone . " They also withdrew their previous demands that British and French forces be frozen at current levels as part of the agree- ment . 5 Gorbachev hinted in the September letter that Soviet LRINF in ...
... weapons from the " European zone . " They also withdrew their previous demands that British and French forces be frozen at current levels as part of the agree- ment . 5 Gorbachev hinted in the September letter that Soviet LRINF in ...
Page 7
... weapons testing and a new one - year moratorium on all but the smallest nu- clear weapons tests ( providing the Soviets did likewise ) ; a hold on production of chemical weapons ; and maintaining SDI funding at last year's level plus ...
... weapons testing and a new one - year moratorium on all but the smallest nu- clear weapons tests ( providing the Soviets did likewise ) ; a hold on production of chemical weapons ; and maintaining SDI funding at last year's level plus ...
Page 9
... weapons in U.S. totals . However , the United States could not accept the Soviet formulation which would have led to unequal ceilings in the residual warheads . At that point , the working group called a recess for consultation . During ...
... weapons in U.S. totals . However , the United States could not accept the Soviet formulation which would have led to unequal ceilings in the residual warheads . At that point , the working group called a recess for consultation . During ...
Page 11
... weapons - the Soviets were insisting , as they had from the outset , that strategic offensive reductions be linked to constraints on strategic defense . With all but the final details to be worked out , an agreement on strategic arms ...
... weapons - the Soviets were insisting , as they had from the outset , that strategic offensive reductions be linked to constraints on strategic defense . With all but the final details to be worked out , an agreement on strategic arms ...
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
The Reykjavik Process: Preparation for and Conduct of the Iceland Summit and ... Affichage du livre entier - 1987 |
The Reykjavik Process: Preparation for and Conduct of the Iceland ..., Volume 4 Affichage du livre entier - 1987 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM Treaty agreed ALCM allies Ambassador arms control negotiations arms control policy arms control process Aspin ballistic missiles bomber bureaucracy Chairman chev Chiefs of Staff COMMITTEE ON ARMED Congress Congressional consultation control working group Defense Policy Panel deploy deployment Donald Regan draft eliminate all ballistic elimination of ballistic endnotes Geneva George Shultz Gorba gravity bombs ICBMs Iceland summit implications interagency John Poindexter Joint Chiefs kjavik LES ASPIN letter linked LRINF missiles Marshal Akhromeyev meeting ment missile warheads national security Nicholas Daniloff Nitze nuclear testing nuclear weapons October 14 offensive ballistic Paul Nitze political President Reagan President's press briefing Reagan Administration Reykjavik Reykjavik summit Richard Perle role SDI testing September session Shevardnadze side Soviet military Soviet position Soviet proposal Soviet Union strategic arms strategic defense strategic forces strategic offensive reductions Sunday talks tegic tion U.S. arms control U.S. military U.S. position U.S. proposal United verification White House zero
Fréquemment cités
Page 27 - If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there.") Perhaps a few distinctions — and questions — are in order.
Page 14 - I don't know when we will see each other again. GORBACHEV. I don't know what else I could have done. REAGAN. You could have said yes.
Page 5 - ... the following: First, both sides would agree to confine themselves through 1991 to research, development, and testing — which is permitted by the ABM treaty — to determine whether advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Second, a new treaty signed now would provide that if, after 1991, either side should decide to deploy such a system, that side would be obliged to offer a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defense and for eliminating offensive ballistic missiles.
Page 15 - ... beginning to be understood. We proposed the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history. We offered the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles — Soviet and American — from the face of the Earth by 1996. While we parted company with this American offer still on the table, we are closer than ever before to agreements that could lead to a safer world without nuclear weapons.
Page 30 - That the Soviet military have played an important, perhaps even formidable, role in the SALT process was evident in this concluding comment by Garthoff in his analysis of the Soviet military's participation in SALT negotiations : Soviet military participation in SALT planning and decisionmaking, and in the actual negotiations, has been active and vigorous at all levels. The effect of this active role has probably been to exert a conservative and cautious influence t positions, but it has not precluded...
Page 25 - If we agree that by the end of the ten-year period, all nuclear arms are to be eliminated, we can refer this to our delegations in Geneva to prepare an agreement that you could sign during your visit to the United States.
Page 25 - Shevardnadze, and the appropriate interpreters and notetakers, at the end of which a recess took place, and we convened with the President to hear the reaction of the Soviet side to the American proposal. It was here that we learned for the first time that the Soviets were insisting that we go far beyond the ABM Treaty and agree to limit all space research to the laboratory.
Page 7 - It still could be possible, however, for July. But if not then, later. But I have made one thing plain. The fall months of our election are not going to be months that I will agree to a summit, and I will stick with that. Q. So, sir, after June or July what is your next best time, December? November? The President. Well, I would think after the election, then.