The Reykjavik Process: Preparation for and Conduct of the Iceland Summit and Its Implications for Arms Control Policy : Report of the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-ninth Congress, Second SessionU.S. Government Printing Office, 1987 - 30 pages |
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... Staff Member WARREN L. NELSON , Professional Staff Member MYRA S. MCKITRICK , Fellow U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES , COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES ,. BILL NICHOLS , Alabama NICHOLAS MAVROULES , Massachusetts IKE SKELTON , Missouri DAVE ...
... Staff Member WARREN L. NELSON , Professional Staff Member MYRA S. MCKITRICK , Fellow U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES , COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES ,. BILL NICHOLS , Alabama NICHOLAS MAVROULES , Massachusetts IKE SKELTON , Missouri DAVE ...
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... Staff Member Warren L. Nelson, Professional Staff Member Myra S. McKrnucK, Fellow (ID .:,. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC,
... Staff Member Warren L. Nelson, Professional Staff Member Myra S. McKrnucK, Fellow (ID .:,. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC,
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... Staff ; Ambassador Paul Nitze , Special Assistant to the President on Arms Control ; Honorable James Schlesinger , former Secretary of Defense ; a panel of former nego- tiators ( Ambassador Paul Warnke , Ambassador Raymond L. Garth- off ...
... Staff ; Ambassador Paul Nitze , Special Assistant to the President on Arms Control ; Honorable James Schlesinger , former Secretary of Defense ; a panel of former nego- tiators ( Ambassador Paul Warnke , Ambassador Raymond L. Garth- off ...
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... Staff Donald Regan , supervised by the President himself . Members of the National Security Planning Group ( NSPG ) , a subset of the National Security Council , which includes representa- tives of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS ) ...
... Staff Donald Regan , supervised by the President himself . Members of the National Security Planning Group ( NSPG ) , a subset of the National Security Council , which includes representa- tives of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS ) ...
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... Staff , still failed to alert the United States to Soviet intentions . Akhromeyev's presence should have been a strong signal that the Soviets were anticipating flexibile negotiating on the most important strategic issues , requir- ing ...
... Staff , still failed to alert the United States to Soviet intentions . Akhromeyev's presence should have been a strong signal that the Soviets were anticipating flexibile negotiating on the most important strategic issues , requir- ing ...
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
The Reykjavik Process: Preparation for and Conduct of the Iceland Summit and ... Affichage du livre entier - 1987 |
The Reykjavik Process: Preparation for and Conduct of the Iceland ..., Volume 4 Affichage du livre entier - 1987 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM Treaty agreed ALCM allies Ambassador arms control negotiations arms control policy arms control process Aspin ballistic missiles bomber bureaucracy Chairman chev Chiefs of Staff COMMITTEE ON ARMED Congress Congressional consultation control working group Defense Policy Panel deploy deployment Donald Regan draft eliminate all ballistic elimination of ballistic endnotes Geneva George Shultz Gorba gravity bombs ICBMs Iceland summit implications interagency John Poindexter Joint Chiefs kjavik LES ASPIN letter linked LRINF missiles Marshal Akhromeyev meeting ment missile warheads national security Nicholas Daniloff Nitze nuclear testing nuclear weapons October 14 offensive ballistic Paul Nitze political President Reagan President's press briefing Reagan Administration Reykjavik Reykjavik summit Richard Perle role SDI testing September session Shevardnadze side Soviet military Soviet position Soviet proposal Soviet Union strategic arms strategic defense strategic forces strategic offensive reductions Sunday talks tegic tion U.S. arms control U.S. military U.S. position U.S. proposal United verification White House zero
Fréquemment cités
Page 27 - If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there.") Perhaps a few distinctions — and questions — are in order.
Page 14 - I don't know when we will see each other again. GORBACHEV. I don't know what else I could have done. REAGAN. You could have said yes.
Page 5 - ... the following: First, both sides would agree to confine themselves through 1991 to research, development, and testing — which is permitted by the ABM treaty — to determine whether advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Second, a new treaty signed now would provide that if, after 1991, either side should decide to deploy such a system, that side would be obliged to offer a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defense and for eliminating offensive ballistic missiles.
Page 15 - ... beginning to be understood. We proposed the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history. We offered the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles — Soviet and American — from the face of the Earth by 1996. While we parted company with this American offer still on the table, we are closer than ever before to agreements that could lead to a safer world without nuclear weapons.
Page 30 - That the Soviet military have played an important, perhaps even formidable, role in the SALT process was evident in this concluding comment by Garthoff in his analysis of the Soviet military's participation in SALT negotiations : Soviet military participation in SALT planning and decisionmaking, and in the actual negotiations, has been active and vigorous at all levels. The effect of this active role has probably been to exert a conservative and cautious influence t positions, but it has not precluded...
Page 25 - If we agree that by the end of the ten-year period, all nuclear arms are to be eliminated, we can refer this to our delegations in Geneva to prepare an agreement that you could sign during your visit to the United States.
Page 25 - Shevardnadze, and the appropriate interpreters and notetakers, at the end of which a recess took place, and we convened with the President to hear the reaction of the Soviet side to the American proposal. It was here that we learned for the first time that the Soviets were insisting that we go far beyond the ABM Treaty and agree to limit all space research to the laboratory.
Page 7 - It still could be possible, however, for July. But if not then, later. But I have made one thing plain. The fall months of our election are not going to be months that I will agree to a summit, and I will stick with that. Q. So, sir, after June or July what is your next best time, December? November? The President. Well, I would think after the election, then.