The Daniloff affair

Before the FBI arrested Soviet United Nations employee Gennadi Zakharov for espionage on August 22, little thought seems to have been given to the implications for superpower diplomacy. Those implications became painfully clear eight day later on August 30 when U.S. journalist Nicholas Daniloff was arrested in Moscow in retaliation. Although the KGB claimed to have caught Daniloff receiving classified materials from a Soviet citizen, there was not much question that he was innocent. President Reagan began calling him a "hostage" whose ransom was the release of a genuine Soviet spy.

When negotiations yielded release of both men to the custody of their respective ambassadors on September 12, there was an immediate outcry. Critics said that it was a mistake to concede in fact or in form any equivalence between Daniloff and Zakharov. Reagan responded by insisting that he would never trade an innocent American for a Soviet spy. The President had sent Gorbachev a letter on September 4 assuring him of Daniloff's innocence. Gorbachev personally and publicly rejected Reagan's assurances in a September 18 statement accusing Nicholas Daniloff of being a spy, in effect calling the President a liar. This came one day after the United States announced the impending expulsion of 25 Soviet diplomats from the Soviet mission to the United Nations.

This was the context within which Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze arrived in Washington for previously scheduled talks about U.S.-Soviet relations and preparations for a Washington summit. While these talks reportedly focused on the Daniloff-Zakharov problem, Shevardnadze also delivered a letter to President Reagan. The letter was Gorbachev's response to Reagan's letter of July 25. In it, he modified the latest Soviet proposal on INF, which has been advanced at a meeting of arms control experts in Washington on September 5-6. At that meeting the Soviets proposed that token numbers of LRINF missiles be retained in Europe, rather than total elimination of these weapons from the "European zone." They also withdrew their previous demands that British and French forces be frozen at current levels as part of the agreement. 5

Gorbachev hinted in the September letter that Soviet LRINF in, Asia might be reduced. He also rejected Reagan's proposal for a seven and one-half year transition to a state where either side could deploy strategic defenses, and insisted instead on 15 years of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The Soviet leader expressed confusion over the President's approach to SDI, and suggested that the two get together in Iceland or London for a private planning session prior to the next summit.

Ten days later President Reagan announced that Daniloff had been freed and was leaving the Soviet Union. The next day, September 30, this announcement was followed by two more: Gennadi Zakharov would leave the United States after pleading "no contest" to espionage charges, and Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev would meet in Iceland on the 11th and 12th of October.

5 See endnotes on p. 22.

Invitation accepted

There was an immediate and violent reaction to the way the Administration had handled the Daniloff case. Although the Adminis tration claimed these three events were not linked; that Daniloff had been unconditionally released, that Zakharov had been sent home in exchange for Soviet dissident Yuri Orlov and his wife, that negotiations over Gorbachev's invitation were conducted separately from those concerning Nicholas Daniloff, it is hard to believe all this was coincidence—that this was not a package deal. Indeed, it appeared as if Daniloff had in fact been exchanged for a Soviet spy. Critics compared the outcome unfavorably with other similar incidents in the past, including a case in 1978, which President Carter had been able to resolve without embarrassing the United States. The announcement of a summit to take place in less than two weeks also astonished most observers. Reagan's longstanding and considerable opposition to unprepared summits was well known. Moreover, the President had made a point of setting limits on a summit's timing. In April 1986, for example, he had said: "I have made one thing plain. The fall months of our election are not going to be months that I will agree to a summit, and I will stick to that." Now he had agreed to precisely such a summit after less than 24 hours of consideration, on the basis of the recommendations of a group of three: Shultz, Poindexter and Regan, from which Weinberger was specifically excluded.

Furthermore, the decision was made at least one week before the Daniloff case had been resolved. Other senior members of the Administration became aware of the imminent summit at this timewell before it was announced, but too late to influence the decision. This about-face undertaken in the spirit of apparent casualness drew strong criticism from usual Administration supporters. The columnist George Will, for example, admitted that "the Reagan Administration is losing credibility by taking actions radically inconsistent with its past rhetoric." Henry Kissinger warned: "to leave it [the summit] to the sort of free-wheeling discussion that was mentioned by Secretary Shultz, I think is very dangerous."

There is yet to be a convincing explanation for the Administration's claim that there was no trade of Daniloff for a Soviet spy, nor any linkage between the summit and the entire Daniloff affair. There are several theories about what this linkage might be. One is that it was an explicit element of the Daniloff deal; that the Soviets insisted the United States agree to a summit before a facesaving compromise on Daniloff could be found. This theory is supported by the fact that Reagan made up his mind to agree to a summit a full week before the impasse over Daniloff was resolved. A second possible explanation is that this summit was a quid pro quo for a full summit in Washington in 1986. Perhaps Shevardnadze, in the meetings with Shultz in late September, suggested that a full summit would be inappropriate unless Reagan and Gorbachev met in person to smooth things out. This would explain the dates chosen for the Iceland meeting, which would leave time for a late 1986 summit. A third explanation is that Reagan and his advi

• See endnotes on p. 22.

sors had their eye on the domestic political situation, particularly the difficult negotiations with Congress over defense spending and arms control issues, and the upcoming elections. A summit could go a long way toward convincing Congress to set aside "partisanship" and support the President's 1987 budget while creating a positive issue for Republican mid-term candidates.

Preparation

The United States clearly believed the Reykjavik agenda to be a limited one, meant to result at best in: a date for a Washington summit; the outline of an agreement on INF missiles in Europe, which had been the subject of the most give-and-take in the exchange of letters; and some tangible progress on nuclear testing issues. Preparation for the meeting consisted largely of confirming the most recent U.S. proposal on INF tabled on September 18 at the beginning of the sixth round in Geneva. This proposal built on the Soviet idea for "token" deployments: an interim agreement to a global limit of 200 LRINF missile warheads for each side, with 100 in Europe and the remaining 100 in the United States and Soviet Asia, along with collateral constraints on shorter-range missiles (i.e., SS-12/22, SS-23, Pershing I).

A new approach to a nuclear test ban was also put together for use both in negotiations with Congress over demands for a one-year testing moratorium and for tabling at Reykjavik. The proposal was outlined in a White House letter to Congressional leaders in which Reagan pledged to submit to the Senate two treaties on nuclear testing signed in the 1970s, and to begin talks with the Soviets aimed at achieving a comprehensive test ban on a step-by-step basis in parallel with reductions in offensive nuclear arms.

There was no fallback position considered on these two topics. On INF in particular, the little interagency discussion that had been conducted concluded that the U.S. should not go beyond its current proposal. No new positions on strategic offensive reductions or on strategic defense were considered, nor were specific interagency discussions held on these subjects in preparation for the summit. It is not clear to what extent Shultz and Shevardnadze discussed their expectations for the meeting during their 19-20 September negotiations, and whether or not these discussions were followed up by any backchannel preparations. Certainly, there was no detailed agenda, nor any pre-agreed communique or final statement. Although the makeup of each delegation was known to the other prior to the meeting, the planned attendance of Soviet Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff, still failed to alert the United States to Soviet intentions. Akhromeyev's presence should have been a strong signal that the Soviets were anticipating flexibile negotiating on the most important strategic issues, requiring real-time military analysis and approval of the top military officer.

The congressional debate on arms control

While the President and his advisors focused on the upcoming meeting in Reykjavik, the House and Senate were in the midst of the conference on the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1987. Arms control had been at the center of the debate for

months, and still represented a priority concern during the week preceding the summit. At issue were several amendments passed by the House of Representatives, including: denial of funds to support deployment of forces in excess of the SALT II Treaty sublimits; a continued moratorium on anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons testing and a new one-year moratorium on all but the smallest nuclear weapons tests (providing the Soviets did likewise); a hold on production of chemical weapons; and maintaining SDI funding at last year's level plus 3.5% for inflation.

Although each of these positions was opposed by the Senate, exploratory discussions seemed to be leading to compromise. All thoughts of compromise were brought up short by the announce ment of the summit. The Senate argued that the President's "hands must be free" to negotiate with the Soviets. Responding to an Executive request for bipartisan support on the eve of the Reykjavik meeting, the House agreed on October 10 to accept a White House-Senate sponsored compromise on arms control that dropped the SALT II compliance requirement and the nuclear testing moratorium, provided for some chemical weapons production, sustained the ASAT testing moratorium, and split the difference between the two houses on the SDI authorization. As a result, when the Presi dent met with Gorbachev in Iceland the next morning, key arms control policy questions were left open, giving the United States maximum negotiating flexibility.

Consultation with the allies

In the usual course of arms control negotiations, there is both time and opportunity for considerable discussion with allies of 300 cific proposals and counterproposals. A summit requires a different sort of consultation based on non-specific possibilities and agree ment on basic objectives and bottom-iine positions.

The Reykjavik summit, launched as it was with less than two weeks' notice, fell outside both of these patterns of arms control consultation. The NATO allies had been consulted on the 53 proposals prior to the beginning of the 6th round in Geneva in late September, according to usual practice. Consequently, neither me cific nor general consultations were held in the 11 days prior to Reykjavik.

Saturday morning, 11 October

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Treaty for 10 years combined with a "strengthening" of the treaty language on testing (i.e., restricting research and testing on spacebased ABM elements to the laboratory). Some elements of this proposal went beyond recent Soviet proposals tabled in Geneva. On LRINF the Soviets had proposed interim restraints of 100 warheads each in Europe, rather than zero, and the demand for no withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for 10 years represented a retreat from the 15 years Gorbachev had previously required. In addition, Gorbachev dropped his previous demands for an immediate end to all nuclear testing, calling instead for negotiations leading toward a comprehensive ban. However, the interest in restricting SDI-type research more narrowly than the ABM Treaty was fully consistent with the long-standing Soviet position in Geneva (see Endnote #5).

In the discussions following this initial exchange, Gorbachev rejected Reagan's offer to share technology while expressing dissatisfaction with his explanation of SDI. Reagan in turn rejected the offer to eliminate LRINF in Europe without also reducing Soviet LRINF in Asia. On this note of little progress, the two broke for lunch.

Saturday noon recess

When President Reagan met with his advisers for lunch at the U.S. Embassy in Reykjavik, a decision was reached to propose that working groups meet through the night to flesh out the areas of agreement and disagreement between the two sides. One set of working groups, headed by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Rozanne Ridgeway, would discuss bilateral, regional and human rights issues. The other set, headed by the former chief INF negotiator and now special Advisor on Arms Control, Paul Nitze, would work out the differences on arms control.

This U.S. initiative may have been a critical turning point. By its very nature, this plan confirmed that the United States was prepared to join the Soviets in escalating the importance of this meeting. What had been carefully portrayed as working session in preparation for a summit suddenly was transformed into a forum for real deal-making.

Another source of discussion during the noontime recess was Gorbachev's proposal to restrict SDI testing to laboratories. The Soviet position on this issue had not changed as a result of Reagan's pleas through correspondence. While it remained to be seen whether Gorbachev could be brought around to the U.S. view, it must have already been clear that SDI testing loomed as the biggest stumbling block between the two sides.

Saturday afternoon session

Gorbachev agreed to Reagan's proposal for working groups, and both men then agreed that the goal for the groups was to reach agreement on instructions to Foreign Ministers, who would in turn work toward a "framework agreement" for signature at a Washington summit. The first day's meetings ended for the two leaders about 5:45 p.m. The two working groups were to meet at 8:00 p.m. that evening.