The all-night session

The Soviet arms control working group was headed by Marshal Akhromeyev. Ambassador Karpov, chief negotiator for the Soviets in Geneva, had a secondary role. The United States organized its working group quite differently. It was led by Ambassador Nitze, civilian Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State. The inner working group-those who conducted the real negotiations-were all civilians. The JCS representative, Lt. General John Moellering, played a relatively minor role throughout the two days, in stark contrast to the Soviet military representative.

By 1:30 a.m. on Sunday morning the arms control working group had made little progress. The Soviets made a few concessions: They agreed to freeze their short-range INF missiles both in Europe and in Asia. They also agreed that verification requirements, including on-site inspections, were acceptable in principle. However, negotiators could not reach agreement on what to do about the long-range SS-20 missiles in Asia, or whether the United States would have the right to equal levels.

An impasse had also been reached on actual implementation of the agreement to cut strategic forces by 50%. The Soviets had introduced the subject of 50% cuts to the group by producing a chart of proposed reductions in strategic forces. The chart pleased the U.S. participants because it made no reference to either dual-capable aircraft or U.S. INF systems which could strike the Soviet Union. The Soviets had tried on previous occasions to include both these categories of weapons in U.S. totals. However, the United States could not accept the Soviet formulation which would have led to unequal ceilings in the residual warheads. At that point, the working group called a recess for consultation. During the next hour, Paul Nitze spoke with Secretary of State George Shultz, who gave him full authority to negotiate for the United States.

By the time the working group resumed work at 3 a.m., the Soviets were prepared to concede on strategic systems. They agreed to a reduction to equal ceilings of 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV) and 6,000 strategic offensive nuclear warheads, and substantial (though unspecified) reductions in Soviet heavy ICBMs. Nuclear testing issues were discussed, and a phased approach focusing first on improving verification and second on reducing tests in parallel with reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles, was agreed. However, disagreement remained over the degree of emphasis to be given to the objective of a comprehensive test ban. After the summit, the Soviets also claimed that they did not agree to the phased approach.

Toward the end of this all-night session, the Soviets proposed new bomber counting rules within the framework of the 50% reductions in strategic forces already agreed. Previously, the Soviet position had been that each weapon carried aboard a strategic bomber should count as an individual "nuclear charge." This meant that a simple gravity bomb was the equivalent of an ICBM warhead for accounting purposes; it also meant that the U.S. would have to pay a huge penalty for its larger bomber force. The U.S. proposed no limit on bomber armaments other than a one-for-one count of air-launched cruise missiles.

Under the new counting rules proposed by the Soviets at Reykjavik, each air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) carried aboard a strategic bomber would still count as one toward the 6,000 ceiling. However, all other armaments aboard bombers, such as shortrange attack missiles (SRAM) and gravity bombs, would be counted as one unit per aircraft. In other words, each bomber would be considered to have one "warhead" aboard (whether it had zero SRAMS and gravity bombs or 10) plus one warhead per each ALCM it could carry. This formulation was accepted by the United States, although it had not been staffed out or studied by the JCS. The rules represented an improvement over the previous Soviet position. They provided relatively minor restrictions on penetrating bombers (those without ALCMs), although that portion of the U.S. bomber force carrying ALCMS would still be penalized.

Although the Soviets had not specifically stated a requirement for a comprehensive package linking all agreements, including INF and nuclear testing, to resolution of the SDI issue, it was apparent to at least some U.S. participants in retrospect that the linkage was implicit by the time the arms control working group disbanded at 6:30 a.m. This raises an important question: How was SDI handled during the working group discussions? Was it avoided or explicitly discussed? Other participants claim that linkage was not established until the very end of the talks on Sunday. This is one of the prime contradictions in Administration reporting, and has implications for the way the United States approached the Sunday session.

Sunday morning session

By the time General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan met again to review the reports of the two working groups, the Soviets were prepared to make a major concession on INF: reduction of all LRINF missile warheads outside Europe to 100. Combined with the elimination of all LRINF missiles in Europe already proposed and the commitment to a freeze and subsequent negotiations to reduce short-range INF in Europe, the deal offered by Gorbachev came close to the U.S. proposal. The President accepted this formulation, despite the fact that there had been no consultation with the NATO allies-those most directly affected-on the possibility of immediate elimination of these long-range systems. At this point, the President authorized a series of phone calls to the leaders of those European countries committed to deployment of the LRINF missiles. These calls informed each nation of the U.S. intention to agree to elimination of these systems.

The United States claims that Gorbachev agreed next to a broad understanding to pursue a step-by-step halt to nuclear testing, as discussed by the arms control working group. Gorbachev now says that there was no agreement on testing, and, in another significant contradiction in Administration reporting, at least one unnamed Administration source has claimed that the U.S. portrayal of near agreement is a misrepresentation of what actually happened.

The U.S. participants had good reason to be pleased at this point in the meeting. The framework for an INF agreement had been achieved, and nothing appeared to stand in the way of its formal conclusion, perhaps at the Washington summit. Had the meeting

ended here according to the original schedule, Reagan would have walked away from the meeting with an outcome exceeding all dampened expectations.

In retrospect, it is important to ask why this wasn't done. Having himself initiated the all-night negotiations which now appeared to offer a breakthrough in the strategic and testing areas as well, perhaps the President felt a responsibility to try to carry through to a conclusion. But the issue of strategic defense continued to pose an obstacle to consummation of the 50% reduction in strategic weapons-the Soviets were insisting, as they had from the outset, that strategic offensive reductions be linked to constraints on strategic defense. With all but the final details to be worked out, an agreement on strategic arms must have seemed very near. Thus, Reagan was vulnerable to Gorbachev's suggestion that an unscheduled afternoon session be held to discuss strategic defense issues further.

Sunday afternoon sessions

While the two leaders took a break, Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met at 2 p.m. to discuss SDI. The Soviet position was consistent with their opening proposal: both sides would pledge not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years, and deployment of strategic defenses after that time would be subject to mutual agreement. Shultz countered with a proposal to link the 50% cuts already agreed upon to five years of ABM Treaty adherence; the second five years of adherence would be tied to complete elimination of offensive ballistic missiles.

This was the first time at Reykjavik that the United States formally proposed that strategic offensive reductions be made an integral part of an agreement on strategic defense. Moreover, it was the first time that the United States had ever proposed to eliminate all ballistic missiles within a specified time frame. While Reagan had proposed such an elimination in his July letter to Gorbachev and again in his U.N. speech in September, no mention had been made of a timetable, as in this proposal. The United States was finally in the role of initiator, which seemed to catch the Soviets off guard. Nevertheless, Shevardnadze agreed to discuss it with Gorbachev. After one hour these talks recessed.

Final session on Sunday

At 3:30 p.m., the discussion reconvened with Reagan and Gorbachev in attendance. Reagan confirmed the U.S. counter-proposal as offered by Shultz shortly before. At this point, Gorbachev countered with his Saturday morning proposal: strengthen the ABM Treaty so that testing of "all space elements of ABM defense in space are prohibited, except research and testing in laboratories." Further, eventual strategic defense deployment would be contingent on future negotiations. Some of the Reykjavik participants have claimed that the reappearance at this point of the restrictions to the laboratory was a last minute move they did not expect. It remains unclear how, despite repeated Soviet calls for such restrictions in Geneva and at Reykjavik the previous day, these participants could have been surprised.

Finally, the Soviets extended Reagan's linkage of the elimination of all ballistic missiles with ABM Treaty adherence for 10 years to the elimination of all strategic offensive forces in 10 years. At least one participant in the talks has suggested that the SDI testing constraint was added by the Soviets--knowing it would be unacceptable to the United States-as a response to President Reagan's proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles, a proposition the Soviets could not accept but did not want to explicitly reject. However, it is more logical on both negotiating and strategic grounds to assume that the Soviet demand for a reduction of all strategic offensive weapons was the direct response. This suggests that SDI testing was always intended to be a distinct component of the final Soviet proposal, not tied to any U.S. demand.

At this point Reagan left the meeting to consult for about 30 minutes with U.S. experts. By 5 p.m., he returned with an amended version of Gorbachev's last draft, which he intended to be the last U.S. offer.

In this U.S. "counter-counter proposal," most of the Soviet language was retained. However, key portions were altered: the constraint on testing of strategic defense elements was removed, the reference to elimination of all strategic nuclear offensive forces in ten years was crossed out and all offensive ballistic missiles written in, and the right of either party to deploy strategic defense at the end of ten years absent a mutual agreement not to was substituted once again for the Soviet formulation. In offering this final U.S. proposal, Reagan relied on his belief in his own powers of persuasion to convince the Soviet leader that strategic defenses were a necessary "insurance policy" and that they must be non-threatening in a world with no ballistic missiles.

Gorbachev remained unpersuaded of the merits of strategic defense, and it is unclear whether he agreed to drop his demand that deployment be subject to mutual agreement. He then upped the ante with a call for the elimination of all nuclear weapons in ten years; Reagan agreed with the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons. In the third major contradiction in post-Reykjavik reporting (discussed in detail below), the Administration has subsequently claimed that the U.S. draft, which crossed out "all strategic offensive forces" and substituted "all ballistic missiles," was the final U.S. position, despite considerable evidence, including Presidential statements after the meeting, that Reagan in fact was agreeing to Gorbachev's proposal.

But the two men were already talking past each other. Reagan's belief in his SDI and his inability to understand Soviet objections encouraged him to press Gorbachev harder and harder on the point of testing. The Soviet leader in turn refused to compromise on the issue of SDI testing. Finally, Gorbachev refused to validate any of the other agreements-including INF—until this SDI issue was resolved. At that point, the leaders exchanged final words:

GORBACHEV. "I think we can still deal.'

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REAGAN. "I don't think you really wanted a deal. I don't know when we'll see each other again."

GORBACHEV. "I don't know what else I could have done."
REAGAN. "You could have said yes."

Thus, a disappointed Reagan left the Hofdi House where only a few hours earlier success had seemed imminent. Meanwhile, a sober George Shultz announced the "failure" of the summit to the world.

Aftermath

By the next day, October 13, it was apparent that a decision had been made by the Administration to present the summit as a success. Accused of manipulating public opinion by putting a "spin" on the outcome, Administration spokesmen claimed that they had simply been too tired on Sunday evening to recognize the achievements made. According to Donald Regan, on October 14 the participants were just "beginning to realize what we did after we had time to draw back from it, draw a deep breath and look at what had happened-exactly where we were.'

In his address to the nation the evening of October 13, President Reagan claimed that "we are closer than ever before to agreements that could lead to a safer world without nuclear weapons," while other participants were blaming fatigue and disappointment for their failure the night before to acknowledge progress. In fact, it began to seem as if agreements on INF, nuclear testing and 50% cuts in strategic forces had been all but signed-held up only by disagreement over testing of strategic defense elements. Administration spokesmen presented the President as having made a giant step toward peace by negotiating arms control on several fronts, while simultaneously proving that America could not be pushed too far by refusing to compromise on SDI.

A crack in the story appeared almost immediately. Ironically, it has nothing to do with either agreements purportedly reached or with SDI; instead, controversy focused on whether or not President Reagan had agreed to the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Both the President and his closest advisors seemed confused on this issue. According to the most immediate recounting of eventsthe press conference with George Shultz on Sunday evening, October 12-the agreement nearly reached would have eliminated "all offensive strategic arms." In his speech the next night, however, Reagan specifically referred only to his proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles. But in a briefing with Congressional leaders the following morning, the President referred, as Shultz had, to the elimination of all strategic offensive forces.

The Administration quickly sought to squelch the controversy by focusing on the written exchanges at Reykjavik, which clearly had the United States proposing only the elimination of ballistic missiles. In fact, the Soviet document with the U.S. "ballistic missiles" penciled in was produced for reporters. The Soviets, however, focused on the oral exchange. Picking up on the debate already going on in the United States, General Secretary Gorbachev raised the issue in a speech on October 22 in which he claimed Reagan agreed to the elimination of all nuclear arms by 1996. Three days later Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh quoted Reagan as having said Gorbachev:

If we agree that by the end of the 10-year period, all nuclear arms are to be eliminated, we can refer this to our