The Reykjavik Process: Preparation for and Conduct of the Iceland Summit and Its Implications for Arms Control Policy : Report of the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-ninth Congress, Second Session

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987 - 30 pages

À l'intérieur du livre

Avis des internautes - Rédiger un commentaire

Aucun commentaire n'a été trouvé aux emplacements habituels.

Pages sélectionnées

Autres éditions - Tout afficher

Expressions et termes fréquents

Fréquemment cités

Page 27 - If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there.") Perhaps a few distinctions — and questions — are in order.
Page 14 - I don't know when we will see each other again. GORBACHEV. I don't know what else I could have done. REAGAN. You could have said yes.
Page 5 - ... the following: First, both sides would agree to confine themselves through 1991 to research, development, and testing — which is permitted by the ABM treaty — to determine whether advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Second, a new treaty signed now would provide that if, after 1991, either side should decide to deploy such a system, that side would be obliged to offer a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defense and for eliminating offensive ballistic missiles.
Page 15 - ... beginning to be understood. We proposed the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history. We offered the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles — Soviet and American — from the face of the Earth by 1996. While we parted company with this American offer still on the table, we are closer than ever before to agreements that could lead to a safer world without nuclear weapons.
Page 30 - That the Soviet military have played an important, perhaps even formidable, role in the SALT process was evident in this concluding comment by Garthoff in his analysis of the Soviet military's participation in SALT negotiations : Soviet military participation in SALT planning and decisionmaking, and in the actual negotiations, has been active and vigorous at all levels. The effect of this active role has probably been to exert a conservative and cautious influence t positions, but it has not precluded...
Page 25 - If we agree that by the end of the ten-year period, all nuclear arms are to be eliminated, we can refer this to our delegations in Geneva to prepare an agreement that you could sign during your visit to the United States.
Page 25 - Shevardnadze, and the appropriate interpreters and notetakers, at the end of which a recess took place, and we convened with the President to hear the reaction of the Soviet side to the American proposal. It was here that we learned for the first time that the Soviets were insisting that we go far beyond the ABM Treaty and agree to limit all space research to the laboratory.
Page 7 - It still could be possible, however, for July. But if not then, later. But I have made one thing plain. The fall months of our election are not going to be months that I will agree to a summit, and I will stick with that. Q. So, sir, after June or July what is your next best time, December? November? The President. Well, I would think after the election, then.

Informations bibliographiques