Controlling Space Weapons: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session on S. Res. 43 ..., S.J. Res. 28 ... April 14 and May 18, 1983U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983 - 173 pages |
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Page 16
... question that we are going to discuss this afternoon is what are we going to do about it ? Does anybody advocate trying to out- build the Soviets in counterforce warheads ? I do not . I do strongly advocate trying to deny the Soviets ...
... question that we are going to discuss this afternoon is what are we going to do about it ? Does anybody advocate trying to out- build the Soviets in counterforce warheads ? I do not . I do strongly advocate trying to deny the Soviets ...
Page 18
... question of our broader arms control policy , because I believe this is absolutely important . I see absolutely no possibility of moving forward on ASAT treaties unless we are able first to put together some kind of a workable arms ...
... question of our broader arms control policy , because I believe this is absolutely important . I see absolutely no possibility of moving forward on ASAT treaties unless we are able first to put together some kind of a workable arms ...
Page 20
... question of whether this type of treaty is in the Nation's interest . In my view , these systems are not in the nation's interest . The development and deployment of such ABM systems by either side would intensify nuclear dangers rather ...
... question of whether this type of treaty is in the Nation's interest . In my view , these systems are not in the nation's interest . The development and deployment of such ABM systems by either side would intensify nuclear dangers rather ...
Page 23
... question of ballistic missile defense . It is fundamentally a much more difficult problem than that of destroying satellites , especially if in considering destruction of ballistic missiles , one has in mind , as the President suggested ...
... question of ballistic missile defense . It is fundamentally a much more difficult problem than that of destroying satellites , especially if in considering destruction of ballistic missiles , one has in mind , as the President suggested ...
Page 24
... question of space - based anti - ballistic missile systems . I shall comment very briefly on the first two issues to set the stage for dis- cussion of the third . Years ago , President Johnson noted that the intelligence information ...
... question of space - based anti - ballistic missile systems . I shall comment very briefly on the first two issues to set the stage for dis- cussion of the third . Years ago , President Johnson noted that the intelligence information ...
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Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM systems ABM Treaty ADELMAN administration American anti-ballistic missile antisatellite weapons arms control agreements arms race Article ASAT capability ASAT system ASAT weapons attack ballistic missile defense believe billion booster Chairman committee cost countermeasures cruise missiles defensive systems deployed deployment destroy destruction DEUDNEY draft treaty earth effective effort forces Garwin GBMD going GRAHAM High Frontier ICBM IKLE important issues kind laser launched limit LODAL ment MIRVS mutual assured destruction national security national technical means negotiations nuclear war nuclear weapons offensive orbit Outer Space Treaty particle beam possible potential President's prohibiting proposed question radars RATHJENS SALT II scientists Senator PELL Senator PRESSLER Senator TSONGAS shuttle Soviet ASAT Soviet Union space arms control space objects space systems space technology space weapons space-based laser strategic talks target Test Ban threat tion U.S. ASAT U.S. satellites United warheads weaponry weapons in space weapons systems
Fréquemment cités
Page 66 - ... achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, US supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The US does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the US Government attaches...
Page 65 - Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Page 55 - I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.
Page 124 - To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.
Page 66 - Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile landbased.
Page 125 - XVI 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.
Page 124 - Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972.
Page 65 - Agreement,* agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels.
Page 66 - ... not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. 2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher...
Page 159 - I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that.