Controlling Space Weapons: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session on S. Res. 43 ..., S.J. Res. 28 ... April 14 and May 18, 1983U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983 - 173 pages |
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Page 1
... continue to accelerate and still there is no movement to the negotiating table . Before turning to the main theme of this hearing , I should note that since the first hearing on space arms control issues and today's hearing , the United ...
... continue to accelerate and still there is no movement to the negotiating table . Before turning to the main theme of this hearing , I should note that since the first hearing on space arms control issues and today's hearing , the United ...
Page 2
... considering the development and deplovment of space - based weapons , we must give serious consideration to this and to other long - term im- plications for strategic stability . In the meantime , the United States should continue its 2.
... considering the development and deplovment of space - based weapons , we must give serious consideration to this and to other long - term im- plications for strategic stability . In the meantime , the United States should continue its 2.
Page 3
... continue its research ef- forts on ballistic missile defense [ BMD ] systems . This is the only prudent course to follow . if we are to avoid a dangerous and destabiliz- ing Soviet technological breakthrough . We cannot and must not be ...
... continue its research ef- forts on ballistic missile defense [ BMD ] systems . This is the only prudent course to follow . if we are to avoid a dangerous and destabiliz- ing Soviet technological breakthrough . We cannot and must not be ...
Page 10
... continue to pursue real reductions in nuclear arms , negotiating from a position of strength that can be insured only by modernizing our strategic forces . At the same time , we must take steps to reduce the risk of a conventional ...
... continue to pursue real reductions in nuclear arms , negotiating from a position of strength that can be insured only by modernizing our strategic forces . At the same time , we must take steps to reduce the risk of a conventional ...
Page 12
... continue , the threat to U.S. space interests will not come from ASATS alone . Moscow has an active laser- and par- ticle - beam weapons - development effort that can be deployed in or directed at space . Though this program may not be ...
... continue , the threat to U.S. space interests will not come from ASATS alone . Moscow has an active laser- and par- ticle - beam weapons - development effort that can be deployed in or directed at space . Though this program may not be ...
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Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM systems ABM Treaty ADELMAN administration American anti-ballistic missile antisatellite weapons arms control agreements arms race Article ASAT capability ASAT system ASAT weapons attack ballistic missile defense believe billion booster Chairman committee cost countermeasures cruise missiles defensive systems deployed deployment destroy destruction DEUDNEY draft treaty earth effective effort forces Garwin GBMD going GRAHAM High Frontier ICBM IKLE important issues kind laser launched limit LODAL ment MIRVS mutual assured destruction national security national technical means negotiations nuclear war nuclear weapons offensive orbit Outer Space Treaty particle beam possible potential President's prohibiting proposed question radars RATHJENS SALT II scientists Senator PELL Senator PRESSLER Senator TSONGAS shuttle Soviet ASAT Soviet Union space arms control space objects space systems space technology space weapons space-based laser strategic talks target Test Ban threat tion U.S. ASAT U.S. satellites United warheads weaponry weapons in space weapons systems
Fréquemment cités
Page 66 - ... achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, US supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The US does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the US Government attaches...
Page 65 - Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Page 55 - I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.
Page 124 - To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.
Page 66 - Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile landbased.
Page 125 - XVI 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.
Page 124 - Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972.
Page 65 - Agreement,* agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels.
Page 66 - ... not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. 2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher...
Page 159 - I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that.