Controlling Space Weapons

CONTROLLING SPACE WEAPONS

THURSDAY, APRIL 14, 1983

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Larry Pressler presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Helms, Pressler, and Pell.

Senator PRESSLER. I will call the committee meeting to order and thank our witnesses for their patience. We had a vote. We thank you very much for being here and we appreciate your patience. I have an opening statement and then I will call on my colleague, Senator Helms, for his statement and then we will proceed, if that is agreeable. This is the second in a series of hearings that will consider the direction of United States and Soviet space weapons programs and their arms control implication. I opened the first hearing last September by noting that since the time I had initially offered a Senate resolution on space arms control in May 1981, there has been little movement toward negotiations and a great deal of activity indicating that we are on the verge of a United States-Soviet space weapons race. This race is not confined to killer satellites alone. Both countries are now developing a number of exotic space-based and space-related weapons. Events in recent weeks and months have reinforced this conclusion. Indeed, space weapons activities continue to accelerate and still there is no movement to the negotiating table.

Before turning to the main theme of this hearing, I should note that since the first hearing on space arms control issues and today's hearing, the United States crossed the quarter century mark in space exploration. In these 25 years, space technology has made a major impact upon our way of life. Besides applications in the military field, satellites are playing important roles in science and in commerce. Space systems are assisting our search for new sources of energy and meteorological satellites have aided farms production. Communications satellites not only provide rapid access to our troops abroad, but they help our business leaders to conduct financial transactions.

In the next quarter century, this trend can continue. But much depends upon our ability to develop policies and policymaking tools which will maximize developments in space technology. Unfortunately, it seems that technology has begun to outpace our ability to manage it. This can lead to inefficient use of this technology and illconceived notions on how best to utilize its potential.

The move toward space weapons is only one example of this. We seem to be entering a space weapons race before fully assessing

whether such a race is in our interest, or whether a space arms race can be avoided. In another field, that of remote sensing satellites and weather satellites, we seem to be moving away from Government leadership well before the private sector has demonstrated that it can operate these programs in a cost-effective manner. Internationally, there are efforts by some of the world's developing states to politicize the process of allocating orbital space assignments. Using international bodies, such as the International Telecommunications Union [ITU], these nations are blocking the application of new technologies, such as direct satellite broadcasting. Increasingly, the ITU looks like the Law of the Sea negotiations, with some nations seeking a free ride on American shoulders.

We in the United States lack a coherent policy to meet these challenges. Unless we begin to conceive a comprehensive approach that covers all the dimension of space utilization-military, scientific, and commercial-we cannot hope to maintain U.S. leadership in space. Today's hearing will focus on one segment of this important area: The role of arms control in space. Let me begin this session by saying that a space weapons race could have grave consequence and we must not engage in it lightly, if we are to serve the interests of the American people and of our allies. A move toward space arms represents the most revolutionary shift in strategy since the advent of nuclear weapons. In this regard, this hearing is scheduled at a most propitious time. At the moment that we meet here, a group of distinguished scientists are meeting in Los Alamos, N. Mex., to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Manhattan project that produced the world's first atomic bomb. It is important that we keep that development and its implications in mind as we assess the possible consequences of a space weapons race.

I fully support a strong defense for America, but it is far from certain that a space arms competition is a way to assure it. A space arms competition would be very expensive, and it could undermine our ability to correct existing deficiencies in our Armed Forces. Given our Nation's dependence on space systems for keeping the peace, space weapons would compromise many valuable U.S. military assets in space.

Let me cite some statistics. The U.S. F-15 based antisatellite [ASAT] weapon, which, according to press reports, will be tested this summer, will cost tens of billions of dollars, according to a GAO study. But we are now informed by Aviation Week, that Space Command no longer regards this conventionally armed ASAT as good enough and that we must move toward a laser ASAT weapon. Last year a Defense Department study put a price tag of $50 billion on such a laser weapon. That estimate is probably too low, given the many uncertainties that will have to be tackled in deploying laser weapons.

The President has helped to focus attention on the future of space weapons by his March 23 speech. The hope of moving away from deterrence toward a policy that would end the tyranny of nuclear weapons is admirable. But as President Reagan noted, unless we can significantly reduce nuclear weapons before we deploy a laser defense, such a defense could be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy. In considering the development and deplovment of space-based weapons, we must give serious consideration to this and to other long-term implications for strategic stability.

In the meantime, the United States should continue its research efforts on ballistic missile defense [BMD] systems. This is the only prudent course to follow. if we are to avoid a dangerous and destabilizing Soviet technological breakthrough. We cannot and must not be caught off guard for this is an area that is under active investigation in the Soviet Union. I ask that the relevant excerpts from President Reagan's speech be included in the record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Once started, the momentum of a space weapons race will be strong and verification problems could make space arms control agreements extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Therefore, unless we can reverse the trend toward space arms quickly, the deployment of increasingly advanced and exotic weapons, such as laser defenses, may become unavoidable.

As noted, ASAT weapons are very expensive. These systems meet and often surpass the cost of the MX missile which has received much greater budgetary attention in the Senate. In cost terms, space-based missile defenses would likely dwarf ASATs. According to Dr. Robert Cooper, director of DARPÅ, a conventionally armed ballistic missile defense would cost from $200 to $300 billion. Similarly, a Defense Department study concludes that a missile defense based upon more advanced laser weapons would cost $500 billion. That is twice as much as the entire defense budget for this year.

We must approach a space arms competition with the greatest of caution. It is not wise to assume that in the long run such a space race will serve our Nation's interests. Before we dare join this race, we must first examine its potential risks for strategic stability and its great cost to the American taxpayer. In proceeding, arms control must be given a serious try. A space arms competition may still be avoidable and a weapons ban might still be verifiable. But that requires a return to United States-Soviet negotiations. Given sufficient seriousness on both sides, we can still hope to halt these developments. Should talks fail, we would retain our weapons option.

For these reasons, I have offered Senate Resolution 43 which includes as sponsors Senators Percy and Pell and six other Senators, including four other Senators on this committee. Senate Resolution 43 calls for negotiations on a verifiable ban on antisatellites as a first step toward prohibiting all space-based and space-directed weapons. It is a refinement of two previous resolutions.

I favor negotiations that would ban all space weapons, but I believe that negotiating such a ban is a complex task. If we are to succeed in negotiations, we must deal with first things first. Given the imminent danger of an ASAT competition, Senate Resolution 43 urges that we immediately resume ASAT talks as a first phase in negotiations that would deal with all space weapons. I ask that Senate Resolution 43 be printed in the record of this hearing together with an article by Flora Lewis in the New York Times of April 11, 1983, urging Senate action on this resolution. I also ask that two op. ed. articles that I wrote for the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

I requested that Defense Secretary Weinberger and other administration witnesses testify at this hearing. The administration has decided to withhold testimony until it concludes a review of U.S. space policy. We will hear from the administration in a hearing next month. [Text of S. Res. 43 and S.J. Res. 28 follows:]

98TH CONGRESS

18T SESSION

S. RES. 43

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States invite the Soviet Union to negotiate a verifiable ban on antisatellite weapons as a first step toward prohibiting all space-based and space-directed weapons.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 2 (legislative day, JANUARY 25), 1983

Mr. PRESSLER (for himself, Mr. PERCY, Mr. PELL, Mr. MATHIAS, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. PROXMIRE, and Mr. D'AMATO) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

RESOLUTION

Whereas the United States depends upon satellites for preserving the peace through command and control of United States forces worldwide and through early warning of strategic attack, among other functions;

Whereas satellites are vital for verification of arms control

agreements;

Whereas the safety of such important missions including those performed by the Space Shuttle would be compromised by the threat posed by killer satellites;

Whereas a space arms race would undermine strategic stability; Whereas a military space race would add to the uncertainties faced by military planners and thereby complicate the task of designing an effective military force structure;

Whereas an arms race in space would be a drain on the American taxpayer and would undermine our ability to correct current deficiencies in our military posture;

Whereas the United States and other nations rely increasingly

on space-based systems for weather forecasting, communications, natural resource exploration and other important commercial activities;

Whereas the maximum utilization of space technology for commerce and science is assured only under peaceful conditions; Whereas the unregulated deployment of hazardous space systems, even if intended for nonweapons purposes, poses a serious danger to human life; and

Whereas the present pace of military space developments will soon reduce the prospects of avoiding the weaponization of outer space: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that

(a) the President should immediately prepare a proposal and invite the Soviet Union to negotiate a verifiable ban on the development, testing, production, and deployment of antisatellite weapons as a first step toward prohibiting all space-based and space-directed

weaponry;

(b) these negotiations should also seek to restrict

to the extent consistent with United States national in

SRES 43 IS

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