Besides, we, far more than Moscow, are dependent on risk-free operation in space. The Soviet Union's central geographic position and huge land area provide it with land lines of communication to much of the globe, while timely control of American forces worldwide depends largely on satellites. Already the potential risk of a space-weapons race has encouraged some defense planners to look toward costly and diplomatically delicate land-based communications as a backup. In any case, many military operations such as the attempted rescue of hostages in Iran would be nearly impossible without satellites.

Weapons that effectively threatened our satellites would also compromise other important military space missions such as early warning of strategic attacks, verification of arms control agreements and reconnaissance. We can of course "harden" our satellites to resist attack, add to antijamming equipment and equip them to maneuver away from the enemy's satellite killers. But this would greatly add to our defense bill and would interefere with our satellites' primary missions. The Pentagon has already requested that commercial satellites be hardened, perhaps making them uneconomical just when reduced cost has led to increased use. This makes it all the more urgent to resume space-weapon negotiations. The United States should offer a nonrenewable two-year mutual freeze on flight tests of antisatellite weapons. If the Soviet Union resists this arrangement, we could begin with a ban on high-altitude antisatellite weapons tests. This would allow the United States to deploy its own antisatellite weapons in the short run and would protect many of our satellites. The restriction of antisatellite weapons testing is the first step-but the ultimate goal of negotiations should be a total ban on all weapons and hazardous objects in space.

[From the New York Times, Apr. 11, 1983]

WARNING: DANGER IN SPACE

(By Flora Lewis)

LONDON, April 10.-A small group of people, including some top experts on space war, just finished a conference near here on the military use of space.

Their chilling conclusion was that the military space age has already arrived and it can't be revoked. The questions remaining are whether there will be weapons in space and war in space. Even more chilling is the fact that they don't agree whether the possibility is good or bad for the United States.

There is, the experts said, remarkably little time left to make policy decisions that will lead America toward the "new high ground," as advocates call space in the military sense of seeking dominance, or away from it toward arms control. The little-noticed establishment of an Air Force Space Command last year was more important than President Reagan's recent call to seek an antimissile weapon in space. It created an organizational base for those who want to challenge the Russians out yonder because they think there is a chance of breaking out of military balance to decisive superiority.

They argue, as Fred Iklé, Undersecretary of Defense, has put it, that this would move war "out there where the people aren't." They speak in terms of a more secure defense, but it is clear they think this would also reduce inhibitions on forceful pursuit of American interests on earth.

They don't discuss what wars are about or what they are supposed to solve. They seem to take it for granted that competition with the Russians is bound to bring conflict somewhere, so they suggest space not only because it's distant but because they believe the U.S. can permanently hold the lead.

Richard L. Garwin, who helped build the H-bomb and has worked for 32 years on exotic weapons and defense developments, warned a Senate committee against these beliefs last fall. "Space wars are not an alternative to war on earth," he said. "In my view, they are a prelude to war on earth." And he added that "we are on the verge of war in space" because of weapons the Soviet Union has tested and better ones the U.S. is preparing.

It is true that the space-based laser or electronic beam Mr. Reagan had in mind to shoot down earth-based nuclear missiles is 20 or 30 years away, if it ever proves feasible. But the risk of space war is no longer science fiction because of the development of antisatellite weapons, ASAT's in the jargon.

Studies of defense against missiles and attacks on satellites are conducted separately, but the links is inescapable. An antimissile space ray would have to

be stationed on a satellite, and it would only be as secure as that satellite's invulnerability to ASAT's, including the minuscule "space mines" that Mr. Garwin's fertile brain has envisaged in quite practical terms.

Work on ASAT's is forging ahead now in both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. Space is already militarized, not with weapons yet, but with surveillance, communications and guidance systems that warn of a potential enemy's activity in peace and direct earthly weapons to precise targets in war.

"Sweeping the skies," as military planners call destruction or incapacitation of these satellites, would give the side that managed it such an advantage that the other side would probably consider it the first step to war and might well retaliate on earth. The U.S. is well ahead of the Russians in these satellite systems. That's a plus so long as they function, but also a weakness because the U.S. relies on them and could be struck dumb and blind if they were ruined.

Many kinds of countermeasures are possible, but it will also be possible to leapfrog them with new offensive devices. The story of MIRV's, the multiple-missile warheads that were supposed to put the U.S. far in the lead in the 1960's but spurred Soviet programs endangering the U.S. Minutemen now, is regularly cited by those experts who are convinced there isn't any kind of scientific wizardry to assure long-term U.S. superiority. On the contrary, the lesson of MIRV's is that another cycle in the arms race only assures soaring costs and greater risk of war.

Does that mean President Reagan's glint-in-the-eye vision of a defense against nuclear weapons must be totally rejected? Not necessarily. The history of weaponry is a swing between preponderance for defensive and offensive arms. But it does mean the effort must not be allowed to be a race and that the need for negotiated agreements is more urgent than ever.

The Russians proposed a treaty to ban certain kinds of ASAT's in 1981 after preliminary Soviet-American negotiations broke down because of the invasion of Afghanistan. None of the American experts find the draft acceptable as is, but those who wisely fear space war urge a counterproposal now.

A Senate bipartisan resolution asks the President to start talks again for "a verifiable ban on antisatellite weapons as a first step toward prohibiting all space-based and space-directed weapons." Anyone who realizes that war in the sky is far nearer than pie in the sky should urge the Senate to pass pending Resolution 43.

Senator PRESSLER. Senator Helms.
Senator HELMS. Thank you.

There has been no more gratifying development in the view of this Senator than the President's having put the subject of strategic defense at the top of the national agenda, or at least high on it. In my judgment it should always have been at the top because the very purpose of military force is to safeguard the American people.

Most Americans believe that the dollars they pay to the Pentagon go primarily to protect them against Soviet missiles. But in fact, for more than 15 years, in all candor the policy of the U.S. Government has been that the American people should be virtually without protection from Soviet missiles.

Since the McNamara days, we have relied upon the threat to massacre innocent Russian citizens for our safety. This is morally wrong, but it is not merely morally wrong, it is militarily senseless, especially since the Soviets have done and are doing everything in their power to protect the Soviet people.

Their missiles, unlike ours, are designed to destroy enemy silos, thereby dramatically reducing the enemy's ability to strike back, the enemy being us. After a Soviet first strike, the United States would be left with little more than half of our submarine-launched missiles. The ABM system around Moscow with rapid fire launchers, augmented by the battle management radars, would take its toll of our missiles. How many more would be struck down by dual-purpose air defense

systems is anyone's guess. Then of course, there is the old fashioned but effective Soviet air defense system.

The point I am making is that even our militarily and morally senseless retaliatory threat is losing credibility. As the Soviets develop directed energy defense weapons, the credibility of our offense will get close to the vanishing point.

So the question that we are going to discuss this afternoon is what are we going to do about it? Does anybody advocate trying to outbuild the Soviets in counterforce warheads? I do not. I do strongly advocate trying to deny the Soviets the capability of disarming us and threatening us. In my judgment, the best way to do this is by ballistic missile defense. The best way to do that is by layering different systems. But the top layer must be space-based.

We have before us four distinguished citizens. They have varying views on this subject, which is good. We need to hear all views possible on this subject, and I certainly want to hear them.

I want to pay my respects in particular to my long-time friend, Danny Graham, who has done so much work in this area. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much.

Senator Pell, would you like to make your opening statement now or later?

Senator PELL. I think I will make my opening statement later on. Senator PRESSLER. All right. Today we are fortunate to have a distinguished panel of public witnesses. They are Jan Lodal, executive vice president, American Management Systems, former member of the National Security Council staff; Dr. George Rathjens, professor of political science, MIT, former Deputy Director of DARPA; Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, U.S. Army retired, director, High Frontier, and former head of DIA; and Dr. Daniel Deudney, senior researcher, Worldwatch Institute.

I have no preference for what order we call on them, perhaps in the order I read them, which happens to be the way they are listed here. Is that agreeable?

Therefore I will call first on Jan Lodal, executive vice president of American Management Systems.

STATEMENT OF JAN M. LODAL, FORMER STAFF MEMBER,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, ARLINGTON, VA.

Mr. LODAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of time I will highlight the points in my prepared statement and request it be inserted in the record, if that is acceptable to you.

I would like to touch today on three subjects. First, the desirability and feasibility of negotiating an agreement on ASAT weapons, as proposed in your resolution, Senate Resolution 43. Second, the relationship of such efforts to potential anti-ballistic-missile programs and the ABM Treaty. And third, the overall context of our ongoing arms control negotiations and the relationship of strategic arms limitations and intermediate nuclear force limitations to ASAT negotiations.

With respect to Senate Resolution 43, in principle, I fully support the effort to negotiate a ban on antisatellite weapons, and in the future,

a ban on further weapons in space, but I believe there are serious practical limitations to doing this.

As you know of course, we have several treaties that ban or limit certain types of weapons in space, and the ASAT treaty would go only one additional step in a long and continuous history of these efforts. But let me highlight a few of the difficulties that I believe our Nation will face if we attempt to

Senator PRESSLER. Pardon me. I am sorry for interrupting. My colleagues have reminded me that I forgot to say that we are going to put a time limitation on opening statements of—what is a reasonable time for opening statements?

Senator PELL. Five minutes?

Senator PRESSLER. Keep it between 5 and 10 minutes, if you could. Then we can get into questions more quickly.

Mr. LODAL. Good.

Senator PRESSLER. And everybody's statements will be printed in the record in full, plus any additional materials you might have.

Mr. LODAL. Fine. The three difficulties that I would highlight are first, the importance of protecting our space-based system even if an ASAT treaty were negotiated. I don't see any way to negotiate a treaty that would effectively eliminate the Soviet capability to break out of the treaty and destroy our essential space-based systems, and therefore I believe we have to rely on military measures for this protection.

Second, we must be realistic in looking at the possibilities of ASAT treaties. I think there are serious limits to what can be done here. It is possible to in my opinion reach agreements that would eliminate all-out space wars, but I don't think we can go a long way beyond that in the near future.

Third, many of the verification aspects of ASAT are not only difficult, but essentially impossible. So we will have to negotiate agreements where we can rely on countermeasures and other military measures to protect us against the possibility of Soviet abrogation and breakout.

Fourth, the Soviets did not express much interest in this type of agreement in the past, so I don't think we would delude ourselves about the negotiating difficulties.

Now let me turn to ABMs. ABMs are certainly the most talked about and one of the most important possible space-based weapons systems, and therefore quite relevant to the recommendations in Senate Resolution 43. In my view, the issue with regard to ABM's is whether or not one ought to move away from the recommendations of a resolution such as this in order to permit more direct movement on an ABM.

My judgment is that a more direct movement toward an ABM would not be in the Nation's interest. I don't believe that such systems, including space-based ones, will be in our interest even if they could be made to work technically, and I think there are serious technical problems.

I might add here that in the 30 minutes we had ahead of time, General Graham was doing a very good job of convincing me that his system has more possibilities than perhaps the laser systems, and I

think that is worth hearing out. But nonetheless, I think there are serious problems and let me highlight just two or three of those.

The first is that you have to have essentially a perfect defense against bombers as well, unless you have a system such as this which is totally deployed in space. Otherwise, cruise missiles and bombers can come in ahead of time and simply destroy the ground-based elements of your ABM, leaving you defenseless.

The second is that you have a serious problem of a period of instability while you are trying to get these things deployed and the strategic relationship between the two sides. There is a period where there is great uncertainty, and there would be great risk.

The risk is that there is simply no way to protect the allies in Europe with these systems because the types of attack that you have to protect them against are not affected at all by any of these ABM systems, so you would have a tremendous political problem within the NATO Alliance. You can protect the American public, but you are not able to protect our European allies in any way.

So I think all of these are problems that have to be dealt with. Finally, let me turn to the question of our broader arms control policy, because I believe this is absolutely important. I see absolutely no possibility of moving forward on ASAT treaties unless we are able first to put together some kind of a workable arms control regime that covers the most important weapons and the most important threats; namely the strategic retaliatory forces and the intermediate range nuclear forces of the two sides, the forces that are subject to negotiation today in Geneva.

I think this is an appropriate and important time to have these hearings because the Scowcroft Commission has just issued its report, which covers not only the MX but this broader issue of how our arms control policy should proceed.

In my opinion, they have made a major contribution in suggesting a movement away from past approaches and a movement toward aggregate limits on nuclear warheads. I would commend this report, the entire report, to your attention. I believe it is the most important statement on nuclear policy that has been made in a decade and deserves your attention.

I further believe that the present arms control approach that is being pursued, while no one can say for sure whether they will succeed or not, are unlikely to succeed. I think we would need to move to a different approach that does not have the complications associated with the START approach and the INF approach that today are under discussion in Geneva, and I think the aggregate warhead limit approach that the Scowcroft Commission has suggested is the right way to go.

In my prepared statement I have gone through some of the reasons for that and in some earlier writings have developed those thoughts even further. But I believe that if we could first reach an agreement that limited the total number of warheads in these important categories of intermediate and strategic forces, which by coincidence are essentially equal today in the Soviet Union and the United States, about 12,000 each, that we would then have an atmosphere in which important but in some sense secondary issues, such as ASAT, could proceed forward.

Thank you very much.