for weather, radar, photo reconnaissance, navigation and so on at a high cost-if we had to pay it every day for decades-but at a very affordable cost, day-by-day, in comparison with a large-scale war.

Space defense against nuclear weapons, which has come up in this meeting-my views are on the record of a Senate Armed Services meeting of May 2, and here I should just ask that that be placed in the record, and I want to note the judgment by Edward Teller, testifying at that same hearing, that ballistic missile defense systems based on satellites would cost vastly more than the system which could defeat them.

That does not mean that Teller agrees with me that we are taking the wrong approach in emphasizing now defense before we understand how to do it, or that the Secretary of Defense has a warranted position when he explained on national television March 27 that he is confident that we can have an essentially perfect defense against nuclear ballistic missiles and against nuclear-armed cruise missiles as well. That goes far beyond the President's speech and far beyond, I think, what Professor Teller would say.

So my views on the utility of space defense are negative, and I certainly do not think that the hopes for such space defense-supposed to be undertaken anyhow in conformance with the ABM Treaty obligations-I do not believe that those opportunities, so-called, should stand in the way of an urgent negotiation to ban antisatellite activities and to protect our satellites for military and civil uses.

Thank you.

[Mr. Garwin's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. GARWIN

Thank you for the invitation to present my views in support of the improved national security to be obtained by limitations on the possible threat to our satellite systems, so important now to our society, to our conventional military capability, and especially to our confidence in understanding the world and in avoiding developments which might lead to nuclear war.

I testified to this Committee September 20, 1982, urging the U.S. Government to conclude with the Soviet Union an agreement effectively banning testing of antisatellite weapons, and banning the deployment of weapons in space. It is important to limit the evolution of Soviet antisatellite capabiltiy, and continued use of U.S. satellites in peace and in war is much more important to the United States than the freedom to test our own ASAT system. A bilateral ASAT treaty drafted with the goal of becoming an international agreement should have no difficulty in gaining wide support, after it entered into force between the United States and the Soviet Union. At that hearing I indicated that it would be useful for even a private group to consider an appropriate text, and I am grateful to the Union of Concerned Scientists for providing the text which has been presented by Dr. Gottfried, and which I support.

Since the 1950's, I have been involved in military and civil space activities, as well as with the evolution of our ICBM and SLBM forces, with the R&D program on ballistic-missile defense (BMD), and with the assessment of the balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. I have participated, on behalf of the U.S. Government, in international negotiations to prevent surprise attack, to limit the testing of nuclear weapons, and I have studied such matters for many years for the Department of Defense, for the White House, and for other government agencies.

A close reading of this draft treaty shows, of course, that it forbids actual attack on satellites of other states (Article I). That in itself would be little comfort to us; like a renunciation of the use of force, abjuring attack on satellites without limiting testing and readiness and without maintaining vigilance about the potential threat would hardly add to our security. But this Article I motivates the rest of the Draft.

The real teeth and protection of the Draft reside in Article II, banning the placing of ASAT weapons in orbit (II.1), and banning the testing of such weapons in space or against space objects. This would ban any further test of the Soviet ASAT, which has apparently been tested in only a very limited range of orbital inclinations, and which is said to have had only about 50 percent success rate. It would also ban space tests of the U.S. MHV (miniature homing vehicle)—the key element of the F-15 aircraft-launched ASAT now nearing test phase. Furthermore, it would ban tests of ground-based lasers against satellites, as well as the testing of space-based lasers which otherwise might be claimed to be ASAToriented but which were in fact a Soviet program which might evolve to BMD capability.

The ban on stationing weapons in orbit would effectively bar the emplacement of space mines small satellites carrying conventional explosives (like a Claymore mine), which from a modest distance of a kilometer or less could be commanded instantly to destroy the satellite it had accompanied for weeks or months. No existing agreement bans the emplacement of space mines, and that is a critical threat to the survival of U.S. satellite systems in conventional war or at the outbreak of nuclear war.

Verification by national technical means (NTM) would, of course, include the use of existing radars, optical telescopes, satellite sensors, and the like, with which the United States monitors compliance with existing arms control agreements. It would become worthwhile also to make specialized observation systems to determine whether Soviet satellites were being heated by groundbased lasers, to provide close-in photographs of maneuverable space objects, and the like. In general, it is much easier to detect a violation of such a treaty than to determine which of an enormous array of permitted activities (in the absence of a treaty) are a threat to U.S. security.

ASAT STATUS

The December 1982 Committee Print, "Soviet Space Programs: 1976-80," describes the Soviet ASAT as weighing some 3,300 kg, and being launched by an "F-1-m" rocket assembly from Tyuratam into orbits of inclinations varying from 62 to 65 degrees, or so. The F-1 is said to be derived from the SS-9, the monster predecessor of the current SS-18 ICBM. The Print lists 17 tests of the Soviet ASAT, with indifferent success reported. To extend the altitude range of a coorbital interceptor from low earth orbit to circular synchronous orbit requires almost 4 km/s additional velocity, and that would require an additional stage of propulsion about five times as large as the entire F-1 booster.

The U.S. ASAT program will use an MHV propelled by the booster from the Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM), on which is mounted an Altair rocket. The system is designed for intercept of satellites in low earth orbit, not by going into orbit and making small adjustments to attack the quarry, but by "direct ascent," a far more difficult approach requiring extreme accuracy in position and time. This approach, however, allows destruction of a satellite with MHV lobbed to orbital altitude, without requiring orbital velocity-a saving of about a factor 3 in launch weight (on top of the factor 100 which arises because the MHV is so much smaller than the Soviet ASAT vehicle). The F-15 fighter aircraft and the earth's rotation add another 1.4 km/s.

The F-15 ASAT, technically, will be able to operate from any ordinary airfield, given adequate command and control, so that satellite intercepts in LEO could take place, in principle, within an hour of the command to perform them. The Soviet ASAT, thus far launched only from a single complex, would have to wait until the earth turned to bring the launch site under the satellite orbitas much as 24 hours. Upgrade to attack satellites at geosynchronous altitude (GEO) would require a very large booster to carry the Soviet ASAT, while a 16,000-lb system, still carried on the F-15, would handle the MHV approach. To stop testing right now will leave the United States closer to an effective allaltitude ASAT capable of attacking large numbers of satellites than it will leave the Soviets; but it will leave both sides comfortable that months must elapse after an abrogation of the treaty before such an effective capability can exist. I emphasize the urgency of stopping the evolution of ASAT systems. On February 24 of this year, Professor Carl Sagan and I prepared a "Petition For A Ban On Space Weaponry," which I hope can be introduced into the record. More than 40 physicists, space scientists, and strategists have joined us “ . . . in urging the United States, the Soviet Union and other spacefaring nations to

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negotiate, for their benefit and for the benefit of the human species, a treaty to ban weapons of any kind from space, and to prohibit damage to or destruction of satellites of any nation." We cabled the petition March 26 to the leaders of France, India, Japan, the Peoples Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In the petition we noted specifically the continuing tests of the Soviet ASAT, and the imminent test of the U.S. system. In no way can we negotiate for the U.S. Government, but we would be remiss if we did not use our experience and our knowledge to provide our best judgment to the leaders of the world who are capable of action to reduce the threat of conflict in space.

We have received only one response thus far, from Secretary Andropov, which I append. We have responded, emphasizing that "significant steps towards a practical and equitable treaty banning space weaponry would be greatly aided if the U.S.S.R. would publicly state that, as part of a comprehensive treaty banning space weaponry, it would be willing to forego tests of any anti-satellite system it may have developed or deployed, provided the United States made an identical commitment."

Senator Pressler and colleagues, we can urgently negotiate a treaty along the lines of the Draft presented here, or we can see the wealth and security of our nation imperiled by a needless, conflict in space, brought about by a greater desire for advantage than for mutual benefit, and fostered by emerging doctrine and organizations which regard space as an opportunity for conflict rather than the marvelous tool and environment which it is. We can try to make space safe for all non-weapon activities, or we can risk our own continued military and civil use of space. Negotiation, without further ASAT tests, is an opportunity we will not have much longer. [Attachments]

CORNELL UNIVERSITY,

CENTER FOR RADIOPHYSICS AND SPACE RESEARCH,
Ithaca, N.Y., May 16, 1983.

Secretary-General Y. V. ANDROPOV,

Moscow

DEAR SECRETAry Andropov, We appreciate your reply to the petition of February 24 1983 to ban space weaponry, signed now by forty prominent American defense strategists and space scientists. It was sent to the leaders of all spacefaring nations with an independent launch capability. The Soviet Union was the first nation to reply. We are confident that large numbers of our Soviet colleagues are as concerned as we are about the imminent and potentially irreversible extension of earthly military confrontation into the space environment. No one nation is solely responsible for the global crisis that we face. In our petition to you and the other heads of spacefaring nations, we noted Soviet tests of anti-satellite weapons since the early 1970's, as well as the U.S. antisatellite system now approaching its test phase. Your reply mentions American plans and pronouncements on American anti-satellite weapons, but says nothing about the existing Soviet anti-satellite capability. We believe that significant steps towards a practical and equitable treaty banning space weaponry would be greatly aided if the U.S.S.R. would publicly state that, as part of a comprehensive treaty banning space weaponry, it would be willing to forego tests of any anti-satellite systems it may have developed or deployed, provided the United States made an identical commitment.

Sincerely,

RICHARD L. GARWIN.
CARL SAGAN.

[Appended is an up-to-date list of leading American defense strategists and space scientists who have signed the petition.]

Y. V. ANDROPOV'S RESPONSE TO THE APPEAL OF A GROUP OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS AND PUBLIC FIGURES, APRIL 25, 1983

Dear Sirs. Your appeal regarding the prohibition of space weapons is permiated with serious concern about the peaceful future of space. I fully share this concern. Preventing the militarization of outer space is one of the priority problems facing mankind, and a lot depends here, on Earth, on whether or not it will be resolved.

As scientists and experts you realize well enough the extremely dangerous consequences of saturating outer space with deadly weapons. Statesmen, poli

ticians and scientists should really do everything possible already now not to have the achievements of human mind and the accelerated progress of science and technology used to the detriment of people.

I would like to emphasize that it is precisely the Soviet Union-the country which 25 years ago opened the path into space-that is the initiator of and participant in all the currently existing international agreements aimed at having space used only for peaceful purposes, to the benefit of mankind.

In order to resolve this task radically the Soviet Union, as, I believe, you know, has proposed that a treaty be concluded prohibiting the placement in outer space of weapons of any kind. We submitted such draft treaty to the United Nations as early as August 1981. The implementation of that Soviet proposal, in support of which the overwhelming majority of the U.N. member-states cast their votes, would be tantamount to setting a reliable barrier to the attempts to turn space into a source of a deadly danger to people.

Unfortunately, the work on the draft of such a treaty in the Committee on Disarmament, in fact, has not yet begun because of the position of the USA and a number of other NATO countries. Moreover, the recent developments show that in the strategic calculations of the USA, including those declared at the level of the highest American leadership, an ever increasing role is assigned to the use of military space hardware.

Now a truly decisive moment is coming: either the interested states will without delay sit at the negotiating table and take up the preparation of a treaty prohibiting the placement in outer space of weapons of any kind or the arms race will spread into space as well.

I can assure you that the Soviet Union will continue to apply the maximum of efforts to prevent. the sinister plans of carrying over the arms race into space from turning into reality.

I would like to hope that the scientists and public figures of the entire world will also make their contribution to space remaining forever free of any weapons, to preventing it from becoming an arena of military clashes, to assuring that there will be no threat from space to those living on Earth.

I wish you success in your efforts to protect peaceful space, the efforts which are fully supported in the Soviet Union.

Sincerely,

Y. ANDROPOV.

PETITION FOR A BAN ON SPACE WEAPONRY, FEBRUARY 24, 1983 In the quarter century since the first artificial Earth satellite was launched, on October 4, 1957, humans have used their new spacefaring capability wisely-for global communications; navigation; weather observations; monitoring Earth resources; for reconnaissance, which tends to moderate destabilizing world political and military trends; and for verifying the compliance of nations with their treaty obligations. The exploration of space by men and women, and particularly the scientific results of planetary missions and observations from space platforms, have changed our view of the universe. They have made it possible for us to understand our environment in ways which may be critical in the solution of major world problems. These developments have been almost wholly benign, have significantly benefited the peoples of the Earth, and represent an important aperture to a hopeful future for the human species.

After American nuclear explosions in space inadvertently damaged satellites of the United States and other nations in 1962, most countries of the world, including the United States, and the Soviet Union, agreed in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 never to explode nuclear weapons in space, in the oceans, or in the atmosphere. In 20 years no signatory nation has violated this agreement. Most nations, including the United States and the Soviet Union, also adhere to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 banning from space all weapons of mass destruction, and, specifically, all nuclear weapons. But fiction writers and military strategists have for about a century romanticized the purported inevitability of warfare in space. The use of non-nuclear weapons of more limited lethality than "mass destruction," while forbidden on other celestial bodies by the 1967 Treaty, is still permitted in Earth orbit, and in cislunar, circumplanetary and interplanetary space.

We believe that the testing or deployment of any weapons in space in part by threatening vital satellite assets-significantly increases the likelihood of warfare on Earth. The Soviet Union has tested a rudimentary anti-satellite

weapons system beginning in the early 1970's, but in 1981 formally presented a draft treaty banning all space weapons and prohibiting damage to or destruction of satellites by any means. The United States will soon begin testing a much more sophisticated anti-satellite system. Once such weapons systems are established in national arsenals they become very difficult to displace. Proposals, for example, to ban MIRVs before their deployment were rejected; today these destabilizing weapons systems are generally distributed and threaten the security of all nations. Failure to limit their deployment is now widely regretted. If space weapons are ever to be banned, this may be close to the last moment in which it can be done.

RICHARD L. GARWIN.
CARL SAGAN.

We join in urging the United States, the Soviet Union and other spacefaring nations to negotiate, for their benefit and for the benefit of the human species, a treaty to ban weapons of any kind from space, and to prohibit damage to or destruction of satellites of any nation.

Richard L. Garwin, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center, P.O. Box 218, Yorktown Heights, N.Y.

Carl Sagan, Professor of Astronomy and Space Sciences and Director, Laboratory for Planetary Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.

Hans A. Bethe, Professor of Physics Emeritus, Cornell University; Nobel Laureate in Physics; Head, Theoretical Division, Manhattan Project; Consultant, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory.

E. Margaret Burbidge, Professor of Astronomy and Director, Center for Astrophysics and Space Sciences, University of California at San Diego; President, American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Clark R. Chapman, Senior Scientist, Planetary Science Institute, Science Applications Inc., Tucson; Chairman, Division for Planetary Sciences, American Astronomical Society.

Thomas M. Donahue, Professor of Atmospheric Science, University of Michigan; Chairman, Space Science Board, National Academy of Science/National Research Council.

Sidney D. Drell, Professor of Physics, Stanford University; Consultant to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and to the National Security Council. Lee A. DuBridge, President Emeritus, California Institute of Technology; Science Adviser to former President Nixon.

Admiral Noel Gayler (USN, Ret.), former Director, National Security Agency; former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Forces in the Pacific; former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Research and Development).

Donald M. Hunten, Professor of Planetary Sciences, University of Arizona. Christopher C. Kraft, former Director, Flight Operations, Apollo missions to the Moon; former Director, NASA Johnson Space Center.

Vice-Admiral John Marshall Lee (USN, Ret.), former Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Franklin A. Long, Professor of Chemistry Emeritus, Cornell University; former Associate Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Carson Mark, former Head, Theoretical Division, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory.

James S. Martin, Jr., former Vice President and General Manager, Martin Marietta Corporation; Project Manager, Viking mission to Mars, NASA. David Morrison, Professor of Astronomy, University of Hawaii.

Philip Morrison, Group Leader, Manhattan Project; Professor of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Bruce C. Murray, Professor of Planetary Sciences, California Institute of Technology; former Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, NASA.

Gerry Neugebauer, Professor of Physics, California Institute of Technology; Director, Mount Palomar Observatory.

Tobias Owen, Professor of Astronomy and Chairman, Astrophysics Program, State University of New York at Stony Brook.

Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, Director, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center; former member, General Advisory Committee, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Gordon H. Pettengill, Professor of Planetary Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.