Controlling Space Weapons: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session on S. Res. 43 ... S.J. Res. 28 ... April 14 and May 18, 1983
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983 - 173 pages
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able ABM Treaty activities ADELMAN administration agree agreement American antisatellite approach arms control arms race ASAT attack ballistic missiles believe billion Chairman Committee communications concern continue cost defense deployed deployment destroy destruction direct discuss draft earth effective effort existing fact follows forces further future going hearing important initiative interceptor interest issues kind laser launched limit look means measures military missiles move negotiations nuclear objects offensive operational orbit outer space peace position possible potential prepared present President problems prohibiting proposed protect question require resolution satellites scientists Senator PELL Senator PRESSLER Senator Tsongas sides Soviet ASAT Soviet Union space arms control space weapons space-based statement strategic talks technical testing Thank things threat tion treaty United verification weapons in space
Page 66 - ... achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, US supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The US does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the US Government attaches...
Page 65 - Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Page 55 - I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.
Page 124 - To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.
Page 66 - Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile landbased.
Page 125 - XVI 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.
Page 124 - Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972.
Page 65 - Agreement,* agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels.
Page 66 - ... not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. 2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher...