The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991Oxford University Press, 25 sept. 1997 - 368 pages For half of the twentieth century, the Cold War gripped the world. International relations everywhere--and domestic policy in scores of nations--pivoted around this central point, the American-Soviet rivalry. Even today, much of the world's diplomacy grapples with chaos created by the Cold War's sudden disappearance. Here indeed is a subject that defies easy understanding. Now comes a definitive account, a startlingly fresh, clear eyed, comprehensive history of our century's longest struggle. In The Cold War, Ronald E. Powaski offers a new perspective on the great rivalry, even as he provides a coherent, concise narrative. He wastes no time in challenging the reader to think of the Cold War in new ways, arguing that the roots of the conflict are centuries old, going back to Czarist Russia and to the very infancy of the American nation. He shows that both Russia and America were expansionist nations with messianic complexes, and the people of both nations believed they possessed a unique mission in history. Except for a brief interval in 1917, Americans perceived the Russian government (whether Czarist or Bolshevik) as despotic; Russians saw the United States as conspiring to prevent it from reaching its place in the sun. U.S. military intervention in Russia's civil war, with the aim of overthrowing Lenin's upstart regime, entrenched Moscow's fears. Soviet American relations, difficult before World War II--when both nations were relatively weak militarily and isolated from world affairs--escalated dramatically after both nations emerged as the world's major military powers. Powaski paints a portrait of the spiraling tensions with stark clarity, as each new development added to the rivalry: the Marshall Plan, the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, the formation of NATO, the first Soviet nuclear test. In this atmosphere, Truman found it easy to believe that the Communist victory in China and the Korean War were products of Soviet expansionism. He and his successors extended their own web of mutual defense treaties, covert actions, and military interventions across the globe--from the Caribbean to the Middle East and, finally to Southeast Asia, where containment famously foundered in the bog of Vietnam. Powaski skillfully highlights the domestic politics, diplomatic maneuvers, and even psychological factors as he untangles the knot that bound the two superpowers together in conflict. From the nuclear arms race, to the impact of U.S. recognition of China on detente, to Brezhnev's inflexible persistence in competing with America everywhere, he casts new light on familiar topics. Always judicious in his assessments, Powaski gives due credit to Reagan and especially Bush in facilitating the Soviet collapse, but also notes that internal economic failure, not outside pressure, proved decisive in the Communist failure. Perhaps most important, he offers a clear eyed assessment of the lasting distortions the struggle wrought upon American institutions, raising questions about whether anyone really won the Cold War. With clarity, fairness, and insight, he offers the definitive account of our century's longest international rivalry. |
À l'intérieur du livre
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... peace through strength” policy, this viewpoint argues, pushed the Soviet Union to the verge of economic collapse and, in effect, forced the Soviets to sue for peace and end the Cold War. Not everyone accepts this interpretation. Some ...
... peace through strength” policy, this viewpoint argues, pushed the Soviet Union to the verge of economic collapse and, in effect, forced the Soviets to sue for peace and end the Cold War. Not everyone accepts this interpretation. Some ...
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... peace treaty at BrestLitovsk in Poland on December 22. The Bolsheviks attempted to place on the Allies the entire blame for the separate peace these negotiations eventually produced. On November 27 Trotsky demanded that the Allies ...
... peace treaty at BrestLitovsk in Poland on December 22. The Bolsheviks attempted to place on the Allies the entire blame for the separate peace these negotiations eventually produced. On November 27 Trotsky demanded that the Allies ...
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... peace” before German “autocracy had been taught its final and convincing lesson.”4 Yet neither Wilson nor Lansing was content to follow the “donothing” policy the secretary of state had recommended in his December 2 memorandum. As their ...
... peace” before German “autocracy had been taught its final and convincing lesson.”4 Yet neither Wilson nor Lansing was content to follow the “donothing” policy the secretary of state had recommended in his December 2 memorandum. As their ...
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... peace negotiations with the Germans. That day Wilson delivered his famous Fourteen Points peace plan to a joint session of Congress. The address was designed not only to counter the Bolsheviks' call for a general armistice but also, by ...
... peace negotiations with the Germans. That day Wilson delivered his famous Fourteen Points peace plan to a joint session of Congress. The address was designed not only to counter the Bolsheviks' call for a general armistice but also, by ...
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... peace talks between the Bolsheviks and Central Powers at BrestLitovsk continued to run into difficulties. The Germans demanded that the Soviet government renounce Russian sovereignty over Poland, Lithuania, and most of Latvia, and ...
... peace talks between the Bolsheviks and Central Powers at BrestLitovsk continued to run into difficulties. The Germans demanded that the Soviet government renounce Russian sovereignty over Poland, Lithuania, and most of Latvia, and ...
Table des matières
6 | |
Carter and the Decline of Détente 19771981 | |
The Reagan Cold War 19811989 | |
George Bush and the End of the Cold War 19891991 | |
Conclusion | |
Notes | |
Suggested Readings | |
Index | |
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991 Ronald E. Powaski Aucun aperçu disponible - 1997 |
The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991 Ronald E. Powaski Aucun aperçu disponible - 1998 |
The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991 Ronald E. Powaski Aucun aperçu disponible - 1998 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
accept administration’s agreed agreement Allied American Angola announced army assistance attempt believed Berlin Bolsheviks bomb Brezhnev Britain British Brzezinski Bush Carter China Chinese Churchill Cold Cold War communist concessions conflict Congress cooperation crisis Cuba Cuban Cuban missile crisis December defense détente diplomacy diplomatic Eastern Europe economic Eisenhower administration election European feared Foreign Policy French German Gorbachev Grand Alliance hardliners human rights ICBMs Indochina intervention invasion Iran January Japan Japanese John Lewis Gaddis Johnson June Kennedy Kennedy’s Khrushchev Kissinger Korea Mao Zedong March Middle East missiles Moscow Nationalist nations NATO negotiations Nixon North Vietnamese November nuclear weapons October overthrow Pact peace political president presidential proposal refused regime result Roosevelt Russia SALT South Vietnam Soviet government Soviet leader Soviet Union Stalin strategic summit superpowers Taiwan talks Third World treaty Truman administration U.S. forces U.S. military U.S. troops United Vietnamese Vladivostok West West Germany Western Wilson withdrawal