I have reviewed the report of the Commission I established to investigate the accident at Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. The Commission, chaired by Dr. John Kemeny, found very serious shortcomings in the way that both the government and the utility industry regulate and manage nuclear power.

The steps I am taking today will help ensure that nuclear power plants are operated safely. Safety has always been, and will remain, my top priority.

As I have stated before, in this country, nuclear power is an energy source of last resort. By this I meant that as we reach our goals for conservation, direct use of coal, development of solar power and synthetic fuels and enhanced production of American oil and natural gas, we can minimize our reliance on nuclear power.

Many of our foreign allies must place greater reliance than do we on nuclear power, because thay do not have the vast natural resources that give us many alternatives. We must get on with the job of developing alternative energy sources-by passing the legislation I proposed to the Congress, and by making an effort at every level of society to conserve energy.

We cannot shut the door on nuclear energy.

The recent events in Iran have shown us the clear, stark dangers that excessive dependence on imported oil holds for our Nation. We must make every effort to lead this country to energy security.

Every domestic energy source, including nuclear power, is critical if we are to free our country from its overdependence on unstable sources of high-priced foreign oil. We do not have the luxury of abandoning nuclear power or imposing a lengthy moratorium on its further use. A nuclear plant can displace up to 35,000 barrels per day. We must take every possible step to increase the safety of nuclear power production. I agree fully with the spirit and intent of the Kemeny Commission's recommendations, some of which are within my power to implement, others of which rely on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the utility industry itself.

To get the government's own house in order I will take several steps. First, I will send to Congress a reorganization plan to strengthen the role of the Chairman of the NRC and provide this person with the power to act on a daily basis as the chief executive officer, with authority to put needed safety requirements and procedures in place. The Chairman must be able to select key personnel, and act on behalf of the commission during an emergency.

Second, I will appoint a new Chairman of the NRC-someone from outside that agency, in the spirit of the Kemeny Commission's recommendation. In the meantime, I have asked Commissioner Ahearne, now on the NRC, to serve as Chairman. Dr. Ahearne will stress safety and the prompt implementation of the needed reforms. In addition, I will establish an independent advisory committee to help keep me informed of the progress the NRC and the industry are achieving in making nuclear energy safer.

Third, I am directing the Federal Emergency Management Agency to head up all off-site emergency activities, and complete a thorough review of emergency plans in all states with operating reactors by June.

Fourth, I have directed NRC and other agencies to accelerate our program to place a resident federal inspector at every reactor site.

Fifth, I am asking all relevant government agencies to implement virtually all of the other recommendations of the Kemeny Commission.

A detailed fact sheet is being issued to the public, and a more extended briefing will be given to the press.

With clear leadership and improved organization, the Executive branch and the NRC will be better able to act quickly on the critical issues of improved training and standards, safety procedures, and the other Kemeny Commission recommendations.

But responsibility to make nuclear power safer does not stop with the federal government. In fact, the primary day-to-day responsibility for safety rests with utility company management and suppliers of nuclear equipment. There is no substitute for technically qualified and committed people working on the construction, operation and inspection of nuclear power plants. Personal reponsibility must be charged both at the corporate level and at the plant site. The industry owes it to the American people to strengthen its commitment to safety.

I call on the utilities to implement the following changes:

First, building on the steps already taken, the industry must organize itself to develop enhanced standards for safe design, operation, and construction of plants.

Second, the nuclear industry must work together to develop and to maintain in operation a comprehensive training, examination and evaluation program for operators and supervisors. This training program must pass muster with the NRC through accreditation of training programs.

Third, control rooms must be modernized, standardized and simplified as much as possible to permit better informed decisionmaking during an emergency.

I challenge our utility companies to bend every effort to improve the safety of nuclear power.

Finally, I would like to discuss how we manage the transition period during which the Kemeny recommendations are being implemented. There are a number of new nuclear plants now awaiting operating licenses or construction permits.

Licensing decisions rest with the NRC and, as the Kemeny Commission noted, it has the authority to proceed with licensing these plants on a case-by-case basis, which may be used as circumstances surrounding a plant dictate. The NRC has indicated, however, that it will pause in issuing new licenses and construction permits in order to devote its full attention to putting its house in order. I endorse the approach the NRC has adopted, but I urge the NRC to complete its work as quickly as possible, and in any event no latter than six months from today.

Once we have instituted the necessary reforms to assure safety, we must resume the licensing process promptly so that the new plants which we need to reduce our dependence on foreign oil can be built and operated.

The steps I am announcing today will help assure our country of the safety of nuclear plants. Nuclear power has a future in the United States-it is an option that we must keep open. I call on the utilities and their suppliers, the NRC, the executive Departments and agencies, and the State and local governments to assure that the future is a safe one.

The goals of the NRC in licensing and regulating nuclear reactors in the United States are to protect the public health and safety, to protect the quality of the environment, and to assure compliance with the antitrust laws in civilian nuclear activities. The reactor licensing process is centered in the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), where each proposed nuclear power plant is reviewed by a staff drawn from a a broad spectrum of professional disciplines. (See Appendix 1 for a description of the NRR organization.)

The Three Mile Island accident revealed the need for a number of changes in NRC's conception of and approach to nuclear safety, requiring action in the areas of human factors, operational safety, emergency planning, nuclear power plant design and siting, health effects, and public information. Much of the NRR staff was involved in these efforts, participating in the task forces on TMI Support, Bulletins and Orders, and Lessons Learned, as discussed in Chapter 2. This chapter deals with other matters related to the licensing and regulation of nuclear power plants: the licensing of reactor operators, unresolved safety issues, other technical issues, advanced nuclear power plants, protection of the environment, progress in standardization, antitrust and indemnity activities, and other subjects.

Status of Nuclear Power Generation

As of September 30, 1979, there were 192 nuclear power units either in operation, being built or being planned, representing a total capacity of 187,000 net megawatts electric (MWe). This total is 20 units fewer than the total at the end of fiscal year 1978. Of the 192 units, 186 had entered the NRC licensing process, as follows:

70 licensed to operate, with a total capacity of 51,000 MWe.

91 with construction permits representing 100,000 MWe.

25 under review for construction permits, representing 29,000 MWe. (Initial construction work was proceeding on four of these under limited work authorizations.)

Of the remaining six units-those which had not entered the NRC licensing process-four had been ordered and two publicly announced.

Shortly after the close of fiscal year 1979, the Commission issued an "Interim Statement of Policy and Procedure," dated October 4, 1979, taking note of the various investigations-within and outside of NRC-of the TMI accident still underway, and the implications of those efforts for pending licensing actions. The statement affirmed that "new construction permits, limited work authorizations, or operating licenses for any nuclear power reactors shall be issued only after action of the Commission itself. . . . In these circumstances no full adjudicatory decision which authorizes issuance of such a permit, authorization or license shall be issued by an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board except after further order of the Commission itself."

On November 9, following publication of the report of the President's Commission (see Chapter 2), ChairIman Hendrie notified the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy that new nuclear power plants would not be licensed until NRC had developed new or improved safety objectives and the criteria by which to implement them.

Assistance From Other Agencies

Because of the necessity of reallocating a major portion of the staff of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to the conduct and support of the numerous investigations and associated activities

Obtaining an NRC construction permit-or a limited work authorization, pending a decision on issuance of a construction permit-is the first objective of a utility or other company seeking to operate a nuclear power reactor or other nuclear facility under NRC license. The process is set in motion with the filing and acceptance of the application, generally comprising ten or more large volumes of material covering both safety and environmental factors, in accordance with NRC requirements and guidance. The second phase consists of safety and environmental factors, in accordance with NRC requirements and guidance. The second phase consists of safety, environmental, safeguards and antitrust reviews undertaken by the NRC staff. Third, a safety review is conducted by the independent Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); this review is required by law. Fourth, a mandatory public hearing is conducted by a three-member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), which then makes an initial decision as to whether the permit should be granted. This decision is subject to appeal to an Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (ASLAB) and could ultimately go to the Commissioners for final NRC decision. The law provides for appeal beyond the Commission in the Federal courts.

As soon as an initial application is accepted, or “docketed,” by the NRC, a notice of that fact is published in the Federal Register, and copies of the application are furnished to appropriate State and local authorities and to a local public document room (LPDR) established in the vicinity of the proposed site, as well as to the NRC-PDR in Washington, D.C. At the same time, a notice of a public hearing is published in the Federal Register and local newspapers) which provides 30 days for members of the public to petition to intervene in the proceeding. Such petitions are entertained and adjudicated by the ASLB appointed to the case, with rights of appeal by the petitioner to the ASLAB.

The NRC staff's safety, safeguards, environmental and antitrust reviews proceed in parallel. With the guidance of the Standard Format (Regulatory Guide 1.70), the applicant for a construction permit lays out the proposed nuclear plant design in a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR). If and when this report has been made sufficiently complete to warrant review, the application is docketed and NRC staff evaluations begin. Even prior to submission of the report, NRC staff conducts a substantive review and inspection of the applicant's quality assurance program covering design and procurement. The safety review is performed by NRC staff in accordance with the Standard Review Plan for Light-Water-Cooled Reactors, initially published in September 1975 and updated periodically. This plan states the acceptance criteria used in evaluating the various systems, components and structures important to safety and in assessing the proposed site, and it describes the procedures used in performing the safety review.

The NRC staff examines the applicant's PSAR to determine whether the plant design is safe and consistent with NRC rules and regulations; whether valid methods of calculation were employed and accurately carried out; whether the applicant has conducted his analysis and evaluation in sufficient depth and breadth to support staff approval with respect to safety. When the staff is satisfied that the acceptance criteria of the Standard Review Plan have been met by the applicant's preliminary report, a Safety Evaluation Report is prepared by the staff summarizing the results of their review regarding the anticipated effects of the proposed facility on the public health and safety.

Following publication of the staff Safety Evaluation Report, the ACRS completes its review and meets with staff and applicant. The ACRS then prepares a letter report to the Chairman of the NRC

presenting the results of its independent evaluation and recommending whether or not a construction permit should be issued. The staff issues a supplement to the Safety Evaluation Report incorporating any changes or actions adopted as a result of ACRS recommendations. A public hearing can then be held, generally in a community near the proposed site, on safety aspects of the licensing decision.

In appropriate cases, NRC may grant a Limited Work Authorization to an applicant in advance of the final decision on the construction permit in order to allow certain work to begin at the site, saving as much as seven months time. The authorization will not be given, however, until NRC staff has completed environmental impact and site suitability reviews and the appointed ASLB has conducted a public hearing on environmental impact and site suitability with a favorable finding. To realize the desired saving of time, the applicant must submit the environmental portion of the application early.

The environmental review begins with a review of the applicant's Environmental Report (ER) for acceptability. Assuming the ER is sufficiently complete to warrant review, it is docketed and an analysis of the consequences to the environment of the construction and operation of the proposed facility at the proposed site is begun. Upon completion of this analysis, a Draft Environmental Statement is published and distributed with specific requests for review and comment by Federal, State and local agencies, other interested parties and members of the public. All of their comments are then taken into account in the preparation of a Final Environmental Statement. Both the draft and the final statements are made available to the public at the time of respective publication. During this same time period NRC is conducting an analysis and preparing a report on site suitability aspects of the proposed licensing action. Upon completion of these activities, a public hearing, with the appointed ASLB presiding, may be conducted on environmental and site suitability aspects of the propsed licensing action (or a single hearing on both safety and environmental matters may be held, if that is indicated).

The antitrust reviews of license applications are carried out by the NRC and the Attorney General in advance of, or concurrently with, other licensing reviews. If an antitrust hearing is required, it is held separately from those on safety and environmental aspects.

About two or three years before construction of the plant is scheduled to be complete, the applicant files an application for an operating license. A process similar to that for the construction permit is followed. The application is filed, NRC staff and the ACRS review it, a Safety Evaluation Report and an updated Environmental Statement are issued. A public hearing is not mandatory at this stage, but one may be held if requested by affected members of the public or at the initiative of the Commission. Each license for operation of a nuclear reactor contains technical specifications which set forth the particular safety and environmental protection measures to be imposed upon the facility and the conditions that must be met for the facility to operate.

Once licensed, a nuclear facility remains under NRC surveillance and undergoes periodic inspections throughout its operating life. In cases where the NRC finds that substantial, additional protection is necessary for the public health and safety or the common defense and security, the NRC may require "backfitting" of a licensed plant, that is, the addition, elimination or modification of structures, systems or components of the plant.

related to the accident at Three Mile Island, substantial delays were encountered in the review of applications for operating licenses for nuclear power plants. To help alleviate this situation, the NRC sought the help of technical experts in other Government agencies on a temporary basis, under interagency contracting arrangements.

During the latter part of 1979, the Department of Energy made available technical specialists from several national laboratories to assist in technical reviews of applications. Review teams have been established at the Argonne National Laboratory, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the Savannah River Laboratory, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, the Pacific Northwest Laboratory, the Battelle Columbus Laboratory, the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, and the Energy Technology Engineering Center.

Technical assistance has also been obtained from the U.S. Geological Survey, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Naval Research Laboratory.

These resources will be used during fiscal year 1980 to supplement NRC staff resources for the review of license applications, pending recruitment and hiring of additional personnel authorized by Congress.

Licensing Reactor Operators

The safety of a nuclear facility depends not only on its design but on the qualifications of the people who operate it. To assure that the people in charge of each nuclear power plant are capable of directing and performing the activities necessary to reactor operation, the NRC requires each individual who handles the controls of the reactor to be licensed. The requirements for issuance of operators' licenses are set forth in 10 CFR Part 55. Two types of licenses are issued by the NRC: one for "operators" and one for "senior operators." During fiscal year 1979, the NRC issued 212 new operator licenses, 256 renewals, and 26 amendments, bringing the number of operator licenses in effect on September 30, 1979 to 992. During the

same period, 184 new licenses, 434 renewals, and 36 amendments were issued for senior operators, bringing the total to 1,437 in effect.

TMI Related Activities. Following the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI), members of the Operator Licensing Branch were assigned to the Lessons Learned Task Force, Bulletins and Orders Task Force, and TMI Support Task Force to determine the role of nuclear power plant operators in the TMI-2 accident, to assist in the development of recommendations for the upgrading of operator training requirements, and to review and recommend changes to normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures. A number of these proposals have been submitted to the Commission for review. The activities of these task forces and other groups dealing with the causes and consequences of the TMI accident, both within and outside of the NRC, are covered at length in the preceding chapter of this report.

UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES

Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, reads as follows:

"Unresolved Safety Issues Plan" "Section 210. The Commission shall develop a plan for providing for specification and analysis of unresolved safety issues relating to nuclear reactors and shall take such action as may be necessary to implement corrective measures with respect to such issues. Such plan shall be submitted to the Congress on or before January 1, 1978 and progress reports shall be included in the annual report to the Commission thereafter."

In response to this reporting requirement, the NRC provided a report to the Congress, NUREG-0410, in January of 1978 describing the generic issues program of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) that had been implemented early in 1977. The NRR program described in NUREG-0410 provides for the identification of generic issues, the assignment of

priorities, the development of detailed task action plans to resolve the issues, the projections of dollar and man-power costs, continuing high level management oversight of task progress, and public dissemination of information related to the tasks as they progress.

The 1978 NRC Annual Report described the NRC's progress towards resolving those issues addressed in the NRR program that had been identified as "Unresolved Safety Issues" (p. 19). Seventeen "Unresolved Safety Issues" were identified, to be addressed by 22 generic tasks. Three of these generic tasks have now been reported as complete.

Evaluation Process

The definition of an "Unresolved Safety Issue" developed by the NRC for use in identifying issues that require reporting to the Congress (pursuant to Section 210) is as follows:

"An Unresolved Safety Issue is a matter affecting a number of nuclear power plants that poses important questions concerning the adequacy of existing safety requirements for which a final resolution has not yet been developed and that involves conditions not likely to be acceptable over the lifetime of the plants affected."

The process used to determine which issues met the definition of an "Unresolved Safety Issue" was described briefly in the 1978 NRC Annual Report and in considerably more detail in NUREG-0510, "Identification of Unresolved Safety Issues Relating to Nuclear Power Plants-A Report to Congress." (NUREG-0510 accompanied the 1978 Annual Report when it was transmitted to the Congress in January of 1979.) The review process included a systematic review of over 130 generic issues. As an aid to this review, an evaluation was made of the subject areas involved according to their relative importance from the standpoint of public risk. This risk-based characterization was used together with a substantial body of additional information (e.g., heavy weight was given to issues arising from events reported to the Congress as "Abnormal Occurrences") to determine which issues qualified for reporting to Congress.

Table 2 provides a listing of each of the "Unresolved Safety Issues" and related generic tasks identified in the 1978 NRC Annual Report. It also provides last year's projected dates for issuing NRC staff reports and the corresponding dates as of December 1, 1979.

As indicated in Table 2, three reports providing the staff's resolution of three "Unresolved Safety Issues" were issued for public comment as of January 1, 1980. Four more staff reports addressing four more "Unresolved Safety Issues" are expected to be issued by the end of February 1980. A number of the tasks have undergone schedule slips in 1979. These schedule slips

can be attributed in large measure to the temporary staff reassignments occasioned by the TMI-2 accident. The technical scope of several of the tasks also required some further definition as a result of the accident. The impacts of the accident on those Unresolved Safety Issue tasks which were affected are discussed briefly in the individual task progress reports below.

In an effort to minimize the impact of the TMI-2 accident on these tasks, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation established, in June of 1979, an interim organization specifically assigned to continue work on "Unresolved Safety Issues." This interim structure was still in place as of January 1, 1980.

Identification of New Issues

Although a number of safety-related issues came to light in 1979 as a result of the TMI-2 accident and other events, the NRC staff has not been able to perform an in-depth review to identify and evaluate new issues. Therefore, no new "Unresolved Safety Issues” have been defined for reporting in 1979. As of January 1, 1980, NRC efforts were being concentrated on implementing new TMI-related TMI-related requirements on operating plants and on identifying, defining and scoping additional TMI-related issues and tasks. Several broad program areas where issues and tasks are being scoped will likely result in designation of new Unresolved Safety Issues. These program areas include the following:

(1) Man-machine interface and control-room design.

(2) Qualification and training of operation, maintenance and supervisory personnel.

(3) Off-site emergency response, emergency planing, and action guidelines.

(4) Siting policy, including compensatory design and operating provisions for plants in areas where evacuation would be difficult.

(5) Systems reliability and interactions. (6) Consideration in licensing requirements of accidents involving degraded or melted fuel. The NRC staff performed a cursory review of a number of candidate issues from sources other than TMI accident investigations, including a review of events reported as Abnormal Occurrences in 1979. None of these issues was judged to be of such safety urgency and importance as to require reporting in advance of the staff's and the Commission's in-depth and systematic review of all candidate issues. Such a systematic and in-depth review will be performed in 1980, after the major recommendations of the major TMI investigations are available. A special report will be provided to the Congress by July of 1980, describing the review and the new issues to be designated Unresolved Safety Issues.