• To emphasize prompt and vigorous enforcement in dealing with licensees who are unable or unwilling to comply with NRC requirements.

• To require, in any consideration of regulatory costs to licensees and their customers, that cost factors be set forth explicitly and applied with public health and safety being the paramount consideration.

• To consider, in determining the adequacy of public protection, the health and safety implications of not operating a facility as well as the potential radiological or other hazards of its operation.

• To increase emphasis on minimizing the consequences of possible accidents, theft or diversion of nuclear materials, and sabotage or other illegal acts.

• To license or permit continued operation of a nuclear facility only when the NRC is confident that, after termination of the license, there will be adequate protection of the public health and safety from potential hazards of the decommissioned facility itself and from wastes associated with it.

• To continue a research program whose objectives are (1) to assist in determining adequate levels of protection of the public health and safety and (2) to explore ways to achieve improved levels of protection. The research program should not include items that should be supported exclusively by the private sector. The research program must be focused on identifiable needs, and its relevance to the agency's regulatory mission must be the paramount basis for the program.

These policy and planning guidance statements form the basis for more detailed policy and budget guidance on each of the important NRC programs.

HIGHLIGHTS AND UPDATES

Accident at Three Mile Island

The accident that occurred on March 28, 1979 at Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 2 was a traumatic event for the American public-especially for the public living near the facility-as well as for the licensee and other utilities; nuclear plant designers, manufacturers and suppliers; local, State, and Federal authorities responding to the emergency; and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The extent of the accident's impact on all of these and on the future of commercial nuclear activity may not be assessable for a long time, but it is certain that it is and will be a profound and lasting one. As serious as the event was, major investigations agreed that releases of radioactive material from the facility were low throughout the course of the accident.

Chapter 2 of this annual report, which is devoted entirely to the TMI accident, includes a narrative of the events of March 28-April 1; actions taken and investigations made by NRC in the aftermath of the accident up to the end of 1979, with conclusions and recommendations; and a full account of the findings and recommendations of the President's Commission on the accident and the NRC's response to each of them.

The President's Commission on the TMI accident was established on April 11, 1979. President Carter

charged the Commission with investigating the accident and reporting to him within six months with recommendations based on its findings.

The NRC also chartered its own inquiry into the accident, under independent directorship, the results of which were published at the end of January 1980. In general, the conclusions and recommendations of this NRC Special Inquiry Group were consistent with, but more detailed than, those of the President's Commission. The Special Inquiry Group's report was still under review by the Commission in early 1980.

NRC Organization and Management

The reports of the President's Commission on the TMI accident, NRC's Special Inquiry Group, and the recent five-year evaluation of the NRC by the General Accounting Office ("The Nuclear Regulatory Commission: More Aggressive Leadership Needed") stressed the need to improve the overall managerial functions of the Commission as a means of improving reactor safety. The Commission did not agree with the recommendation that the NRC be made an Executive Branch agency headed by a single administrator.

In addition to the formulation of explicit policy, planning, and program guidance mentioned earlier, the Commission has taken or is taking the following steps to provide more effective agency management: • The Commission continues to pursue the consolidation of all NRC offices at a single location as a means of increasing effectiveness, as recommended by Congressional committees and various investigatory bodies.

• The Commission is moving to correct the significant organization and management weaknesses that were revealed by the TMI accident and subsequent investigations. These actions include clarifying the role of the Executive Director for Operations, making the Chairman solely responsible for emergency response, giving increased attention to human factors in nuclear regulation, developing mechanisms to assure more effective use of advice offered by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, providing a staff dedicated solely to the evaluation of operating experience, and providing for a more effective role of the public in reactor licensing.

• The Commission is considering appropriate delegations of authority to the NRC staff that would permit increased concentration by the Commissioners on matters of overriding significance.

As this report was in final preparation, the President sent to the Congress an NRC reorganization plan designed to improve agency management by, among other actions, strengthening the role of the Chairman.

Reactor Safety

In July 1979, an NRC task force-brought together to develop a systematic NRC response to the several inquiries and investigations of the TMI accident-recommended a number of short-term actions to improve power reactor safety (see Chapter 2, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force"). New requirements were issued to all operating reactor licensees with the objective of completing the changes by January 1, 1980. Some licensees had difficulty meeting the deadline because of delays in obtaining necessary equipment. Thus, while most licensees had made significant progress by the end of 1979, the NRC took further action by issuing orders making continued operation of the reactor(s) in question contingent upon all changes being implemented by January 31, 1980. Extensions of the deadline were permitted only when a licensee could show that the needed equipment could not be obtained within the time frame or that a reasonable delay would alleviate severe power supply problems. In no case, however, will plants be allowed to operate beyond June 1, 1980 without completion of the changes.

By the end of 1979, the findings of the various investigations and studies of the TMI accident were used

by the staff to draft a proposed program of work, "NRC Action Plans Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident" (NUREG-0660). This draft "TMI Action Plan" contains schedules and resource requirements for more than 100 tasks to provide a higher level of protection of the public health and safety. Although many of the proposed tasks are to be completed in 1980, a significant number are multi-year projects that may extend into the mid-1980's.

No operating license was issued for a nuclear power plant during fiscal year 1979, and the need to devote licensing staff resources to TMI-related issues applicable to operating reactors, and subsequently to apply the lessons learned to new plants not yet in operation, resulted in a licensing hiatus that extended into early 1980. Further, because the TMI accident raised significant questions concerning the effectiveness of NRC regulations and practices in assuring adequate protection to the public, the Commissioners announced in October that new construction permits, limited work authorizations, or operating licenses would be issued only after careful review by the Commission itself. *

Certain NRC actions also are intended to improve the technical and managerial competence of reactor licensees and the quality of the human element in achieving the safe operation of nuclear reactors. Essentially, these actions are concerned with the interaction between man and machine-the "human

On February 28, 1980, the Commissioners approved issuance of a license to the Tennessee Valley Authority authorizing the loading of fuel in its Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1, and performance of low-power testing under specified conditions. Several other similar actions were under consideration.

factors" whose critical importance was revealed in the TMI accident. Proposed projects range from establishing new requirements for staffing and manning control rooms and for training and qualification of reactor operators and their supervisors to developing and procuring training and engineering simulators. In cooperation with the nuclear industry, the staff also proposed to study and identify means for improving control room design.

Emergency Preparedness

The accident demonstrated that emergency preparedness both on-site and off-site should be considered comparable in importance to other elements of the “defense-in-depth" approach to nuclear safety, and that substantial work must be done in emergency preparedness, particularly with respect to off-site preparedness to deal with the aftermath of an accident.

Soon after the accident, Chairman Joseph Hendrie wrote to the Governors of applicable States urging the development and testing of emergency plans around the sites of nuclear power reactors in operation or under construction. Most of the State and local authorities have begun to move ahead with development or refinement of their plans.

In December 1979, the Commission proposed new rules that would require upgraded emergency plans in areas near nuclear power plants and concurrence by the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in State and local plans as a condition. of continued operation of existing plants and issuance of new operating licenses. Both NRC and FEMA are working with State and local authorities to test and evaluate off-site emergency plans.

From April through July of 1979, a continuous watch was established in each region and at the NRC Incident Response Center in Bethesda, Md., to provide for immediate response to any incident or accident. In August, a communications system directly tied into the Operations Center (where 24-hour coverage is maintained) became operational, thus relieving the 24-hour duty offices in the Regions.

Other NRC priorities for improving emergency capabilities include:

• Developing NRC, licensee, and State/Local emergency procedures for all appropriate facilities.

Instituting for emergency planning purposes a zone concept that would establish two concentric zones around each nuclear power plant-the first for plume exposure pathway and the second for the ingestive exposure pathway (milk and agricultural products).

• Requiring additional instrumentation that would: (1) provide more precise information on the status of key equipment during an accident,

Several hundred State and local employees assigned to radiological emergency response teams have received training in the Radiological Emergency Response Operations course conducted at DOE's Nevada Test Site.

and (2) expand the means for measuring radioactive releases around major nuclear facilities. Upgrading NRC, licensee, and local communications facilities for prompt NRC response to emergencies.

Analysis of Operating Data

The TMI accident revealed a need for NRC to put greater effort into systematically analyzing operational data from nuclear power plants to detect trends that would better enable all concerned to identify safety problems and take action before they cause accidents.

In July 1979, the NRC established an Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data to conduct systematic and rigorous assessments of licensee operating experience. The new office will analyze and evaluate operational data associated with all NRC licensed activities; develop formal NRC guidance on the collection, evaluation, and feedback of operational data; and take cognizance of the similar efforts of NRC program offices, industry organizations, and foreign countries. NRC reactor licensees will be required to conduct analyses of their operating experience and disseminate the results.

Within the industry, two new organizations, the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations have been created to systematically review plant operating experience.

These organizations will develop and implement programs designed to ensure a high quality of operation in nuclear power plants. The NRC's exchange arrangements with other countries and international nuclear organizations provide it with data on operating experience of overseas reactors, many of which are of U.S. design.

Inspection and Enforcement

For some time, NRC had realized that greater NRC presence is needed at major licensed facilities. The resident inspector program provides this increased presence at nuclear power plants and other selected facilities. The resident inspectors conduct frequent. direct observation of licensee activities, thereby relying less on the records and reports which were the principal sources of information in the past.

The resident program, approved by the Commission in 1977, has been expanded to entail the placing of at least two resident inspectors at each operating nuclear facility site in fiscal year 1980. By December 31, 1979, a total of 60 inspectors had been deployed at 45 nuclear power stations and three fuel facilities. By June 1980, each site with a reactor in operation or about to go into operation (as well as a substantial number of reactor construction sites) will have at least one resident inspector.

NRC is currently examining its enforcement policy and practices. The Commission is awaiting Congressional action on a proposal to increase the civil penalty authority from a maximum of $5,000 to $100,000 per violation; the higher authority is more in line with that available to other agencies with public health and safety missions. The Commission is also preparing a restatement of enforcement policy that would implement the new authority and provide clear guidance to the staff.

An NRC reactor inspector (right) at work.

Radiation Protection

Significant steps are being taken in improving our understanding of the potential health effects from exposure to low-level radiation. Holding radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable under normal conditions is a fundamental objective of NRC's radiation protection activities. NRC is taking the following steps to achieve this goal:

• Participating in the President's Radiation Policy Council to improve the coordination of Federal radiation protection activities.

Working closely with the Environmental Protection Agency and other Federal agencies to develop improved standards for controlling occupational exposures. Cooperation with EPA includes joint hearings on occupational exposure standards, coordination of research programs, and a study on the health effects of low-level radiation.

Improving NRC radiation protection criteria for the adequacy of licensee health physics programs, and conducting in-depth radiological safety evaluations at every operating reactor.

• Working with the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health to establish a TMI worker registry that could be used for follow-up health studies.

Research

As a direct result of the TMI accident, NRC's research emphasis is being shifted from large-break, loss-of-coolant accidents to small-break LOCA's and related transients. Research effort is increasing in the areas of verification of computer codes, fuel behavior under accident conditions, monitoring of radioactive releases, emergency response planning, and risk assessment. Research has also been initiated in areas not adequately considered in the past-fuel damage and its effects, core melt, and containment integrity. Also, a new study has begun into simulators, control rooms, and human factors in nuclear power plant operations. The accident has also underscored the need to apply the fault-tree/event-tree techniques used in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) to each operating plant, in an effort to identify the likelihood and consequences of the accident sequences which are the largest contributors to risk. An "Interim Reliability Evaluation Program" to review all operating reactors over the next few years is already under way.

In areas unrelated to TMI, NRC research on seismic and structural engineering and code verification was increased during the reporting period following the shutdown of five reactors in early March 1979 because of errors in the seismic analyses of the plants. Research into the development and application of risk assessment techniques has allowed the Commission to iden