is apprehended in the latter, and the want of SERM. it in the other. But applying this to ourselves, VIII. and to the direction of our own affairs, we shall be yet more fenfible how much wisdom is neceffarily in our esteem, and of how great importance to our happiness; for, as we are inwardly conscious of an intelligent principle, our fatisfaction in the part we act, always de pends upon our knowing that we are governed by it. Events which have no dependence on our own choice or intention may affect us very fenfibly, whether they be fuppofed to come by chance, or neceffity, or by the will of another agent; they may, I fay, affect us, but in a manner very different from our own ac tions with the forefeen neceffary confequences of them, which are directly the objects of the mind's approbation or disapprobation, and give us pleasure upon the review of them, only fo far as we appear to our felves to have acted wifely.

Nay fo true are mankind universally to this rule of conduct, however they may be mistaken in the application of it, that in all their divided opinions and purfuits, moft directly contradictory to each other, every one flatters himself, that he has reafon on his fide. The religious man, the philofopher, the politician, the economist, and even the fordid mifer, and

the

ŞERM, the luxurious, fuch, at least, of these several VIII. fects as are the most fixed in their oppofite courfes, and thoroughly governed by their denominating principle (and in them the cafe is fairly stated) imagine that their choice is, all circumstances confidered, the best, and their behaviour the wifeft. The men of pleasure and gayety who feem profeffedly to despise wisdom, it is only what they fancy to be the outward appearances and affectation of it that is the object of their ridicule, they think that good fenfe and reason is with them, which is but another name for wisdom, that the end of their prosecutions is fomething real, a sensible pleasure, (and there is no arguing against experience) and that the fuperior enjoyments which others talk of are but vifionary. The more grave and fober man, who is wholly devoted to his worldly intereft, which he decently and fkilfully purfues, imagines he knows the world well, which he reckons a point of great wisdom, and the defigns he carries on are well concerted, folid and fubftantial, leaving fpiritual and intellectual pleafures, fo called, which he defpifes in his heart, to the religionists and virtuofi, as well as the madness of licentious and expenfive mirth to the prodigal. I obferve this only to fhew that there must be fome appearance of wif

dom in our conduct to justify it to ourselves, SERM. and that we neceffarily have fuch a regard to VIII, reason, that we cannot knowingly and deliberately act against its dictates with any contentment in our own minds; fo that lufts and paffions, let them be ever fo ftrong, in order to their having a fettled dominion in the heart, must filence understanding, or rather bring it over to their fide; for fuppofing a man's choice, and the course he follows, to be never fo foolish in itself, and in the judgment of others, he cannot be eafy in it without, at least, a conceit of wisdom to countenance it, which is apparent in the case of the fluggard (one of the lowest and most contemptible of all characters) who, as Soloman obferves, * is wifer in his own conceit than feven men that can render a reafon.

Since it is fo, this is one principal point which all our deliberations ought to aim at; and the question, by the decifion whereof, we fhould be determined in our defigns and courfes of action is, whether they be wife or not, that is, becoming rational agents in our circumstances? And then it evidently follows, that we ought to examine, there being no other way by which we can come to a rational judgment. Let it not be objected that examination is difficult, and we are in danger of miftaking; difficulty fhould never be objected

*Prov. xxvi. 16.

SERM. jected against abfolute neceffity; and for the VIII. danger of a wrong judgment whether it is greater

in the way of a diligent enquiry, or of negli gence? The queftion is not, whether we fhall be directed by the appearance of wisdom, or not? that is unavoidable; but whether we are more likely to escape being mif-led by falfe appearances, and attain to the knowledge of the truth, and to fatisfaction in our own minds, as acting a rational part, by examining or no examining, by exercifing our own reafon, or not exercifing it?

Let the most important of all caufes, that of religion itself, be determined this way'; and the more important it is, the greater attention it deferves. My text fays it is wisdom, and it reprefents God as faying fo unto man, he faid, behold the fear of the Lord, that is wif dom, and to depart from evil is understanding. In the preceding verfe it is fhewn that man carmot penetrate into the counfels of God, his contrivances in the formation of the world, and in the government of it, they are too deep for his understanding: God's ways are un fearchable, and his judgments past finding out, but the trueft wisdom for him, and the moft fuitable to his nature, that he may attain the highest perfection it is capable of, is religion,

or

or the fear of the Lord. This God himfelfSERM. has taught us, and fince he has condefcended VIII. to fet it in that light; he has thereby fubjected it to our own enquiry and confideration, it being impoffible we should fee any thing to be wisdom, and rationally pronounce it fo without examining it. Religion is not, under the pretence of its being facred and too fublime for the human understanding, to be taken upon truft without enquiring into the grounds of it; for thus we should expose ourfelves a prey to every impofture, and have no means left of diftinguishing between truth and falfhood, in a matter which of all others is the most important. Let every man's reason be judge for himself what he shall believe as truth, and what he fhall embrace as wisdom, for we have no other faculty by which we can difcern either, to give an affent upon other terms, is what our minds are not capable of.

Now though the affertion of the text, that the fear of the Lord is wisdom, generally paffes for true among chriftians, however it may be too little confidered, and have too little influence on men's practice, yet it is avowa edly opposed by fome who represent all religion as unreasonable, both in its foundation, and its tendency. They pretend, firft of all, that there is at bottom nothing in it but what is

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