government they were made; but they are com posed of precepts, founded in the nature of things, adapted to man's circumstances, necessary for his well-being and happiness: They are profitable to him for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness; that the rational creature of God may be perfect, and thoroughly furnished unto all good works. This, I take to be, the great end of religion, both natural and revealed: and, so far as the sanctions and the doctrines, of the one, and of the other, are calculated to produce these effects, they are beneficial and divine: and where this is not the case, although they may have descended to us from ancient times, and have been taught in creeds and missals, and have been decreed sacred and true, and have been upheld by power, advocated by talent, and graced by fashion, they must be classed amongst the offspring of prejudice, and the visions of su~* perstition.

But here a most important question arises. How, says the inquirer, shall I discover truth and reject falsehood? By what rule shall I ascertain whether the precepts and doctrines that are propounded to me, really, have the sanction of genuine religion? We will proceed, briefly, to reply to this question.

We have already observed that, the Creator may be known by his works: or, in the words of the apostle; "The invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made:' that, from the same sources, we derive much knowledge of

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what he requireth of us, as creatures whom he hath endowed with reason, and associated with beings of like nature with ourselves. We remarked, moreover, that 'revelation confirms the knowledge which men derive from meditations upon the works of God; that it adds thereunto, many new and most interesting facts, and presents to their minds other and more powerful motives for the diligent performance of duty. So that, we perceive, the Divine Being hath provided the means whereby truth may be discovered, in the very nature and constitution of the system with which we are connected. In fact, truth has been, justly, defined to be, the agreement of our ideas, words and actions, with the real nature and state of things.' Here, then, we have a test, by which, in all those branches of knowledge more immediately necessary to our welfare-in every thing that concerns the chief duties and relations of our being, we may try our principles and actions, and form a tolerably correct judgment, as to what is good or evil, true or false. In proportion as men have paid a due regard to this test, their ideas of God and of their duty have been refined and enlarged, and the beneficial consequences of such attention have been visible in their condition; but, whensoever, either through the darkness of mind which never fails to accompany a too great devotion to sensual pleasures and pursuits, or the obliquity of judgment which is produced by teaching the fear of God, not after the testimony of his works, but after the traditions and precepts of men, they have been induced to disregard and contemn

this test, and to reject it as their rule in principle and practice, the truth of God has been changed into a lie-the creature has been worshiped and served rather than the Creator; and superstition, vice, and misery, have been suffered to defeat the best purposes and hopes of humanity.

But it may be asked, how is it possible to make a rule, generally applicable, which requires a vast amount of previous knowledge in the person using it? How can it be of service amongst the greater portion of the human race, made up, as that portion is, of unlettered, inexperienced, men? The application of the rule requires a knowledge too profound, and an experience too extensive, for the generality of men to pretend to? This, as it seems to me, is an objection more plausible than solid. The Divine Being has so constituted the nature and circumstances of man, that in some cases, his very existence, and in all cases, his improvement and happiness, depend, upon his adherence to truth; while his bane and his misery are no less intimately connected with error. It cannot be, that, under the government of a Being of perfect goodness, the discovery of all truth, more immediately, necessary, to the welfare of man, should, to an honest and ingenuous mind, be an uncertain or difficult matter. I would not, indeed, be understood to say, that there do not frequently occur cases, in the eventful life of man, wherein the wisest, the most patient investigator, would be baffled in his researches; but that, as it respects homely, practical, every-day, truthstruths, which make men upright and useful mem

bers of society, as it respects the great subjects of religion and morals-duty towards God, ourselves, and our fellow men,-the path is clear, the truth is easily discovered. 'Some cases,' says an eminent divine, are so complicated; and so many circumstances are to be taken in, in order to know the truth, the truth of the case, that it may be very difficult to determine which way to act. But, generally speaking, the truth is plain, and there is wanting only common care and attention to direct men: and they are so conscious of this, that they can condemn themselves, how much soever they may strive to conceal their actions from others. This shows that they know the truth, and measure their actions by it, and are not ignorant of the relations of things; but only strive to cover and conceal from others what they are conscious is done amiss.'

'Truth,' as we have already observed, is the agreement of our ideas, words, and actions, with the real nature and state of things.' It is by this rule that men try the correctness or the fallacy of any given proposition. The axiom, that 'the whole is greater than its part,' or that things which are halves of the same are equal to one another,' is true, not because such is the arbitrary appointment of any being whatsoever, but because it agrees with the necessary and unalterable relations of things. The same rule may be applied to propositions in morals. God hath so constituted our nature, that sensual excesses produce disease

* Dr. Sykes.—Principles and Connexion of Nat, and Ren, Rel.

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thats a selfish and reckless pursuit of our own desires and pleasures, causes suffering and misery in the society of which we form a part. Such conduct is denominated intemperate and vicious, not from any arbitrary determination of men, but because it is so, by the will and appointment, of God. Hence are the propositions, Temperance promotes health,' and Vice leads to misery, true propositions. dojda en ennastaranis oft mor

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But passing over many common and hobrie ous modes of application of the rule of truth, we observe, that it may be used as a test of moral character. There are certain duties incumbent on us as rational beings and members of society, by the neglecting, or the performing, of which, our character is determined. If a man be industrious in the business of his calling, and duly exert himself to provide for his family if he do his best to cherish his wife, to provide instruction for his children, and to set forth, both by precept and example, the reasonableness, the beauty, and the value of honesty and industry we ac knowledge that he acts according to the rule of truth that is, to the nature and state of the circumstances in which he is placed. We call such a one a good husband, a good father, a good, or true, member of society. But, on the other hand, if his actions have little or no correspondence to, or agreement with, the circumstances of his particular case, he violates the rule of truth: we pronounce him to be a bad husband, a bad father, a bad, or untrue, member of society. The same test -may be applied with equal certainty to all the

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