 That, in short, no reasoning from generals to particulars can, as such, prove anything, since from a general principle we cannot infer any particulars, but those which the principle itself assumes as known.  The British Quarterly Review - Page 19publié par - 1846Affichage du livre entier - À propos de ce livre
 | 1843 - 832 pages
...every shadow of douht which could affect any case comprised with it, is dispelled hy evidence alinnds, and then what remains for the syllogism to prove ?...reasoning from generals to particulars can, as such, prove any thing; since from a general principle you cannot infer any particulars, hut those which the principle... | |
 | 1843 - 1380 pages
...every shadow of doubt which could affect any case comprised with it, is dispelled by evidence aliunde, and then what remains for the syllogism to prove ?...reasoning from generals to particulars can, as such, prove any thing; since from a general principle you cannot infer any particulars, but those which the principle... | |
 | Edward Royall Tyler, William Lathrop Kingsley, George Park Fisher, Timothy Dwight - 1846 - 632 pages
...reasoning from generals to particulars can prove any thing, since from a general principle you can not infer any particulars but those which the principle itself assumes as foreknown." But the question is not whether you can infer any other particulars, but whether the inference you... | |
 | John Stuart Mill - 1846 - 624 pages
...comprised with it, is dispelled by evidence aliundè.; and then what remains for the syllogism to prove 1 that, in short, no reasoning from generals to particulars...assumes as foreknown. This doctrine is irrefragable ; and if logicians, though unable to dispute it, have usually exhibited a strong disposition to explain... | |
 | John Stuart Mill - 1846 - 630 pages
...dispelled by evidence aliunde ; and then what remains for the syllogism to prove 1 that, in nhojt, no reasoning from generals to particulars can, as such, prove anything : since from s general principle you cannot infer any particulars, but those which the principle itself assumes... | |
 | 1848 - 544 pages
...Accordingly he allows, that " no reasoning from generals to particulars can, as such, prove any thing ; since from a general principle you cannot infer any...which the principle itself assumes as foreknown." " But this is in fact to say, that nothing ever was or can be proved by syllogism, which was not known,... | |
 | John Stuart Mill - 1851 - 530 pages
...every shadow of doubt which could affect any case comprised with it, is dispelled by evidence aliundd; and then what remains for the syllogism to prove?...particulars, but those which the principle itself assumes as known. This doctrine appears to me irrefragable; and if logicians, though unable to dispute it, have... | |
 | John Stuart Mill - 1852 - 640 pages
...every shadow of doubt which could aflbct any case comprised with it, is dispelled by evidence aliunde ; and then what remains for the syllogism to prove ?...to particulars can, as such, prove anything : since Irom a general principle you cannot infer any particulars, but those which the principle itself assumes... | |
 | Jared Sparks, Edward Everett, James Russell Lowell, Henry Cabot Lodge - 1856 - 588 pages
...of a new truth, but only a repetition of what we have just taken for granted. Hence, it is argued, " no reasoning from generals to particulars can, as...which the principle itself assumes as foreknown." De Morgan answers this sophistry by saying : " Inference does not give us more than there was before... | |
 | James Robert Boyd - 1856 - 266 pages
...to prove ? that, in short, no reasoning from generals to particulars can, as such, prove any thing ; since from a general principle you cannot infer any...assumes as foreknown. This doctrine is irrefragable ; and if logicians, though unable to dispute it, have usually exhibited a strong disposition to explain... | |
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