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Philosophy ever will be, with the principles and interests of correct morals and religion. The aspect of the times evidently demanded that the attempt should be made by somebody. There is no question that a Work of this kind, especially in connexion with the mental training of young persons, has for some time been greatly needed. But whether I have succeeded in meeting the reasonable expectations and wishes of the friends of literature, I must leave to others to decide.

The reader will notice that the Work proceeds, after a brief discussion of the doctrine of Primary Truths, and a few other preparatory views, upon the basis of a threefold division of the mind, viz., the INTELLECT, the SENSIBILITIES, and the WILL. This general division, which, notwithstanding its obvious importance, has not generally been made proininent in philosophical writers, and has even been rejected by some, is strictly adhered to throughout. From this general division other subordinate arrangements and classifications, some of which are peculiar to the present Work, naturally and easily flow. And thus the reader will find the whole subject opening itself connectedly and symmetrically, and in such a manner as to present, in its completed outline, not merely a disjointed congeries of philosophical facts, but the regularity and beauty of a philosophical system. The general division of the Sensibilities is into the Natural and Moral. Under the head of the MORAL SENSIBILITIES, I have examined the subject of conscience at some length and in various points of view, and cannot but hope that some of the difficulties which have hitherto attended it have been removed ; and that the whole subject is placed, to some extent, in a consistent and satisfactory light. In many other respects, particularly in the classification of the Emotions and the Desires, and their relation to each other, and in some of

the doctrines which are contained in the volume on the Will, the reader will find some important views, which I suppose he will not be likely to find in other philosophical works.

It has already been intimated, that the method of inquiry which is pursued is rather inductive than speculative. In other words, I have endeavoured in every case, where the. nature of the inquiry admitted of it, to make well-ascertained facts the basis of the conclusions which have been adopted. Furthermore, in selecting such facts, it has been an object to take those which not only had relation to the matter under discussion, but which promised a degree of interest to the reader, particularly to young minds. Simplicity and uniformity of style have been aimed at, although, in a few instances, the statements of other writers, which conveyed important and well-ascertained views, have been admitted with only slight variations when it was thought they had been peculiarly happy in them As I can truly say my object in writing has not been the honour and the rewards of authorship, to which I shoulo consider myself but poorly qualified to aspire, but rather the good of my fellow-men, particularly those who are in a course of education, I did not feel at liberty to prejudice the general design by rejecting the facts, arguments, and, in a few cases, even the expressions of others. I now commend the Work to the acceptance of the public, in the belief that, so far as it is worthy of their acceptance, it will be sufficiently well received. And if it should prove otherwise, I do not know that I shall have occa. sion to regret the labour I have bestowed upon it

THOMAS C. UPHAM Bowdoin College, May, 1840.

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Chap. I. --ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.

Bection

Page

36. Connexion of the mind with the material world

59

37. Of the origin or beginnings of knowledge

60

38. Our first knowledge in general of a material or external origin 62

39. Further proof of the beginnings of knowledge from external causes 64

40. The same subject further illustrated

65

41. Subject illustrated from the case of Jaines Mitchell

66

42. Illustration from the case of Caspar Hauser

67

43. Of connatural or innate knowledge

69

44. The doctrine of innate knowledge not susceptible of proof : 70

45. The doctrine tried by the idea of a God

71

46. The discussion of this subject superseded and unnecessary 73

47. Further remarks on the rise of knowledge by means of the senses 74

CHAP. II.-SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

48. Sensation a simple mental state originating in the senses

76

49. All sensation is properly and truly in the mind

50. Sensations are not images or resemblances of objects

78

51. The connexion between the mental and physical change not sus,

ceptible of explanation

80

52. Of the meaning and nature of perception

80

53. Of the primary and secondary qualities of matter

81

54. Of the secondary qualities of matter

82

55. Of the nature of mental powers or faculties

83

CHAP. III.-THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE.

56. Nature and importance of the senses as a source of knowledge 84

57. Of the connexion of the brain with sensation and perception 85

58. Order in which the senses are to be considered

86

59. Of the sense and sensation of smell

87

60. Of perceptions of smell in distinction from sensations

88

61. Of the sense and sensation of taste

88

62. Design and uses of the senses of smell and taste

89

CHAP. IV.—THE SENSE OF HEARING.

63. Organ of the sense of hearing,

90

64. Nature of sonorous bodies and the medium of the communication

of sound

91

65. Varieties of the sensation of sound

92

66. Manner in which we learn the place of sounds

93

67. Application of these views to the art of ventriloquism

94

68. Uses of hearing, and its connexion with oral language

96

CHAP. V.- THE SENSE OF TOUCH.

69. Of the sense of touch and its sensations in general

97

70 Idea of externality suggested in connexion with the touch . 98

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