formation concerning diversities of distance; for all the various signs of it enumerated by optical writers, presuppose the antecedent recognition of the bodies around us as separate objects of perception. It is not, therefore, surprising, that signs so indispensably subservient to the exercise of our noblest sense should cease in early infancy to attract notice as the subjects of our consciousness, and that afterward they should present themselves to the Imagination rather as qualities of Matter than as attributes of Mind."

239. Whether there be heat in fire, &c.

The questions, whether there be heat in fire, coldness in snow, sweetness in sugar, and the like, seem well suited to the inquisitive and nicely discriminating spirit of the Scholastic ages. Although well adapted to exercise the ingenuity of the Schools, they are far from being without some importance in the more practical philosophy of later times. If these questions concern merely the matter of fact; if the inquiry be, What do people think on these points? it admits of different answers. But this is of less consequence to be known than to know what is the true view of this subject.

The following, there is much reason to think, is the view which should be taken. If by heat, cold, and taste in bodies we merely mean that there is this or that disposition, or motion, or attraction in the particles, then it must clearly be granted that fire is hot, that snow is cold, and sugar is sweet. But if by heat is understood what one feels on the application of fire to the limbs, or if by sweetness is understood the sensation of taste when a sapid body is applied to the tongue, &c., then fire has no heat, sugar no sweetness, and snow is not cold. These states of the mind can never be transformed into anything material and external. The heat or the cold which I feel, and the different kinds of tastes, are sensations in the soul, and nothing else.

§ 240. Whether there be meaning in words.

We say in our common discourse that there is meaning * Stewart's Historical Dissertation, pt. i., sect. ii.. ch. ii.

in words, that there is meaning in the printed page of an author; and the language is perhaps sufficiently correct for those occasions on which it is ordinarily employed. We do not deem it necessary to object to the common mode of speaking in this particular instance, nor to undertake to propose anything better. But there is here an association of ideas similar, both in its nature and its effects, to that existing between extension and colour already remarked upon.

our.

of an

When objects external to us are presented to the sense of sight, there is immediately the sensation of some colThis sensation we have been so long in the habit of referring to the external object, that we speak and act as if the colour were truly in that object and not in ourselves; in the language of D'Alembert, as if the sensation were transported out of the mind, and spread over the material substance. And it is not until we take some time to reflect, and until we institute a careful examination, that we become satisfied of our error. In the same way, when we look upon the page author, we say it has meaning, or that it is full of thought; whereas, in truth, in consequence of a longcontinued and obstinate association, of which we are hardly sensible ourselves, we transport the meaning or thought out of ourselves, and spread it upon that page. The thought or meaning is in ourselves, but is placed by us, through the means of a casual but very strong association, in the written marks which are before us. All the power which the words have results from convention, or, what is the same thing, exists in consequence of certain intellectual habits formed in reference to those words. It is these habits, formed in reference to them, it is this mental correspondence, which gives these characters all their value; and without the mind, which answers to and which interprets them, they could be considered as nothing more than mere black strokes drawn upon white paper, and essentially differing in nothing from the zigzag and unmeaning delineations of a schoolboy on the sand. As all the beautiful varieties of colour do not and cannot have an existence without the mind, which has sensations of them or perceives them, so words

are useless, are unmeaning, are nothing without the n terpretations of an intellect that has been trained up so as to correspond to them. If it were otherwise, there would be meaning in the unknown inscriptions on the bricks and other fragments of antiquity which are occasionally brought from the banks of the Euphrates; there would be meaning in those hieroglyphic figures on the monuments of Egypt, which have hitherto, or, at least, until a very recent period, eluded the efforts to interpret them; in neither case would they stare upon us with that unintelligent vacancy which has so long characterized them. They are now without meaning, without life and intelligence, for this reason, and this only, that the minds which once corresponded to them, and which gave them life and intelligence, are no more. By association, therefore, we refer the meaning to the written characters or words, when, in truth, it is in the mind, and there alone

241. Benefit of examining such connexions of thought.

It is of great importance to us to be able to separate ideas which our situation and habits may have intimately combined together. To a person who has this power in a considerable degree, we readily give the credit of possessing a clear and discriminating judgment. And this mental characteristic is of great consequence, not only in pursuing the study of intellectual philosophy, but in the conduct of life. It is, in particular, directly subservient to the power of reasoning, since all processes of reasoning are made up of successive propositions, the comparison of which implies the exercise of judgment. The associations of thought which have been mentioned in this chapter are so intimate, or, rather, almost indissoluble, that they try and discipline the mind in this respect; they teach it to discriminate. They are worthy to be examined, therefore, and to be understood, not only for the immediate pleasure which they afford in the discovery of our errors, but also because they have the effect of training up one's powers to some good purpose. Let a person be accustomed to making such discriminations as are implied in fully understanding the instances in this chapter, and he acquires a readiness which

is not easily outwitted; he trains himself to such a quickness of perception in finding out what truly belongs to an object and what does not, as will not allow him to be imposed upon by that confusion of ideas which in so many cases distorts the judgments of the multitude.

242. Power of the will over mental associations.

In view of what has been said in this and the former chapters, the interesting inquiry naturally arises, What is the degree of influence which we are able to exercise by mere volition or will over associated trains of mental states? In reply to this inquiry, an obvious remark is, that we cannot, by a mere direct and positive act of the will, call up or create such associated trains. What has already been said on the subject of laws of association, involves that their appearance and departure depend on other causes than a mere unconditional order or command. Furthermore, such is the nature of the volitive faculty, that we evidently can never will the existence of anything without knowing what it is which we will or choose. This, viz., that the act of volition necessarily implies a perceived or known object of volition, requires no further proof than is contained in the proposition itself. Therefore the expressions, to will to have a certain thought or train of thought, clearly imply the present existence of that thought or train; and, consequently, there can be no such thing as calling up or originating thoughts by immediate volition.

To this view of the inefficiency of direct voluntary power in the origination of our associated ideas and feelings, and to the argument in support of it, those mental efforts which we term Recollection or intentional memory have been brought up as an answer. In cases of intentional memory it will be said, an object or event is remembered, or, in other words, an idea or train of ideas is called up, by mere direct volition or choice. To this objection may we not satisfactorily propose this reply? It is evident, before we attempt or make a formal effort to remember the particular circumstances of an event, that the event itself, in general, must have been the object of our attention. There is some particular thing in

all cases of intentional remembrance which we wish to call to mind, although we are totally unable to state what it is; but we know that it is somehow connected with some general event which we already have in memory. Now, by revolving in mind the great facts or outlines of that event, it so happens that the particular circumstance which we were in search of is called up. But certainly no one can say that this is done by a direct volition; so far from it, that nothing more is wanted to explain it than the common principles of association. This statement is illustrated whenever, in reciting an extract which we had committed to memory, we are at a loss for the beginning of a particular sentence. In such a case we naturally repeat a number of times the concluding words of the preceding sentence, and very soon we recall the sentence which was lost; not, however, by direct volition, but by association.

§ 243. Association controlled by indirect voluntary power.

But we would not be understood to say that the will possesses no influence whatever in the origination and control of trains of thought; its influence is very considerable, although it is not, as far as the origination of them is concerned, immediate and direct. (1.) We have, in the first place, the power of checking or delaying the succession of mental states. This power is always found to exist when the direction of the mind towards a particular subject is attended with those feelings of desire or sentiments of duty which are understood to be prerequisite as a basis or foundation for the acts of the will. We are not, indeed, enabled by our power in this respect either directly to call up or to banish any one or any number of our thoughts. But the consequence is, a variety of trains of thought are suggested, which would not have been suggested had it not been for the circumstance of the original train being delayed.

Thus, in the course of our mental associations, the name of Sir Isaac Newton occurs; we experience a strong emotion of interest; we voluntarily check the current of our thoughts at that name, and we feel and are conscious that we have within us the ability to do so.