sustain the same relation to the various attributes of the mind which Sensation, or perhaps, more properly, Perception, does to those of matter. In both cases, viz., in Consciousness and in External Perception, we may be said, with a great degree of propriety, to have direct knowledge; that is to say, knowledge without the intervention of a series of intermediate facts. In the case of Perception, we have a new state of mind; and by means of it (or perhaps we may say, as involved in it) we immediately and necessarily have a knowledge of the corresponding external object. And so in Consciousness, whenever a new state of mind exists, we recognise its existence at once, and as an attribute of our own minds. We cannot help doing it.

197. Further remarks on the proper objects of consciousness.

As there are some things to which Consciousness, as the term is usually employed, relates, and others to which it does not, it is proper to consider it in this respect more fully. (1.) As to those thoughts which may have arisen, or those emotions which may have agitated us in times past, we cannot with propriety be said to be conscious of them at the present moment, although we may be conscious of that present state of mind which we term the recollection of them.-(2.) Again, Consciousness has no direct connexion with such objects, whether material or immaterial, as exist at the present time, but are external to the mind, or, in other words, have an existence independent of it.

For instance, we are not, strictly speaking, conscious of any material existence whatever; of the earth which we tread, of the food which nourishes us, of the clothes that protect, or of anything else of the like nature with which we are conversant; but are conscious merely of the effects they produce within us, of the sensations of taste, of heat and cold, of resistance and extension, of hardness and softness, and the like.

(3.) This view holds also in respect to immaterial things, even the mind itself. We are not directly conscious, using the term in the manner which has been explained, of the existence even of our own mind, but

66

merely of its qualities and operations, and of that firm belief or knowledge of its existence necessarily attendant on those operations. "According to the common doctrine," says Mr. Stewart (Philos. Essays, i., ch. i.), “ of our best philosophers, it is by the evidence of consciousness we are assured that we ourselves exist. The proposition, however, when thus stated, is not accurately true; for our own existence is not a direct or immediate object of consciousness, in the strict and logical meaning of that term. We are conscious of sensation, thought, desire, volition, but we are not conscious of the existence of mind itself; nor would it be possible for us to arrive at the knowledge of it (supposing us to be created in the full possession of all the intellectual capacities that belong to human nature) if no impression were ever to be made on our external senses. The moment that, in consequence of such an impression, a sensation is excited, we learn two facts at once; the existence of the sensation, and our own existence as sentient beings: in other words, the very first exercise of my consciousness necessarily implies a belief, not only of the present existence of what is felt, but of the present existence of that which feels and thinks, or (to employ plainer language) the present existence of that being which I denote by the words 1 and myself. Of these facts, however, it is the former alone of which we can properly be said to be conscious, agreeably to the rigorous interpretation of the expression. The latter is made known to us by a Suggestion of the understanding consequent on the sensation, but so intimately connected with it that it is not surprising that our belief of both should be generally referred to the same origin."

198. Consciousness a ground or law of belief.

Consciousness, as was remarked in the introduction to this work, is a ground or law of belief; and the belief attendant on the exercise of it, like that which accompanies the exercise of Original Suggestion, is of the highest kind. It appears to be utterly out of our power to avoid believing beyond a doubt that the mind experiences certain sensations, or has certain thoughts, or puts forth par

ticular intellectual operations, whenever, in point of fact, that is the case. We may be asked for the reason of this belief, but we have none to give, except that it is the result of an ultimate and controlling principle of our nature; and hence that nothing can ever prevent the convictions resulting from this source, and nothing can divest us of them.

Nor has the history of the human mind made known any instances that have even the appearance of being at variance with this view, except a few cases of undoubted insanity. A man may reason against Consciousness as a ground and law of belief, either for the sake of amusing himself or of perplexing others; but when he not only reasons against it as such, but seriously and sincerely rejects it, it becomes quite another concern; and such a one has, by common consent, broken loose from the authority of his nature, and is truly and emphatically beside himself. It will be impossible to find a restingplace where such a mind can fix itself and repose; the best established truths and the wildest and most extravagant notions will stand nearly an equal chance of being either rejected or received; fancy and fact will be confounded and mingled together, and the whole mind will exhibit a scene of chaotic and irretrievable confusion.

§ 199. Instances of knowledge developed in consciousness. It would be no easy task to point out the numerous states of mind, the ideas, and emotions, and desires, and volitions, which come within the range and cognizance of Consciousness; nor is there any special reason, connected with any object we have in view at present, why such a full enumeration should be attempted. A few instances will suffice to show how fruitful a source of experience and of knowledge this is.

(I.) All the various degrees of belief are matters of Consciousness. We are so constituted that the mind necessarily yields its assent, in a greater or less degree, when evidence is presented. These degrees of assent are exceedingly various and multiplied, although only a few of them are expressed by select and appropriate names; nor does it appear to be necessary for the ends

of society, or for any other purpose, that it should be otherwise. Some of them are as follows: doubting, assenting, presumption, believing, disbelieving, probability certainty, &c.

(II.) The names of all other intellectual acts and operations (not the names of the intellectual Powers, which, like the mind itself, are made known to us by Suggestion, and are expressed by a different class of terms, but simply of acts and operations) are expressive of the subjects of our Consciousness. Among others, the terms perceiving, thinking, attending, conceiving, remembering, comparing, judging, abstracting, reasoning, imagining.

(III.) Consciousness, considered as a source of knowledge, includes likewise all our emotions and desires (everything, in fact, which really and directly comes within the range of the SENSITIVE or SENTIENT part of our nature), as the emotions of the beautiful, the grand, the sublime, the ludicrous; the feelings of pleasure, and pain, and aversion; of hope and joy, of despondency and sadness, and a multitude of others.

(IV.) Here also originates our acquaintance with the complex emotions or passions. A man bestows a benefit upon us, and we are conscious of a new complex feeling, which we call GRATITUDE. Another person does us an injury, and we are conscious of another and distinct feeling, which we call ANGER. In other words, we feel, we know that the passion exists, and that it belongs to ourselves; and it is the same of jealousy, hatred, revenge, friendship, sympathy, the filial' and parental affections, love, &c.

(V.) All the moral and religious emotions and affections, regarded as subjects of internal knowledge, belong here; such as approval, disapproval, remorse, humility, repentance, religious faith, forgiveness, benevolence, the sense of dependance, adoration.-When we consider that the mind is constantly in action; that, in all our intercourse with our fellow-beings, friends, family, countrymen, and enemies, new and exceedingly diversified feelings are called forth; that every new scene in nature and every new combination of events have their appropriate results in the mind, it will be readily conjectured

that this enumeration might be carried to a much greater extent. What has been said will serve to indicate some of the prominent sources for self-inquiry on this subject.

CHAPTER IV.

RELATIVE SUGGESTION OR JUDGMENT

200. Of the susceptibility of perceiving or feeling relations Ir is not inconsistent with the usage of our language to say that the mind brings its thoughts together, and places them side by side, and compares them. Such are nearly the expressions of Mr. Locke, who speaks of the mind's bringing one thing to and setting it by another, and carrying its view from one to the other. And such is the imperfect nature of all arbitrary signs, that this phraseology will probably continue to be employed, although without some attention it will be likely to lead into error. Such expressions are evidently. of material origin, and cannot be rightly interpreted, in their application to the mind, without taking that circumstance into consideration. When it is said that our thoughts are brought together, that they are placed side by side, and the like, probably nothing more can be meant than this, that they are immediately successive to each other. And when it is further said that we compare them, the meaning is, that we perceive or feel their relation to each other in certain respects.

The mind, therefore, has an original susceptibility or power corresponding to this result; in other words, by which this result is brought about; which is sometimes known as its power of RELATIVE SUGGESTION, and at other times the same thing is expressed by the term JUDGMENT, although the latter term is sometimes employed with other shades of meaning.-" With the susceptibility of Relative Suggestion," says Dr. Brown, lect. 51," the faculty of judgment, as that term is commonly employed, may be considered as nearly synonymous; and I