wholly different from itself? If we will interrogate nature, and rest satisfied with her responses, the matter is simple. It is the power that gives us a knowledge of Mind, and uniting mind with its operations gives us the idea of Personality, and combining the present with the past originates the idea and the conviction of Personal Identity, which assures us also of outwardness, of an externality inconsistent with the assumption of all things into our own nature; the power, overlooked too often, and still more frequently estimated too lightly, of Original Suggestion. Nature has implanted within us this spontaneity of thought, this intuitive directness of perception, and thus taken care to furnish important elements of knowledge, which could be possessed in no other

way.

180. Idea of matter or material existence.

It is here also that we find the basis of our conception of MATTER or material existence, when considered in distinction from the mere outward presentations or attributes of matter. The connexion which we have with the material world by means of the senses, makes us acquainted with whatever is strictly appropriate to those senses, such as colour, taste, hardness or softness, extension, &c. When, for instance, we look on a piece of wood or any other of those material bodies by which we are surrounded, an impression is made on the organ of vision, and we have the sensation, or, as we sometimes express it, the idea of colour. By applying the hand to the wood, we learn the penetrability or impenetrability, the softness or hardness of the mass which we hold. By moving the hand from one point to another in the mass, we are informed of the continuity or extension of its parts. But it does not appear that we are able, by means of the senses alone, to carry our inquiries beneath the surface of the body in such a way or to such a degree as to become directly acquainted with that interior something, whatever it is, which is the basis or support of these qualities. The external or sensible Intellect (that is, the intellect operating by means of the senses) furnishes simply the occasion of the idea of matter or material exist

ence; while the internal or pure Intellect (that is, the intellect independent of the senses), acting upon that occasion, and availing itself of its power of Original Suggestion, brings into existence and realizes the idea itself.

This is the simple statement of the fact; but it appears to be abundantly authenticated by the common experience of men. That which is outward and operates upon the senses, that which we taste, and see, and handle, is presented to us (in other words, we regard it) in the light of an attribute or quality rather than of substance. But the very idea of a quality or attribute implies as the antecedent condition of its own existence, an object or subject to which it belongs. The idea of such a subject or object is, under these circumstances (that is to say, when anything presents itself to our notice in the aspect of an attribute or quality), not only naturally and necessarily suggested to us, but it obviously compels our belief As we have already had occasion to remark (§ 132), we believe, and we cannot help believing, that there is some basis, some foundation, which is the support of the various attributes and qualities which are presented to our senses; just as we have the idea and believe in the existence of a God, although we know nothing of his interior essence or nature, but only of his manifestations, attributes, or operations; or as we have the idea of mind suggested to us, and fully believe ir. the existence of mind, although mind is entirely inaccessible in itself, and is made known wholly by those various acts of which we are conscious, such as perceiving, remembering, reasoning, willing, and the like.

181. Origin of the idea of motion.

The idea of Motion, one of those with which we are most early and familiarly acquainted, is of internal and suggestive origin. Motion does not appear to be addressed directly to the senses. We can see things in motion, but not motion itself; we can touch things in motion but motion itself is not accessible and knowable by that sense, nor by any other. When bodies move from each other, this new state of things is always indicated by a change in the appearance of the respective

bodies, such as increased dimness of colour, diminished size, obscurity in the outline, &c. The relation of things, considered in regard to mere position, is disturbed and altered also. Under these circumstances, the idea of motion is naturally and necessarily suggested. And it exists with all that degree of definiteness and distinctness which is necessary for our present purposes.

§ 182. Of the nature of unity and the origin of that nction.

Another important notion, properly entitled to a consideration here, is that of UNITY. We shall decline attempting to explain the nature of unity, for the simple reason that nothing is more easy to be understood; every child knows what is meant by one. And how can we

explain it, if we would? We can explain a hundred by resolving it into parts; we can explain fifty or a score by making a like separation of the whole number into the subordinate portions of which it is made up; but when we arrive at unity, we must stop, and can go no further.

It is true, attempts have been made to define it, but, like many other such attempts, they have proved futile. Unity has been called a thing indivisible in itself, and divided from everything else. But this makes us no wiser. Is it anything more than to say that the unity of an object is its indivisibility? Or, in other words, that its unity is its unity?

As the idea of unity is one of the simplest, so it is one of the earliest notions which men have. It originates in the same way, and very nearly at the same time, with the notions of existence, self-existence, personal identity, and the like. When a man has a notion of himself, he evidently does not think of himself as two, three, or a dozen men, but as one. As soon as he is able to think of himself as distinct from his neighbour, as soon as he is in no danger of mingling and confounding his own identity with that of the multitude around him, so soon does he form the notion of unity. It exists as distinct in his mind as the idea of his own existence does; and arises there immediately successive to that idea, because it is impossi

ble, in the nature of things, that he should have & notion of himself as a twofold or divided person.

Unity is the fundamental element of all enumeration By the repetition or adding of this element, we are able to form numbers to any extent. These numbers may be combined among themselves, and employed merely as expressive of mutual relations, or we may apply them, if we choose, to all external objects whatever, to which we are able to give a common name.-(See § 145.)

183. Nature of succession, and origin of the idea of succession. Another of those conceptions which naturally offer themselves to our notice here, is that of SUCCESSION. This term (when we inquire what succession is in itself) is one of general application, expressive of a mode of existence rather than of existence itself; and in its application to mind in particular, expressive of a condition of the mind's action, but not of the action itself, which that condition regulates. It is certainly a fact too well known to require comment, that our minds exist at different periods in successive states; that our thoughts and feelings, in obedience to a permanent law, follow each other in a train. This is the simple fact. And the fact of such succession, whenever it takes place, forms the occasion on which the notion or idea of succession is sUGGESTED to the mind. Being a simple mental state, it is not susceptible of definition; yet every man possesses it, and every one is rightly supposed to understand its nature.

Accordingly, it is not necessary to refer the origin of this idea to anything external. It is certain that the sense of smell cannot directly give us the idea of succession, nor the sense of taste, nor of touch. And we well know that the deaf and dumb possess it not less than others. The blind also, who have never seen the face of heaven, nor beheld that sun and moon which measure out for us days, and months, and years, have the notion of succession. They feel, they think, they reason, at least in some small degree, like other men; and it is impossible that they should be without it. The origin, therefore, of this notion is within; it is the unfailing result of the inward operation to call it forth, however true it may

be that it is subsequently applied to outward objects and

events.

§ 184. Origin of the notion of duration.

There is usually understood to be a distinction between the idea of succession and that of duration, though neither can be defined. The idea of succession is supposed to be antecedent in point of time to that of duration (we speak now of succession and duration relatively to our conception of them, and not in themselves considered). Duration must be supposed to exist antecedently to succession in the order of nature; but succession is the form in which it is made to apply to men; and is, therefore, naturally the occasion on which the idea of it arises in men's minds. Having the notion of succession, and that of personal or self-existence, a foundation is laid for the additional conception of permanency or duration; in other words, it naturally arises in the mind, or is suggested, under these circumstances.

As we cannot, according to this view of its origin, have the notion of duration without succession, hence it happens that we know nothing of duration when we are perfectly asleep, because we are not then conscious of those intellectual changes which are involved in succession. If a person could sleep with a perfect suspension of all his mental operations from this time until the resurrection, the whole of that period would appear to him as nothing. Ten thousand years passed under such circumstances would be less than a few days or even hours.

That the notion of succession (we do not say succession itself, but only our notion or idea of it) is antecedent to, and is essential to that of duration, is in some measure proved by various facts. There are on record a number of cases of remarkable somnolency, in which persons have slept for weeks and even months. One of the most striking is that of Samuel Chilton, a labourer of Tinsbury, near Bath, in England. On one occasion, in the year 1696, he slept from the ninth of April to the seventh of August, about seventeen weeks, being kept alive by small quantities of wine poured down his throat. He then awoke, dressed himself, and walked about the VOL. L-X