Pagina-afbeeldingen
PDF
ePub

in the mind directly by means of the senses. As they further maintained that those of a complex nature are composed, not merely virtually, but literally, of such as are simple, they consequently considered them in the light of combined and transformed sensations. Such appears to be the general outline of their doctrine, although it has its obscurities and perplexities, as might be expected, in consequence of being essentially ill-founded." If we consider," says Condillac, " that to remember, to compare, to judge, to distinguish, to imagine, to be astonished, to have abstract ideas, to have ideas of number and duration, to know truths, whether general or particular, are but so many modes of being attentive; that to have passions, to love, to hate, to hope, to fear, to will, are but so many different modes of desire; and that attention in the one case, and desire in the other case, of which all these feelings are modes, are themselves, in their origin, nothing more than modes of sensation; we cannot but conclude that SENSATION involves in itself all the faculties of the soul."*

This sentence, in its evident meaning, and as it is understood both by its author and his commentators, is clearly at variance with the doctrine of Cudworth and of other advocates of the "super-sensuous" or transcendental philosophy, and entirely cuts off what has been variously termed the internal, reflex, or subjective source of our knowledge. According to the doctrine of Hobbes, Condillac, Helvetius, and other writers of the sensual or material school, everything may be traced back to the senses, not merely as its occasion, but as its direct, or, at least, its essential cause; everything becomes tangible and materia; we are utterly unable to form a conception even of the invisible and glorious Deity, except under such an appearance as the imagination, dealing with sensible images alone, can picture forth from the gross and limited materials of the earth. And in the same way, every other idea, however spiritual and whatever it may relate to, must be capable of being followed back to some archetype in outward material existences. The mind may separate, and modify, and combine sensible ideas or imaTraité des Sensations, pt. 1, ch. 7, § 2.

ges, but can never get above them; there is a portion of earthliness in every possible thought.-It must, therefore, be obvious, that the tendency of this system is to degrade the mind; not only to limit the range, but to depress the character of its powers, especially when we consider, that, as one of its legitimate results, it rejects the doctrine of a Moral Sense and of the Immutability of Moral Distinctions. It may be said, however, and perhaps with some degree of plausibility, that the propriety of receiving it does not depend so much upon its tendency, as upon the direct evidence which may be brought in its support, in which, nevertheless, it is found to be utterly

deficient.

174. Knowledge begins in the senses, but has internal accessions.

In order to have a clear understanding of the particular topic before us, let us briefly advert to certain general views, already more or less attended to, having a connexion with it. In making the human soul a subject of inquiry, it is an obvious consideration that a distinction may be drawn between the soul, contemplated in itself, and its acts, or states, or the knowledge which it possesses. The inquiry, therefore, naturally arises, Under what circumstances the acquisition of knowledge begins?

Now this is the very question which has already been considered; nor can it be deemed necessary to repeat here the considerations which have been brought up in reference to it. It is enough to express our continued reliance on the general experience and testimony of mankind, so far as it is possible to ascertain them on a subject of so much difficulty, that the beginnings of thought and knowledge are immediately subsequent to certain affections of those bodily organs which we call the SENSES. In other words, were it not for impressions on the senses, which may be traced to objects external to them, our mental capabilities, whatever they may be, would in all probability have remained folded up, and have never been redeemed from a state of fruitless inaction.

Hence the process, which is implied in the perception of external things, or what is commonly termed by Mr. Locke sensation, may justly be considered the OCCASION of

the introductory step to all our knowledge. But it does not follow from this, nor is it by any means true, that the whole amount of it, in its ultimate progress, is to be ascribed directly to the same source. All that can be said with truth is, that the mind receives the earliest part of its ideas by means of the senses, and that, in consequence of having received these elementary thoughts, all its powers become rapidly and fully operative.

And here we come to the SECOND great source of knowledge. The powers of the mind being thus fairly brought into exercise, its various operations then furnish us with another set of notions, which, by way of distinguishing them from those received through the direct mediation of the senses, may be called, in the language of Mr. Locke, ideas of reflection, or, to use a phraseology embracing all possible cases, ideas of INTERNAL ORIGIN.

These two sources of human thought, the Internal and External, however they may have been confounded by some writers, are entirely distinct. The ideas which arise in the mind solely from the fact of the previous existence of certain mental operations, could not have been suggested by anything which takes place in the external world independently of those operations. Of this last class, some instances, with illustrations of the same, may properly be mentioned here.

§ 175. Instances of notions which have an internal origin.

Among other notions which are to be ascribed to the second great source, are those expressed by the terms THINKING, DOUBTING, BELIEVING, and CERTAINTY.-It is a matter of internal observation (that is, of consciousness or of reflection, which are synonymous with internal observation), that the mind does not, and cannot, for any length of time, remain inactive. Hence there is occasion given for the origin of that idea which we denominate The notion which we thus denominate is framed by the mind under these circumstances; the name is given, and nobody is ignorant as to what is meant. But then it is to be marked that its origin is wholly internal; it is not an object of touch, or taste, or sight; it is to be ascribed to the mind itself alone, and to its inhe VOL I-U

THINKING.

rent activity, unaided by the senses, or by anything operating upon them.

Again, in the examination of some topic which is posed for discussion, a proposition is stated with little or no evidence attending it, and the mind, in reference to that proposition, is brought into a position to which we give the name of doubting. It is by no means easy, or, rather, it is impossible, to trace this idea directly to the senses. All we can say of it is, that it has its origin within, and necessarily exists immediately subsequent, not to mere outward impressions, but to certain other mental states, of which we are conscious.

But then, in this very instance, if the evidence be considerably increased, the mental estimation which we form is altered in regard to it, and to this new state of the mind we give the name of belief or believing. And, in case the evidence of the proposition is of a higher and more decided character, there then arises another state of the mind, which we denominate certainty.

The ideas of right and wrong, of unity and number, of time and space, order, proportion, similitude, truth, wisdom, power, obligation, succession, cause, effect, and many others, have a like origin; at least there are none of them to be ascribed directly and exclusively to the senses.—It is cheerfully granted, that, in determining this point, it is proper to refer to the common experience of mankind, and to rely upon it. But it is believed in all these instances (certainly in the most of them) that such a reference will be amply decisive.

Let it, then, be left to the candid internal examination of each individual to determine, Whether a distinction be not rightly drawn between the origin of these ideas, and that of those which we attribute to the senses, such as red, blue, sweet, fragrant, bitter, hard, smooth, loud, soft, extended, &c.? On this question it is thought that, in general, there can be but one answer, although some writers, through the love of excessive simplification, have been betrayed into error in regard to it.

Hence it is distinctly to be kept in mind, that there are two sources of thought and knowledge. An affection of the senses by means of external objects is the immediate

[ocr errors]

occasion of one portion; the constitution of the mind and its operations are the occasions or source of the other. Those notions which can be ascribed directly to any one of the senses as their specific source, and not merely as an indirect and general occasion of their origin, are External, while all others seem to be entitled to be called Internal. And yet it will be recollected that we have found it necessary to treat of some notions under the general head of External Knowledge, not precisely corresponding to the view now given. The mental states which we now have reference to, were found, however, to be so closely connected in their origin with the exercise of the senses, or with some other affection of the bodily system (such as the idea of externality, the uneasy feeling of hunger, thirst, &c.), as to come under consideration somewhat more naturally there than in any subsequent part of our inquiries."

§ 176. Imperfections attendant on classifications in mental philosophy. The remarks just made naturally lead us to embrace this opportunity to suggest a caution applicable to the subject of Classification in mental philosophy in general. It will be recollected, that the first general arrangement of the states of the mind was into the three great Divisions of Intellectual, Sensitive, and Voluntary. Beginning with the INTELLECTUAL part of our nature, we found our intellections susceptible of being divided into those of an External and those of an Internal origin; and have hitherto directed our inquiries with a reference to this division. Now the remark we would make is, that the classifications just referred to, and all other general classifications in mental philosophy, although they may be theoretically and philosophically true, are nevertheless not always easy and satisfactory in their application. As the mind begins to operate in all its parts and in all its relations nearly simultaneously (and certainly at a very early period of life), the history of its multiplied acts and feelings becomes very much interwoven and perplexed. In the matter of Classification, therefore, nothing more is to be expected than a general outline, approximating as nearly as possible to an expression of

« VorigeDoorgaan »