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most accurately. limited; but if this general notion de denied, I confess that I cannot discover any principles of limitation whatever. Why have certain objects been classed together, and not certain other objects, when all have been alike perceived by us; and all, therefore, if there be nothing more than mere perception in the process, are capable of receiving any denomination which we may please to bestow on them? Is it arbitrarily, and without any reason whatever, that we do not class a rose-bush with birds, or an elephant with fish? and if there be any reason for these exclusions, why will not the Nominalist tell us what that reason is-in what feeling it is found-and how it can be made accordant with his system? Must it not be that the rose-bush and a sparrow, though equally perceived by us, do not excite that general notion of resemblance which the term bird is invented to express-do not seem to us to have those relations of a common nature, in certain respects, which lead us to class the sparrow and the ostrich, however different in other respects, as birds; or the petty natives of our brooks and rivulets with the mighty monsters of the deep, under one general and equal denomination? If this be the reason, there is more in every case than perception and the giving of a general name; for there is a peculiar state of mind-a general relative feeling— intervening between the perception and the invention of the term, which is the only reason that can be assigned for that very invention."

§ 152. Further remarks of Brown on general abstractions.

"Can the Nominalist then assert that there is no feeling of the resemblance of objects, in certain respects, which thus intervenes between the perception of them as separate objects, which is one stage of the process, and the comprehension of them under a single name, which is another stage of the process-or must he not rather confess that it is merely in consequence of this intervening feeling we give to the number of objects their general name, to the exclusion of the multitudes of objects to which we do not apply it, as it is in consequence of certain other feelings, excited by them individually, we give

to each separate object its proper name, to the exclusion of every other object? To repeat the process, as already described to you, we perceive two or more objects-we are struck with their resemblance in certain respects. We invent a general name to denote this feeling of resemblance, and we class under this general name every particular object, the perception of which is followed by the same feeling of resemblance, and no object but these alone. If this be a faithful statement of the process-and for its fidelity I may safely appeal to your consciousnessthe doctrine of the Nominalists is not less false than that of the Realists. It is false, because it excludes that general feeling of resemblance-the relative suggestion -which is all that the general name itself truly designates, and without which, therefore, it never would have been invented; while the doctrine of the Realists is false, by inserting in the process those supposed separate entities which form no part of it. The one errs, as I have already said, by excess, the other by deficiency."

CHAPTER XIV.

OF ATTENTION,

153. Of the general nature of attention.

WITHOUT Considering it necessary to speak of attention as a separate intellectual power or faculty, as some may be inclined to do, it seems to be sufficient to say, that ATTENTION expresses the state of the mind when it is steadily directed, for a length of time, to some object of sense or intellect, exclusive of other objects. When we say that any external object, or any subject of thought, which is purely internal, receives attention, it seems to be the fact, as far as we are able to determine, that the intellect is occupied with the subject of its attention, whatever it is, for a certain period, and that all other things are, for the time being, shut out. In other words, he grasp which the perceptive power fixes upon the object

of its contemplations, is an undivided, an unbroken one. -But this does not appear to be all. There is not only a distinct and exclusive mental perception, but also an act of the will, directing, condensing, and confining the perception. So that, in all cases of attention, the act of the mind may be regarded as a complex one, involving not only the mere perception or series of perceptions, but also an act of the will, founded on some feeling of desire or sentiment of duty. It is the act of the will, prompted in general by the feeling of desire or interest, which keeps the mind intense and fixed in its position.

§ 154. Of different degrees of attention.

In agreement with this view of the subject, we often speak of attention as great or small, as existing in a very high or a very slight degree. When the view of the mind is only momentary, and is unaccompanied, as it generally is at such times, with any force of emotion or energy of volitive action, then the attention is said to be slight. When, on the contrary, the mind directs itself to an object or series of objects with earnestness, and for a considerable length of time, and refuses to attend to anything else, then the attention is said to be intense.

We commonly judge at first of the degree of attention to a subject from the length of time during which the mind is occupied with it. But, when we look a little further, it will be found that the time will generally depend upon the strength and permanency of the attendant emotion of interest. And hence both the time and the degree of feeling are to be regarded in our estimate of the power of attention in any particular case; the former being the result, and, in some sense, a measure of the latter. Of instances of people who are able to give but slight attention to any subject of thought, who cannot bring their minds to it with steadiness and power, we everywhere find multitudes, and there are some instances where this ability has been possessed in such a high degree as to be worthy of notice. There have been mathematicians who could investigate the most complicated problems amid every variety and character of disturb

ance.

It was said of Julius Cæsar, that, while writing a

despatch, he could at the same time dictate four others to his secretaries; and if he did not write himself, could dictate seven letters at once. The same thing is asserted also of the Emperor Napoleon, who had a wonderful ca pability of directing his whole mental energy to whatever came before him.*

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The chess-player Philidor could direct three games of chess at the same time, of one of which only he required ocular inspection, the moves of the other two being announced to him by an assistant. The moves of the chessmen formed the subject about which his thoughts were employed; and such was the intensity of interest and such the power of the will, that the mind found no difficulty in dwelling upon it to the entire exclusion of other subjects, and for a considerable length of time.

155. Dependance of memory on attention.

There seems to be no doctrine in mental philosophy more clearly established than this, that memory depends on attention; that is, where attention is very slight, remembrance is weak; and where attention is intense, remembrance continues longer.-There are many facts which confirm this statement.

(1.) In the course of a single day, persons who are in the habit of winking will close their eyelids perhaps thousands of times, and, as often as they close them, will place themselves in utter darkness. Probably they are conscious at the time both of closing their eyelids and of being in the dark; but, as their attention is chiefly taken up with other things, they have entirely forgotten it.

(2.) Let a person be much engaged in conversation, or occupied with any very interesting speculation, and the clock will strike in the room where he is, apparently without his having any knowledge of it. He hears the clock strike as much as at any other time, but, not attending to the perception of sound, and having his thoughts directed another way, he immediately forgets.

(3.) In the occupations of the day, when a multitude of cares are pressing us on every side, a thousand things escape our notice; they appear to be neither seen nor

* Segur's History of the Expedition to Russia, book vii., ch. 13

heard, nor to affect us in any way whatever. But at the stillness of evening, when anxieties and toils are quieted, and there is a general pause in nature, we seem to be endued with a new sense, and the slightest sound attracts our attention. Shakspeare has marked even this. "The crow doth sing as sweetly as the lark When neither is attended; and, I think, The nightingale, if she should sing by day, When every goose is cackling, would be thought No better a musician than the wren."

It is on the same principle that people dwelling in the vicinity of waterfalls do not appear to notice the sound. The residents in the neighbourhood even of the great cataract of Niagara are not seriously disturbed by it, although it is an unbroken, interminable thunder to all others.-The reason in all these cases is the same as has already been given. There is no attention and no remembrance, and, of course, virtually no perception.

(4.) Whenever we read a book, we do not observe the words merely as a whole, but every letter of which they are made up, and even the minute parts of these letters. But it is merely a glance; it does not for any length of time occupy our attention; we immediately forget, and with great difficulty persuade ourselves that we have truly perceived the letters of the word. The fact that every letter is in ordinary cases observed by us, may be proved by leaving out a letter of the word, or by substituting others of a similar form. We readily, in reading, detect such omissions or substitutions

(5.) An expert accountant can sum up, almost witn a single glance of the eye, a. long column of figures. The operation is performed almost instantaneously, and yet he ascertains the sum of the whole with unerring certainty. It is impossible that he should learn the sum without noticing every figure in the whole column, and without allowing each its proper worth; but the attention to them was so very slight, that he is unable to remen be: this distinct notice.

Many facts of this kind evidently show, as we think, that memory depends upon attention, or, rather, upon a continuance of attention, and varies with that continu

arce

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