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CHAP. 5.]

SPIRIT OF THE MORAL LAW.

51

remarks, briefly inquire into their practical obligation. Of these, that which has just been quoted for another purpose, "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them,"* is perhaps cited and recommended more frequently than any other. The difficulty of applying this precept has induced some to reject it as containing a maxim which is not sound: but perhaps it will be found, that the deficiency is not in the rule but in the non-applicability of the cases to which it has often been applied. It is not applicable when the act which another would that we should do to him is in itself unlawful, or adverse to some other portion of the moral law. If I seize a thief in the act of picking a pocket, he undoubtedly " would" that I should let him go; and I, if our situations were exchanged, should wish it too. But I am not therefore to release him; because, since it is a Christian obligation upon the magistrate to punish offenders, the obligation descends to me to secure them for punishment. Besides, in every such case I must do as I would be done unto with respect to all parties concerned, the public as well as the thief. The precept, again, is not applicable when the desire of the second party is such as a Christian cannot lawfully induge. An idle and profligate man asks me to give him money. It would be wrong to indulge such a man's desire, and therefore the precept does not apply.

The reader will perhaps say, that a person's duties in such cases are sufficiently obvious without the gravity of illustration. Well,-but are the principles upon which the duties are ascertained thus obvious? This is the important point. In the affairs of life, many cases arise in which a person has to refer to such principles as these, and in which, if he does not apply the right principles, he will transgress the Christian law. The law appears to be in effect this, Do as you would be done unto, except in those instances in which to act otherwise is permitted by Christianity. Inferior grounds of limitation are often applied; and they are always wrong, because they always subject the moral law to suspension by inferior authorities. To do this, is to reject the authority of the Divine will, and to place this beautiful expression of that will at the mercy of every man's inclination.

"Whether ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." I have heard of the members of some dinner club who had been recommended to consider this precept, and who in their discussions over the bottle, thought perhaps that they were arguing soundly when they held language like this: "Am I, in lifting this glass to my mouth, to do it for the purpose of bringing glory to God? Is that to be my motive in buying a horse or shooting a pheasant?" From such moralists much sagacity of discrimination was not to be expected; and these questions delighted and probably convinced the club. The mistake of these persons, and perhaps of some others, is that they misunderstand the rule. The promotion of the Divine glory is not to be the motive and purpose of all our actions, but, having actions to perform, we are so to perform them that this glory shall be advanced. The precept is, in effect, Let your actions and the motives of them be such, that others shall have reason to honour God :‡-and a precept like this is a very sensitive test of the purity of our conduct. I know not whether there is a single rule

+1 Cor. x. 31.

* Matt. vii. 12. "Let your light so shine before men that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in Heaven.”—Matt. v. 16.

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SPIRIT OF THE MORAL LAW.

[ESSAY I. of Christianity of which the use is so constant and the application so universal. To do as we would be done by, refers to relative duties; Not to do evil that good may come, refers to particular circumstances: but, To do all things so that the Deity may be honoured, refers to almost every action of a man's life. Happily the Divine glory is thus promoted by some men even in trifling affairs-almost whether they eat or drink, or whatsoever thing they do. There is, in truth, scarcely a more efficacious means of honouring the Deity, than the observing a constant Christian manner of conducting our intercourse with men. He who habitually maintains his allegiance to religion and to purity, who is moderate and chastised in all his pursuits, and who always makes the prospects of the future predominate over the temptations of the present, is one of the most efficacious recommenders of goodness,-one of the most impressive "preachers of righteousness," and by consequence, one of the most efficient promoters of the glory of God.

By a part of Paul's Epistle to the Romans, it appears that he and his coadjutors had been reported to hold the doctrine, that it is lawful "to do evil that good may come.' ""* This report he declares is slanderous; and expresses his reprobation of those who act upon the doctrine, by the short and emphatic declaration,—their condemnation is just. This is not critically a prohibition, but it is a prohibition in effect; and the manner in which the doctrine is reprobated, induces the belief that it was so flagitious that it needed very little inquiry or thought in the writer's mind the transition is immediate, from the idea of the doctrine to the punishment of those who adopt it.

Now the "evil" which is thus prohibited, is, any thing and all things, discordant with the Divine will; so that the unsophisticated meaning of the rule is, that nothing which is contrary to the Christian law may be done for the sake of attaining a beneficial end. Perhaps the breach of no moral rule is productive of more mischief than of this. That "the end justifies the means," is a maxim which many, who condemn it as a maxim, adopt in their practice; and in political affairs it is not only habitually adopted, but is indirectly, if not openly, defended as right. If a senator were to object to some measure of apparent public expediency, that it was not consistent with the moral law, he would probably be laughed at as a fanatic or a fool: yet perhaps some who are flippant with this charge of fanaticism and folly may be in perplexity for a proof. If the expressed will of God is our paramount law, no proof can be brought; and in truth it is not often that it is candidly attempted. I have not been among the least diligent inquirers into the moral reasonings of men, but honest and manly reasoning against this portion of Scripture I have never found.

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Of the rule, "not to do evil that good may come," Dr. Paley says, that it is, for the most part, a salutary caution." A person might as well say that the rule "not to commit murder" is a salutary caution. There is no caution in the matter, but an imperative law. But he proceeds: Strictly speaking, that cannot be evil from which good comes." Now let the reader consider :-Paul says, You may not do evil that good may come: Ay, but, says the philosopher, if good does come, the acts that bring it about are NOT evil. What the apostle would have said of such a reasoner, I will not trust my pen to suppose. The reader

* Rom. iii. 8.

† Mor. and Pol. Phil., b. 2, c. 8.

CHAP. 5.]

BENEVOLENCE OF CHRISTIANITY.

53

will perceive the foundation of this reasoning. It assumes that good and evil are not to be estimated by the expressions of the will of God, but by the effects of actions. The question is clearly fundamental. If expediency be the ultimate test of rectitude, Dr. Paley is right; if the expressions of the Divine will are the ultimate test, he is wrong. You must sacrifice the one authority or the other. If this will is the greater, consequences are not: if consequences are the greater, this will is not. But this question is not now to be discussed: it may however be observed, that the interpretation which the rule has been thus made to bear, appears to be contradicted by the terms of the rule itself. The rule of Christianity is, evil may not be committed for the purpose of good: the rule of philosophy is, evil may not be committed except for the purpose of good. Are these precepts identical? Is there not a fundamental variance, an absolute contrariety between them? Christianity does not speak of evil and good as contingent, but as fixed qualities. You cannot convert the one into the other by disquisitions about expediency. In morals, there is no philosopher's stone that can convert evil into good with a touch. Our labours, so long as the authority of the moral law is acknowledged, will end like those of the physical alchymist: after all our efforts at transmutation, lead will not become gold,-evil will not become good. However, there is one subject of satisfaction in considering such reasonings as these. They prove, negatively, the truth which they assail; for that against which nothing but sophistry can be urged, is undoubtedly true. The simple truth is, that if evil may be done for the sake of good, all the precepts of Scripture which define or prohibit evil are laws no longer; for that cannot in any rational use of language be called a law in respect of those to whom it is directed, if they are at liberty to neglect it when they think fit. These precepts may be advices, recommendations, "salutary cautions," but they are not laws. They .may suggest hints, but they do not impose duties.

With respect to the legitimate grounds of exception or limitation in the application of this rule, there appear to be few or none. The only question is, What actions are evil? Which question is to be determined, ultimately, by the will of God

BENEVOLENCE, AS IT IS PROPOSED IN THE CHRISTIAN SCRIPTURes.

In inquiring into the great principles of that moral system which the Christian revelation institutes, we discover one remarkable characteristic, one pervading peculiarity, by which it is distinguished from every other,the paramount emphasis which it lays upon the exercise of pure benevolence. It will be found that this preference of "love" is wise as it is unexampled, and that no other general principle would effect, with any approach to the same completeness, the best and highest purposes of morality. How easy soever it be for us, to whom the character and obligations of this benevolence are comparatively familiar, to perceive the wisdom of placing it at the foundation of the moral law, we are indebted for the capacity, not to our own sagaciousness, but to light which has been communicated from Heaven. That schoolmaster the law of Moses never taught, and the speculations of philosophy never

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BENEVOLENCE OF CHRISTIANITY.

[ESSAY I.

discovered, that love was the fulfilment of the moral law. Eighteen hundred years ago this doctrine was a new commandment.

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Love is made the test of the validity of our claims to the Christian character-"By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples." Again,- "Love one another. He that loveth another hath fulfilled the law. For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. Love worketh no ill to his neighbour: therefore love is the fulfilling of the law." It is not therefore surprising, that after an enumeration in another place of various duties, the same dignified apostle says, "Above all these things put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness." The inculcation of this benevolence is as frequent in the Christian Scriptures as its practical utility is great. He who will look through the volume will find that no topic is so frequently introduced, no obligation so emphatically enforced, no virtue to which the approbation of God is so specially promised. It is the theme of all the "apostolic exhortations, that with which their morality begins and ends, from which all their details and enumerations set out, and into which they return."§ "He that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God, and God in him." More emphatical language cannot be employed. It exalts to the utmost the character of the virtue, and in effect, promises its possessor the utmost favour and felicity. If then, of faith, hope, and love, love be the greatest,-if it be by the test of love that our pretensions to Christianity are to be tried,—if all the relative duties of morality are embraced in one word, and that word is love,—it is obviously needful that, in a book like this, the requisitions of benevolence should be habitually regarded in the prosecution of its inquiries. And accordingly the reader will sometimes be invited to sacrifice inferior considerations to these requisitions, and to give to the law of love that. paramount station in which it has been placed by the authority of God.

It is certain that almost every offence against the relative duties has its origin, if not in the malevolent propensities, at least in those propensities which are incongruous with love. I know not whether it is possible to disregard any one obligation that respects the intercourse of man with man, without violating this great Christian law. This universal applicability may easily be illustrated by referring to the obligations of justice, obligations which, in civilized communities, are called into operation more frequently than almost any other. He who estimates the obligations of justice by a reference to that benevolence which Christianity prescribes, will form to himself a much more pure and perfect standard than he who refers to the law of the land, to the apprehension of exposure, or to the desire of reputation. There are many ways in which a man can be unjust without censure from the public, and without violating the laws; but there is no way in which he can be unjust without disregarding Christian benevolence. It is a universal and very sensitive test. who does regard it, who uniformly considers whether his conduct towards another is consonant with pure good will, cannot be voluntarily unjust; nor can he who commits injustice do it without the consciousness, if he will reflect, that he is violating the law of love. That integrity

* John xiii. 35.

Evid. Christianity, p. 2, c. 2.

+ Rom. xiii. 9.
1 John iv. 16.

+ Col. iii. 14.

He

CHAP. 6.]

COMMUNICATION OF THE WILL OF GOD.

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which is founded upon love, when compared with that which has any other basis, is recommended by its honour and dignity, as well as by its rectitude. It is more worthy the man as well as the Christian, more beautiful in the eye of infidelity as well as of religion.

It were easy, if it were necessary, to show in what manner the law of benevolence applies to other relative duties, and in what manner, when applied, it purifies and exalts the fulfilment of them. But our present business is with principles rather than with their specific application.

It is obvious that the obligations of this benevolence are not merely prohibitory-directing us to avoid "working ill" to another, but mandatory-requiring us to do him good. That benevolence which is manifested only by doing no evil, is indeed of a very questionable kind. To abstain from injustice, to abstain from violence, to abstain from slander, is compatible with an extreme deficiency of love. There are many who are neither slanderous, nor ferocious, nor unjust, who have yet very little regard for the benevolence of the gospel. In the illustrations therefore of the obligations of morality, whether private or political, it will sometimes become our business to state, what this benevolence requires, as well as what it forbids. The legislator whose laws are contrived only for the detection and punishment of offenders, fulfils but half his duty; if he would conform to the Christian standard, he must provide also for their reformation.

CHAPTER VI.

THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION OF THE WILL OF GOD.

The reader is solicited to approach this subject with that mental seriousness which its nature requires. Whatever be his opinions upon the subject, whether he believes in the reality of such communication or not, he ought not even to think respecting it but with feelings of seriousness.

In endeavouring to investigate this reality, it becomes especially needful to distinguish the communication of the will of God from those inental phenomena with which it has very commonly been intermingled and confounded. The want of this distinction has occasioned a confusion which has been greatly injurious to the cause of truth. It has occasioned great obscurity of opinion respecting divine instruction; and by associating error with truth, has frequently induced skepticism respecting the truth itself. When an intelligent person perceives that infallible truth or divine authority is described as belonging to the dictates of "conscience," and when he perceives, as he must perceive, that these dictates are various and sometimes contradictory; he is in danger of concluding that no unerring and no divine guidance is accorded to man.

Upon this serious subject it is therefore peculiarly necessary to endeavour to attain distinct ideas, and to employ those words only which convey distinct ideas to other men. The first section of the present chapter will accordingly be devoted to some brief observations respecting the conscience, its nature, and its authority; by which it is hoped the reader will see sufficient reason to distinguish its dictates from that higher guidance, respecting which it is the object of the present chapter to inquire.

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