Secretary LAIRD. In a period of two years, I would say no. I would like Admiral Moorer to comment on that question as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but I think if you limit it to two years the answer would be no. Of course, for us to build a submarine would take at least five years from the time that we went forward, but I would like the chairman to comment on that question. Admiral MOORER. Senator Cooper, Secretary Laird and I have repeatedly said that we are confident we have adequate deterrence for today. What we are really talking about in proposing these programs is the future. I don't think that the people at large, the American public as a whole, recognize the very long lead time involved in developing any modern weapon systems. We are concerned about slipping back into a state of obsolescence and, consequently, we must move ahead now in order to maintain modern systems and maintain this deterrence that we are talking about. Senator COOPER. I understand your argument. Secretary Laird said just a few minutes ago that he couldn't state that within five years that the Soviet Union would be superior to us in warheads. QUESTION OF RESTRAINT OR NEW WEAPONS PROGRAM My question now goes to the question whether we should exercise restraint for two years and see what we can do to achieve nuclear offensive missile system reductions or move into a big new weapons program. You said flatly that you don't think that for two years we would be in danger. Admiral Moorer said that unequivocally. Now, I will ask you this: The history of the arms race with the Soviet Union is that we first got the atomic bomb; they wouldn't agree to any restraint until later when they came up with it. We obtained superiority in numbers of ICBM's; they wouldn't agree to restraints until they deployed over 1,000 ICBM's. They agreed to restraints on ABM's, ICBM's and SLBM's only when they deployed them in similar numbers. Are the Soviets really bargaining from strength or are they just saying, "You have this system of weapons; so we will not agree to any limitations until we come up on a level with you."? The fundamental question is, if it is correct that for almost 30 years every deployment we have made has been matched by an equivalent deployment and the only agreements we have reached have been on the basis of parity, why shouldn't we show restraint for two years instead of this demonstrably futile "bargaining from strength" so they will not do what they have done, it seems to me, in the past 30 years, "to not agree on any limitations until we get up to you." If we build up in two years, they will undoubtedly do the same and the arms race will go on. Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, and Senator Cooper, I think we have shown that restraint. When you talk about the position we will be in in two years, what I am really talking about and what the President has submited to this Congress for the B-1 and the Trident system are programs that will place us in a position where we can have this sufficiency, this parity of systems, during the period of the 1980's. Now, the Soviet Union, if we were to stop research and development on a unilateral basis in these offensive areas, if we were to stop building a capability to go forward with these systems and there we are talking about the period of 1978 and beyond-if we were to do that for a period of two years, I believe the safety and the security of our country would be jeopardized. SIGNIFICANCE Senator COOPER. Well, I respect your opinions. Senator COOPER. I don't think our security would be jeopardized if we had rejected your assumptions about Soviet intentions of three or four years ago, but we will never know for sure about that. But my time is up. I would like to say here that I think that it is significant that the military, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approve this unprecedented agreement and should receive credit for their participation in achieving the treaty and interim agreement. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Spong? TECHNICAL SUPERIORITY Senator SPONG. Mr. Secretary, yesterday in the Armed Services Committee hearing-and here this morning-you said that the United States retained a technical superiority under the treaty and under the agreements. In response to Senator Cooper you have compared submarine weaponry capabilities. Would you further elaborate on what you consider technical superiority? Secretary LAIRD. Well, I believe that the disadvantage that shows up in the numbers in the offensive agreement is offset by the 18 to 24 month lead that we have because of our technology in the MIRV area-M-I-R-V area. That is perhaps the best example of what I am talking about. Senator SPONG. Do you expect the Soviets to reach a MIRV capability within the next two years? Secretary LAIRD. I do. In the defense report and statement which Admiral Moorer and I submitted to this Congress in February, we projected in that that such a capability could be acquired and deployed but not for 18 to 24 months, and I stand behind those reports. I think that that generally has complete and total agreement within our government. Senator SPONG. Then your assessment of technical superiority may not go beyond 18 to 24 months in the future? Secretary LAIRD. If we were to stand still and not support the programs that are in the 1973 budget, I think that assessment that you make is correct. SENATOR JACKSON'S WORKING PAPER Senator SPONG. Yesterday Senator Jackson submitted a working paper on provisions of the SALT agreement. Admiral Moorer, in his very thorough statement on the numerical limitations, gave us figures this morning. I wonder, Admiral Moorer, if you would care to comment in any way on Senator Jackson's paper. (Senator Jackson's paper follows:) 1 U.S. intelligence estimate. The Soviets refuse to state the number of ICBM's to which the executive agreement limits them. 2 Requires the Soviets to trade in old submarine launch tubes and/or old missile silos to achieve a number in excess of 740. 3 Requires the United States to trade in Titan ICBM's to achieve a number in excess of 656. Note: This working paper presents those weapon systems covered by the SALT agreement in which the United States and the Soviet Union are permitted different deployment levels. Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. The figures that he had, as I recall, with respect to ICBM's and SLBM's, in general, were correct. AGREEMENTS' EFFECT ON U.S. NEED FOR NAVAL FACILITIES ABROAD Senator SPONG. I would like to ask both of you gentlemen if, in your opinion, the treaty and agreement either increase or diminish the United States need for naval facilities abroad? Secretary LAIRD. I do not see anything in these agreements, in the treaty or in the offensive agreement, that diminishes the need for the current requests we have pending here in the Congress. A large part of the requests that we have pending here in the Congress are dealing with manpower requirements which we have, and the personnel problems which particularly the Navy faces because of the long separations that their sailors have as far as their families are concerned. As for the follow-on programs that we are advocating, such as the Trident, this system would diminish the need for forward basingalthough it will not come into being during the existence of this agreement because the Trident submarine would be based within the United States. But during the period of the agreement the answer to your question is no. I would like to point out that the Trident system does have home basing within the United States. AGREEMENTS' EFFECT ON NEED FOR AIR FACILITIES ABROAD Senator SPONG. Would you comment on whether the treaty and the agreement would increase or diminish our need for air facilities abroad? Secretary LAIRD. No, they would not affect that area. The mutual and balanced force reduction discussions, which could start within the next 12 months, may impact on that particular question. But as for this treaty that we are testifying on today, and the offensive agreement which we are supporting before this committee today, they do not have an impact. ATTITUDE OF EUROPEAN ALLIES Senator SPONG. Now, Secretary Rogers touched on this in his testimony before the committee on Monday, but you may also want to comment upon it. What has been the attitude of our European allies since the announcement of the treaty and agreement? Secretary LAIRD. We have carried on very close and continuing consultations in the spirit that the President outlined in his first meeting with the NATO council in 1969; and I believe that there is general support and understanding for the agreement and for the treaty among our NATO allies. We have also stressed in our briefings of our NATO allies that we are going forward with the various programs that are contained in the 1973 budget. Senator SPONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. The CHAIRMAN. Are you through? Senator Javits has agreed to allow Senator Symington to have his time at this time. Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that and express regret at not being here all the time, but we had the privilege of hearing the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs yesterday in the Senate Armed Services Committee. I would make a couple of observations and then have the comments of the Secretary. CLARITY CONCERNING ABM'S AND SUBMARINES To me, the treaty agreement is clear so far as the ABM's are concerned. It is reasonably clear also so far as the submarines are concerned, although I worry a great deal about the cost of the submarines. If the costs stay firm, I would oppose the rapid development of these new ships, ten of them, especially as you could put the new missile in the Poseidons. FUZZY ASPECT OF ICBM What worries most is the fuzzy aspect of the ICBM. The more I listen to the questions and answers from Senator Jackson, like the capacity to MIRV in heavy quantities, perhaps 20 each, the SS-9's, of which they have 313, it worries me. U.S. ECONOMY As mentioned vesterday, when I was at the White House, Dr. Kissinger talked for an hour and the President for 15 minutes, then he took questions for an hour, but not one word was brought up about the economy. In fact, Secretary Rogers, day before yesterday, before this committee, said he thought the economy was in very good shape and getting better. Perhaps he doesn't think the growing size of the gigantic Federal debt is important. Today it is the third largest cost to the American taxpayer-interest on that debt. 80-942 0-72- -7 INCREASED SPENDING RESULTING FROM SALT AGREEMENT SUGGESTED It would seem the SALT arrangement has been designed to create a heavy increase in arms costs, and this at a time when the taxpayer is already heavily burdened with those costs. Those of us who had hoped any agreement comparable to the SALT agreement would mean less arms costs, less of a burden on the taxpayers' shoulders, at least to the point where we could put more money in our domestic problems, now realize we are faced with the fact that the result of the SALT agreement means you believe we must spend many billions of dollars more in arms. Secretary LAIRD. I don't think that is the case, Senator Symington. I have already presented Senator SYMINGTON. Please let me finish. Secretary LAIRD (continuing). A reduction in our 1973 budget. Senator SYMINGTON. You have talked about a new Soviet test of a new missile. We are always getting to the "scare" aspect as we approach these military budget problems. So, to me, SALT in some ways is now becoming exactly the opposite of what we had hoped for. I have finished my statement, and before going back to the markup, would appreciate your comments. Secretary LAIRD. Well, Senator Symington, I believe that we can move into arms limitations and arms reductions but I think that it has to be done through the negotiating process. These are the first steps in that process-the treaty and the interim offensive agreement. We are submitting a reduction in our 1973 budget as a result of this agreement in the strategic area. We will reduce, and an amendment is coming to your committee which will cover net reductions in the strategic area of over $500 million. The projected reductions are $5 billion during the five-year period; the projected reductions through 1981 are over $8.5 billion; these reductions are in the strategic area of our budget. I believe, Senator Symington, that we are moving in the right direction as far as defense spending is concerned. When I became Secretary of Defense, we were up over 9 percent of our gross national product that was devoted to defense spending. As Senator Cooper remarked, close to 45 percent of our budget was in defense. Now 30 percent of our budget is devoted to defense. We have been able to reduce the size of our military forces from over 3.5 million men and women down to less than 2.4 million men and women and we are making further reductions in the 1973 budget. We have reduced defense-related employment in industry by over 1.3 million. We have reduced Civil Service employment within the Department of Defense by 250,000; so we are moving in that direction. My concern is that we should not go too far unilaterally in these reductions before the negotiations are completed in these various areas. We have made the first step in these negotiations with these two agreements that we have before you today. There will be further agreements in the strategic area, I am confident. There will be, I believe, negotiations within the next 12 months on mutual and balanced force reductions. I believe we can have negotiations in the field of military assistance to limit the military assistance programs in places |