for either deployment or advanced site preparation. Contracts have been let and we were going forward on that basis.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we are all aware of that.

Secretary LAIRD. Now, with this particular treaty we are abandoning that momentum which was started with the approval of the Congress in the defensive area. The Soviet Union is abandoning the extreme momentum which they had going in the offensive area. This was a mutually acceptable course of action for both countries at this time. I do not believe that we should read into the interim offensive agreement considerations which you read into that agreement, and you use as the premise of your question

The CHAIRMAN. Every time we have a ten-minute limitation you take up the whole ten minutes and you leave no opportunity for questions. We are familiar with that. I will remind you that was approved by a 50-50 vote on the ABM. It was not unanimous in the Senate by any

means.

Secretary LAIRD. I am sorry if I implied it was unanimous.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not very significant.

Secretary LAIRD. I have been in politics a long time.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a close question.

Secretary LAIRD. One vote is just as good as two, three, or four; so I don't want to argue how it was approved.

EFFECT OF WITNESS' PROGRAM ON PARITY

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think you have answered or even responded to the questions. We have a sufficiency. The President himself has stated in no uncertain terms that one reason why there has been a favorable response is that these agreements cannot last unless each side feels that it has security. He reiterated as did Mr. Kissinger that you should not describe these agreements as either party having an advantage. that either won the game. He is trying to promote, if I understand him, that each has a degree of parity.

Secretary LAIRD. That is what I am promoting, too.

The CHAIRMAN. What your program is doing is to upset that. You continually refer to superiority as you go along.

Secretary LAIRD. I have referred to it in the area of technology and, Mr. Chairman, we do have a superior position as far as technology is concerned. That is the reason why I am confident that the disparity in numbers that exists in the offensive agreement does not prevent us from maintaining sufficiency as far as our deterrent is concerned.

I would quote the President to vou and perhaps we could put this in the record at this particular point. The President did cover this in his briefing to the members of the committee last week at the White House, and it might be well to restate his position.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like for us to give as many members of the committee as possible some opportunity to make observations.

Secretary LAIRD. Could I put that in the record without reading it? The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you can put anything you would like into the record.

Secretary LAIRD. Thank you. I appreciate that. (See appendix.)

EFFECT OF SEEKING ADVANTAGE ON SPIRIT OF AGREEMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. The point comes back to this. It will destroy the whole spirit of these agreements if you persist or if our government persists in seeking an advantage, and a clear advantage, in any of these fields. The basis of the agreements is a high degree of parity. The numbers are not so significant if there is no defense against them. If the weapons are more than adequate and they can't defend against them, the fact that you have 100 or 500 more missiles doesn't make any appreciable difference. In addition, you have already stated you believe, we have superiority in technology. Our own government made a decision to develop Minuteman, which is smaller than the SS-9, because it is a more efficient way to use your material. A 16-megaton weapon or a 25-megaton weapon is not an efficient way to proceed. We made that decision ourselves; so there is a degree of parity. In fact, there are some very good authorities who believe that we have on balance various very much stronger systems today.

If we go forward with your proposals we will upset that balance and I think we are likely to destroy the effectiveness of the treaty itself and that is what we wish to protect.

ADEQUATE DEFENSE ISSUE IN VIEW OF ABM AGREEMENT

I think the issue about the adequate defense in view of the ABM agreement is the very crux of the matter and I don't quite think you have addressed yourself directly to that question.

We have had some very interesting hearings with other members of the government and some who have recently left, particularly the Navy. Information has been supplied the committee from the Center for Defense Information which, as you know, is headed by an admiral who just retired and who is thoroughly aware of the relative strength of the American government versus the Russians. He says, for example, "The Center for Defense Information has made its own study of the naval balance and has reached the following conclusions: The balance is heavily in favor of the United States. The Soviet Union is doing little which would significantly change the balance in the next few years. There is little evidence to support the request for a large increase in money for ships designed to project U.S. power overseas and to greatly expand U.S. strategic weapons capability."

(The document referred to follows:)

THE SOVIET NAVAL THREAT:
REALITY AND ILLUSION

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, has told Congress that "a major shift in the naval
balance between the United States and the Soviet Union"
is taking place.

"Unless we accelerate the modernization of our fleet," he told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 15, 1972, "the Soviets will increasingly challenge our control of the seas in those maritime regions essential to the success of our forward defense strategy, as well as in ocean areas closer to our shores."

On the basis of these arguments, the Defense Department has asked Congress for $9.7 billion in new Navy procurement funds for fiscal 1973, about $1 billion more than in 1972, which was in turn about $1 billion more than in 1971. These funds are part of a Navy "modernization" program: 42 major combat ships and 21 submarines now under construction or authorized by Congress and more than 60 major surface ships and a new fleet of ballistic missile submarines contemplated (see tables 4 and 5).

The Center for Defense Information has made its own study of the naval balance and has reached the following conclusions:

• The balance is heavily in favor of the United States. • The Soviet Union is doing little which would significantly change the balance in the next few years.

There is little evidence to support the request for a large increase in money for ships designed to project US power overseas and to greatly expand US strategic weapons capability.

A Look at the Balance

Defense Department testimony to Congress on the Soviet naval threat stresses such trends as an increase in the number of Soviet major combat surface ships in the last five years (from 185 to 215, including two new helicopter carriers, seven new missile cruisers, 18 new missile destroyers and 36 new escorts). It stresses Russia's numerical advantage in submarines (about 343 Soviet to 138 US), new Soviet anti-ship missiles, and increases in Soviet naval operations in the world's oceans.

But these presentations fail to give a fair picture of the relative strengths of these two navies. The diagrams and data on the following pages give a fair picture. They show that:

1. The Soviet Union has no nuclear-powered combat surface ships and is not reported to be building any. The United States has four and is building seven more.

2. The United States has 14 attack aircraft carriers which carry from 40 to 90 jet aircraft each, used for striking land or sea targets. Two nuclear carriers are under construction. The Soviet Union has no attack carriers and no sea-based fixed-wing aircraft. The Defense Department has asked for funds in 1973 to start building the power plant for a fourth nuclear attack carrier. It also has asked for funds to design a new fleet of at least eight smaller follow-on carriers to be called Sea Control Ships.

3. The United States has two anti-submarine carriers which carry helicopters and fixed-wing anti-submarine aircraft. The Soviets have two anti-submarine carriers which are actually cruisers with large helicopter landing decks. One 35,000-ton ship is under construction in the Soviet Union which may be a carrier or some other type of ship.

4. The United States has seven "assault" helicopter carriers designed to move marines ashore. Five more, twice the size of the existing ones, are under construction. The Soviet Union has no comparable ships.

5. The United States has nine cruisers. The Soviets have 25. But four of the Soviet cruisers are pre-World War Two and are probably being retired. Ten of the Soviet cruisers are smaller than many US destroyers. The US Navy wants to build two 2200-ton prototypes of what would eventually be a cruiser-size hovercraft called a "surface effects ship."

6. Soviet missile-firing destroyers are fewer and smaller than their US counterparts. Congress has already authorized 30 new destroyers (DD963 Spruance Class), which are larger than any destroyers of the Soviet Union. The US Navy is asking for funds for 50 new "patrol frigates" which will be larger than most Soviet destroyers. By the late 1970s all US destroyers and patrol frigates are to be equipped with the new Harpoon surface-to-surface missile.

7. The present US fleet of 41 strategic ballistic missile submarines has 2800 separately targetable warheads.1 Russia's ballistic missile submarines have about 500 warheads (see Table 1). Also, a greater percentage of the US ballistic missile submarines are on station at a given time than is the case with the Soviet submarines. By 1976, the

80-942 0-72- -6

"Every addition to defense expenditure does not automatically increase military security. Because security is based upon moral and economic, as well as purely military strength, a point can be reached at which additional funds for arms, far from bolstering security, weaken it." President Eisenhower