Secretary ROGERS. I also think I should add we have consulted very actively with our allies and there is great satisfaction on the part of our allies all over the world about the consultation process and we expect to continue that.

IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANSION TO LIMITS OF AGREEMENTS

Senator PELL. I think probably Ambassador Smith would best be able to answer this question. If the Soviets do what is allowed in land and submarine based forward movement on their side, what are the implications for us? If the Kremlin or Pentagon move ahead on the same basis and expand as much as they can within the framework of the agreement, would that put us in the very inferior position after a few years?

Mr. SMITH. I think one of the keys to the answer to your question is your last few words, "after a few years." Now, one cannot tell how long this interim freeze will last. People shorthandedly say this is a 5-year agreement. I hope it won't be. It may be a 1-year agreement; it may be a 2-year agreement, depending on when we succeed in the follow-on negotiations.

Now, it is our calculation that nothing that the Soviets can do even if it went the full term of five years could upset the strategic balance. We will be going ahead, as you know, with substantial programs in the Poseidon and Minuteman field and in other strategic areas, so that it is our confident calculation that the strategic balance will remain firm during that period.

ARE BOTH SIDES GOING FULL STEAM AHEAD?

Senator PELL. Basically what you are saying is that both sides really told each other we are going to go full steam ahead within the terms of the agreement. Would that be correct?

Mr. SMITH. I think "full steam ahead" is much too strong a term. Certainly as far as any programs I know of, if we wanted, we could go much further and much faster. For instance, in such programs as the MIRV programs, you could step that up if you wanted to. There are a number of ways that the United States could produce more launchers rather quickly if it wanted to. So I don't see this as a full steam ahead situation, but it is our understanding that the Soviets are not going to be hesitating and reducing their programs because of the fact that a preliminary SALT offensive agreement has been reached. It is by no means a completed agreement.

MOVING AHEAD TO EXTENT INDICATED QUESTIONED

Senator PELL. In conclusion, as one individual member of the body, I would share the doubts of my chairman and Senator Symington that we should move ahead to the extent Secretary Laird indicates he would like us to move. I would think that it would behoove us to see if we really feel if moving ahead in one or two of those weapons systems would not be enough to meet your bargaining purposes and by the same token would perhaps give us some effect to our economy, which is also needed at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper.

COMMENDATION OF THOSE WHO WORKED ON NEGOTIATION

Senator COOPER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say to the Secretary and to the negotiators and Ambassador Smith, Mr. Nitze, General Allison, Dr. Brown, Mr. Gartoff and all of the staff, Mr. Farley and his staff who worked on these negotiations, I believe you deserve the greatest thanks from the country for the painstaking work that you have done throughout these years.

I want to say I had the good fortune to attend as an observer to three of these meetings, two in Vienna and one in Helsinki and have a good idea of what a difficult painstaking process you had to go through. I say that as to what I believe and also to ask this question.

DECISIONS MADE IN LAST 48 HOURS IN MOSCOW

Some publicity has been given to the view held by some that agreement was largely determined in Moscow in the last 48 hours through quick decisions, and some of them to the disadvantage of the United States, particularly on the submarine launched missiles. Again based upon my experience at the SALT negotiations and from your briefings in Washington, I believe that it is not possible to make sudden changes at the last minute. A constant interchange of proposals and ideas was made during the last 22 years and the treaty and agreement reflect that background. But is there any truth that the decisions made in the last 48 hours were harmful and disadvantageous to the United States of America?

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, I can answer

Senator PELL. What essential agreement was made there that had not been agreed upon in your prior negotiations

Secretary ROGERS. Let me say that when you are dealing with agreements that are as complicated as these agreements are it requires a coordinated effort on the part of many, many, people, and in order to complete the agreements that effort has to be a long one and it has to be carefully planned. In the final analysis when there are differences of views that prevent the agreement from being consummated, they have to be decided at the highest level. Now that was done in this instance. I think this was as well coordinated and well prepared a negotiation as possibly our country has ever engaged in and it required teamwork of the highest order and we had that teamwork. There were major agreements worked out in Helsinki and Vienna over a course of two and a half years, each one of them difficult in itself, and combined extremely difficult, because each related to the

other.

At the end of that process, just before the agreements were signed, there were still some problems, which is not unusual in negotiations. That is why negotiations haven't been completed, because there are problems. These problems were ones that we had more or less anticipated, they were the ones that remained as a result of long discussions that Ambassador Smith and his team engaged in, and it was understood they would be discussed at Moscow.

As you say, they were well thought through and we knew where the areas of disagreement were and there had to be a decision taken by the President himself about what he would finally be willing to do or not do. That was done. And I don't believe it was a disadvantage

at all. I think if it had not been done we wouldn't have these agreements today and I submit Gerry Smith and all his team agree those final decisions of the President, too, were extremely important, were vital in fact to the success of these negotiations and were not harmful in any degree.

Now, each side had to give a little in order to reach the result we reached but, as the chairman said, and I think the sentiment and the general view of what he said is shared; these are very good agreements and no one has been taken advantage of. I don't think the Russians are at a disadvantage, we are not at a disadvantage. I think these agreements reflect the maturity of national interest. They are going to benefit both the Soviet Union and the United States and the people of the whole world and I don't believe anybody lost or won. I think that the world was the winner, and I think it will improve the relations between our two countries to a great extent.

I am not sure that any useful purpose is served by talking about what the disagreements were and how they were resolved. Everything that has been agreed to is before the Congress. We are going to have another series of negotiations that we have to undertake soon. I can only say I am absolutely convinced myself that nothing that happened at Moscow, no decision that was made by the President, in any way disadvantaged this country. On the contrary, I think it was essential to the successful completion of these agreements, which I think serve our national interest.

WITHOUT AGREEMENT OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE AND ABM WOULD CONTINUE

Senator COOPER. What I am saying is indisputable; it is a fact, but for an agreement, the offensive arms race and the ABM, defensive missiles, would continue with no essential additional protection to the United States or either country, and certainly greater danger to both sides. All this futile, dangerous weaponry could be at tremendous cost to both countries. Isn't that correct?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

OTHER UNSUBMITTED DOCUMENTS

Senator COOPER. The President submitted the treaty, the interim agreement and protocol, and also understandings agreed to by both the Soviet Union and the United States, unilateral statements by both countries. In those papers, particularly those dealing with understandings, unilateral statements of both the Soviet Union and the United States, references were made to some other documents which were not included in the papers that were sent up. You already have said there were no secret understandings. Is there anything in the papers to which reference was made in the unilateral statements of both countries and the agreed understandings which are of such significance that they should be sent to the Senate also?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I would like to ask Ambassador Smith to elaborate.

Senator COOPER. The question has arisen many times recently but also in past history, particularly in the early days of this Republic the Executive was asked if the negotiators' papers and instructions

were sent to the Senate on various treaties. Should not these papers— the full papers, the complete record-be given to us now?

Secretary ROGERS. I would like to have Ambassador Smith answer that, but let me before he does say that we very carefully considered everything that may be thought of as an agreement or understanding of any significance and everything that is agreed to of any significance we think has been fully reflected in the treaty, in the agreed understandings that are included in this document. In the interim agreement and protocol. Nevertheless, everything that has been agreed to has been submitted to the Congress for its consideration and perusal. I don't believe there is anything else that is of any consequence.

EXPECTED SOVIET PROGRAMS

Now, there was not any complete transcript maintained of the plenary sessions; so I think the Congress has everything that reflects in any way on what the treaty and agreements involve.

Senator COOPER. Reference has been made to the President's statement that the Soviet Union intends to build up its offensive missiles strength. Agreement has been reached upon the number of land based missiles, submarine launched missiles, protection against upgrading of SAM to the anti-ballistic area. What are the things that you expect the Soviet Union to continue to do, Ambassador Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Well, I think, Senator Cooper, the Soviet Union throughout this negotiation made it very clear that their modernization process should not be interfered with in connection with this first agreement and we, in general, agreed with that proposition. This is to a considerable extent a numerical limitation although there are some qualitative limitations in these arrangements. I think that what the Soviets had in mind is that they want to keep their missile systems up to date. Their missiles are not as efficient as ours. They want to have the opportunity too of having more modern missiles. A lot of their missiles are liquid fueled. They want to probably make them solid fueled. They want to have them more efficient and that is why we had a good deal of discussion about what could be done within the numerical restraints. For instance, one of the questions was, could you increase the size of launchers for an ICBM, and it was agreed that you could not increase the dimensions "significantly." It was subsequently agreed that "significantly increased" meant more than ten or 15 percent. So I would expect that the Soviets will be engaged in programs which would involve some increase in the dimensions of their silo launchers.

In addition to that, the whole submarine program I look on as a modernization program. They apparently are willing to modernize their strategic forces by building more submarines at the price of phasing out ICBM's. I would anticipate we will see that modernization phenomena continue in their forces just as we continue to modernize our forces by improving the warhead situation in our MIRV program, by hardening our silos and otherwise.

Senator COOPER. Then what you are speaking of is the modernization of their ABM system, and their land based missiles systems, and submarine launched missiles systems, which is permitted under the treaty and agreement?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Senator COOPER. Do you anticipate they will continue to work upon MIRV, deployment of MIRV which is not prohibited by the agreement?

Secretary ROGERS. I wouldn't be at all surprised if the Soviets follow a MIRV approach.

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIETS INCREASING SS-9's

Senator COOPER. You have spoken of the enlargement of their silos. Does that offer a danger that by enlarging their silos the Soviets could somehow increase their SS-9's? There is a fixed limit on SS-9's; is there not?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir, they have agreed that they will not construct any new ICBM silos and that means that they are frozen not only at their present level of ICBM silos, but at their present level of what we call heavy ICBM silos, which are SS-9's and any subsequent class of that sort.

They presently have something on the order of 300 operational and under construction and under this agreement they will be limited to that.

Senator COOPER. Could they by increasing the diameter of the silos, which you say is permitted up to 15 percent, would that permit the deployment of heavy missiles comparable to the SS-9? Secretary ROGERS. We believe not.

SUBJECTS FOR NEXT PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS

Senator COOPER. What is there then to negotiate in the next phase? There are bombers. What else?

Secretary ROGERS. The first thing

Senator COOPER. Is reduction of launchers agreed upon in phase one?

Secretary ROGERS. There are not reductions agreed upon in the present situation, except in connection with the SLBM inclusion where the Soviets will have to go in for a substantial reduction program if they want to build up to the levels of submarines and SLBM launchers permitted. I would think that a reduction program would be an important component of any follow-on negotiations but, firstly, what I think we need to get an agreement on is what weapons systems. Strategic offensive weapons systems, must be included in a treaty to match the defensive treaty, and that means including bombers.

Now, the Soviets, as you know, made a strong point in the past of saying it also should include some other aircraft that we do not consider as strategic. These forward based systems

Senator COOPER. In addition to placing the interim agreement in the form of a treaty, achieving launcher number reductions, you might go into subjects such as bombers, forward based aircraft, the aircraft on carriers, that type of thing?

Secretary ROGERS. Our position is that aircraft on carriers and systems based on the Far East and in Europe are not correctly characterized as strategic.

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