reduction in conventional defense leading willy-nilly to a return to increased reliance on nuclear defense as battlefield weapons in Europe and Asia so we can bring the boys home. More "bang for the buck" made little sense 15 years ago and it certainly does not make any sense under the present situation of nuclear parity. If a CTB can help prevent such possible defense policies from emerging, I am for it. VERIFICATION OF COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN In terms of verification of the CTB, I tend to align myself with Mr. Warnke's position, although I am not an expert in that particular area. The key question is how much confidence you ask for under an arms control agreement. One should not expect 100 percent certainty. We do not have that in the absence of arms control. We could, of course, always attempt to negotiate the so-called "threshold" test ban by banning underground nuclear testing above the level at which we are highly confident of detection but below the level which might have sufficient uncertainty to bother some people. Such a two-step approach to a CTB might be bureaucratically effective within the U.S. and the Soviet Union in terms of satisfying those who argue that we must continue testing and it could pave the way for a total test ban without on-site inspection. NUCLEAR TESTS COULD BE DETECTED AS EARTHQUAKES Senator PERCY. Dr. Teller, we would appreciate your comments on this point, that if earthquakes can be detected as possible nuclear tests, is the reverse likely, tests that can pass possibly as earthquakes on detection equipment? Mr. TELLER. I am sorry, sir, I have not understood the question. Senator PERCY. The question is, if earthquakes can be detected as possible nuclear tests, then is the reverse also true or likely, that is, tests that can pass as possible earthquakes on detection equipment? If you have a nuclear test could it show up as an earthquake? Mr. TELLER. That was one of my main points, that a nuclear test can be made to look like an earthquake. I also should say that I would be very interested in hearing from Mr. Warnke, a quantitative statement of how small nuclear explosions does he think can be safely detected? What has gone on here, is a confusion of issues, and a confusion of words. That to me is appalling. Respectfully, Professor Hoffmann said you were confused by the evidence. No evidence was shown here, only words, and those words in toto made no sense. you OBLITERATING DISTINCTION BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS Mr. BRENNAN. May I make one brief point? I would just not like to leave the possible impression on the record I was sympathetic to obliterating the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, in case any of our colleagues had the impression I supported that position. I never have and I do not now. Senator PERCY. Thank you. DEFENSE RELATED RESEARCH ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES Dr. Teller, you made some very disturbing comments about research and research attitudes on universities, and I can assure you that even those of us who did hope that we would not go ahead with ABM deployment always supported continued research in that area, and we tried to overcome the feeling on campuses that defense-related research should not be pursued. I am thankful that we are doing it at campuses rather than just in Government laboratories, and that we have the competence available on campuses. DETECTION OF SUBMARINES I would sometime like very much to pursue with you in private or in executive session the subject you raised of detection of submarines. It would be very crucial to us to know if our submarine fleet is in danger of detection and if we are falling behind in that area of research, and certainly in the national means of verification. I just want to clarify that I understood your point there; as I recall, you indicated that we are making available information to the Soviet Union on our national verification system that is not available to the public or to Congress. I just wanted to be sure I understood what you meant there because, as I understand it, we do not share intelligence data with the Soviet Union. It is not made public, but Congress does have access to such material. Having spent many years in the photographic field, I have had a deep interest in it and it is my impression we can detect railroad ties at 100 miles and even count the railroad ties. A steady pattern of photography over a given area, all four seasons of the year, enables us to verify with considerable accuracy what is going on in that area in the deployment of offensive or defensive systems. Were you saying that we don't have such detection information or that whatever we have should be shared with the public more than it is, or implying that we in Congress are not getting access to information that we should have? Mr. TELLER. I'meant the second and third. COMMENDATION OF WITNESS Senator PERCY. Thank you very much. I appreciate your brevity, and I want to thank you very much again on behalf of the committee for your patience. I am certain committee members will study your testimony very carefully. Senator Cooper and Senator Javits wanted me to express particularly their deep disappointment at not being able to return because of their schedules. But your contribution today will be shared with all committee members and is very valuable indeed. We much appreciate it. The hearings are recessed. (Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 1:30 p.m., the committee to reconvene at 10 o'clock a.m., Thursday, June 29, 1972.) (The following material was subsequently supplied :) LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LABORATORY, Mr. BILL ASHWORTH, Committee on Foreign Relations, DEAR MR. ASHWORTH: Please find enclosed a supplementary statement that I hope you can add to the record of the testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations on June 28. I think this statement is quite important. It explains the basis on which testimony was given concerning an exceedingly important question, namely, the comprehensive test ban. A copy of the attached statement is being sent to Mr. Warnke in case he has anything to say in the way of a refutation or comment. Thanking you for your courtesy, Sincerely, Attachment. EDWARD TELLER. SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT BY DR. EDWARD TELLER Immediately following the question period conducted by Senator Charles H. Percy of Illinois, I (Edward Teller) addressed Mr. Paul Warnke in order to clarify an important question that came up in connection with a possible comprehensive test ban (CTB). I asked Mr. Warnke how small a nuclear explosion needs to be in order to escape detection. Mr. Warnke's answer was, "small enough." I thereupon inquired just how small is "small enough?" Is it one ton? 10 tons? 100 tons? One kilton? 10 kilotons? Mr. Warnke gave an answer to the effect, "I do not care how small it is." I thereupon asked Mr. Warnke, who is of course respected by the Committee as a former head of ISA, to make a statement to the same effect in order to clarify the basis of his testimony. Mr. Warnke refused. Then I told him that in that case I felt that it is my duty to do so myself. He answered that he does not care wheher or not I do so. For the information of the Committee, I wish to add that to the best of my knowledge a nuclear explosion will be effectively undetectable (even as a mere seismic event) if it is smaller than one kiloton and is fired in a reasonably low coupling medium such as dry alluvium. However, no serious evader would consider himself limited by this number. Such an evader would be concerned with the question of how large an explosion can be and still be unidentified (as a nuclear explosion). The following chart was presented as testimony to hte JCAE.1 CHART 22.-EVASION TECHNIQUES Conservative detection or identification Technique Tamped shot in low-coupling media. Decoupling cavity..... Detonate following nearby earthquake... Detonate following large earthquake....... Multiple shot simulation of earthquake____ (kilotons) Constraints on tester 1-2 Low yields; relatively few areas of low-coupling media; most in undeveloped regions; evader should test in seismic region. 50 Large volume of rock or salt to hide; long time to prepare; expensive. 50 Device may have to be emplaced for many months; local earthquakes must be at least 1 seismic magnitude larger than explosion. 10 to 20 events per year > mb 5.5 in U.S.S.R. 100 Most efficient way to conduct clandestine tests; evader should probably test in seismic regions. 1 event every 1 to 2 years. 100 Requires multiple emplacement holes; evader should test in seismic regions. 1 "Status of Current Technology to Identify Seismic Events as Natural or Man Made," Hearings of The Subcommittee on Research Development and Radiation of The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, October 27-28, 1971. Chart 22, page 53, testimony by Dr. Lukasik, Director of Advanced Research Projects Agency. This indicates that an evader can fire up to the order of 100 kilotons, depending on the effort he is willing to exert. In view of the fact that most important work on tactical weapons need be performed under one kiloton and in further view of the fact that the greatest portion of our important shots were fired under 100 kilotons, Mr. Warnke's statement that undetectable explosions are "small enough" is completely unjustified. On the basis of present information we have to accept the fact that a CTB cannot be policed in an effective manner. It should also be noticed that Dr. Lukasik's testimony on which the above chart is based has been given less than a year ago. What this amounts to is the fact that advances in capabilities of detection and identification have been offset by advances in a better understanding of evasion. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS THURSDAY, JUNE 29, 1972 UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (Chairman), presiding. Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Cooper and Percy. OPENING STATEMENT This is the fifth open committee session on the proposed treaty limiting antiballistic missile systems and the proposed Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons. At this point I would like to specifically recognize members of the media who have diligently covered these hearings and, in particular, I would like to express my appreciation to the National Public Radio Network which has broadcasted all of these sessions live, enabling many interested in these issues to follow them closely. This morning I would like to welcome Senator Kennedy as our first witness. We will also be hearing from Senator Buckley, Senator Joseph Clark of the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy; Mr. Roy Bennett of the Americans for Democratic Action; Dr. George Rathjens of the Council for a Livable World; Dr. James Dornan, Liberty Lobby; Mr. Sanford Gottlieb of SANE; Mrs. Phyllis Schafly of the National Association of Pro America; and Mr. Cordell Burch of the Northern Virginia Committee for Victory over Communism. Senator Kennedy, we are very pleased to have you this morning. STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this committee this morning regarding the ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement presented to the Senate by the President. I am pleased to be part of the continuing inquiries by this committee and by the other committees of the Senate, for I believe that the tenor of much of the testimony from Administration witnesses requires some response. (245) |