Secretary LAIRD. We have abandoned the 12-site ABM program with this treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. This in itself makes all these numbers much less significant because you have to treat these two together. If we go through with the ABM relinquishment then the fact that we have 42 against their 62, is not significant. No one maintains that 42 or 62, whatever they may have, constitutes a first-strike capability, in other words, that they could completely overwhelm the United States. No one that I have heard of has said that. I don't know what that number would be, but, you see, you keep coming back to these numbers games which are not really significant if there is no defense against the weapons.

Secretary LAIRD. But our programs are not aimed at numbers. Our programs that are in this budget which I have presented to the Congress for its consideration and decision are aimed at survivability, modernization and replacement, which I believe are absolutely essential. But we do make these decisions on the basis of being able to verify what the Soviets are doing and what they tell us they plan to do; and we do know what their capabilities are.

SOVIET AND U.S. SUBMARINE SYSTEMS

The CHAIRMAN. Did they tell you they are planning to build a Trident?

Secretary LAIRD. We know they are building a Trident. We have verified the fact that they are going forward with a modernized missile submarine, of the Y class.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary LAIRD. —which has longer range. Our particular Trident submarine will be worth two of their modified Y-class submarines in numbers of missiles and we are doing that for a purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. But how do you say they are going forward with a Trident when in the next sentence you say

Secretary LAIRD. It is almost the same range as far as the missile is concerned. It is approximately in that range area of the Trident system. Now, the Trident system that we are asking the Congress to go forward with in research and development in the 1973 budget, is a system that has 24 missiles. Their follow-on or improved Y-class submarine has 12. We have made that conscious decision to go with twice as many missile launchers, and not only on a cost effectiveness basis. We have done it on the basis that our manpower problems in the 1980's are important problems for us to consider and with the long deployments at sea we can get a greater deployment ratio with fewer men in the United States Navy with the larger launch platform. The CHAIRMAN. Are you saying that the extended Y-class submarine is going to be that superior to our existing Poseidon in range?

Secretary LAIRD. What I am saying is that it will have a longer range and a larger missile; it will have a missile system that has an inertial guidance system which we do not have. It will have certain improvements.

Now, I am not raising this question as a question that concerns me because I believe we do have in our budget the follow-on programs that are needed and necessary, not only to assure survivability but also to ensure modernization in the period of the 1980's and beyond.

The CHAIRMAN. I can see that, of course, if you wish to go with the Trident it is twice as big as the existing submarine. It is not planned to be

Secretary LAIRD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. -twice as big?

Secretary LAIRD. At the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. And I expect twice as vulnerable, but anyway obviously it would be a much bigger target than a smaller one?

Secretary LAIRD. I would like to say, Senator Fulbright, that I will be glad to see that a classified briefing is given you on the survivability and on the capabilities, the breakthroughs we made in submarine construction. I think it would be a mistake not to use this new technology as far as the new submarine is concerned. I do not believe that we should build carbon copies of old submarines that were designed in the 1950s. I believe that we should use this modern technology that we have developed and it will give us a greater capability to deal with the ASW. The CHAIRMAN. I know that is the same argument Mr. Teller used to make in his opposition to the test ban treaty. Because we are capable of doing it, he believed we ought to do it. I mean, it is the pursuit of knowledge and technological superiority has that purpose all its

own

Secretary LAIRD. I know, Seantor-
The CHAIRMAN.

Secretary LAIRD.

from a scientific point of view.

GOING FORWARD WITH ABM

you did not support my position on the ABM. I believe that going forward with the ABM was most important and I think that it has contributed considerably to the success we have had in SALT.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think there is any way you can prove that at all. You do not know what would have happened if we had done it. The Russians have never had any confidence in their own Galosh system.

Secretary LAIRD. They are going forward in building new ABM sites around Moscow and they are going forward and developing and deploying new technology in the ABM field.

TESTIMONY OF WITNESS AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The CHAIRMAN. This is again the difference between the way you testify and the way the intelligence community testifies, but, of course, unfortunately, it is secret.

Secretary LAIRD. There is no difference, I can assure you, of that, because the information is developed in the Department of Defense, as you know.

The CHAIRMAN. Your information is, but not all of it.

Secretary LAIRD. Their information is, too, in this area.

The CHAIRMAN. Unfortunately, it doesn't seem to jibe because we had a long session yesterday, but it is classified.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, Senator Fulbright, that comment of yours is

not correct

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is correct.

Secretary LAIRD.

and I do not believe

The CHAIRMAN. We had, years ago this is not new, Mr. Secretary

Secretary LAIRD. It is not fair to put out that kind of information

because it is not correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Years ago, at least four or five years ago, we had this testimony. We examined the intelligence community representative in detail about the Galosh system during the ABM debate. They described it; they had pictures of it and all of this. It was planned to be about 120, 125. They had installed 64. They had abandoned going forward with it. Now after all these years it is approximately in the same state and the only reasonable explanation of why they didn't go forward with it is because they didn't believe it was effective and they didn't want to spend the money on it. Are you saying today they have completed it?

Secretary LAIRD. We have notified your committee at all times of this information; and there has been no disagreement within the intelligence community at any time. To give the American people the impression that the verification figures which we are using here and which are used by the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, or the Department of Defense, are at variance is doing a disservice, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We went all over this.

Secretary LAIRD. They are not at variance and the informationThe CHAIRMAN. When you first came before this committee

Secretary LAIRD. The information we have supplied this committee has been correct in all cases and we have used the intelligence estimates that have been verified by all groups. This goes to the very heart of this agreement. If we cannot accept these verification figures, then truly we are in difficulty. I believe we can accept these verification figures which have been agreed upon by the entire intelligence community. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we went through this when you first came into office. You made statements about the first-strike capability of the Soviet Union and you aroused a great deal of fear and consternation. We had the testimony of Mr. Helms and then you yourself requested that you and Mr. Helms come before the committee

Secretary LAIRD. And there was no difference between our figures at all.

The CHAIRMAN.-in executive session. You are stating your own opinion.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I can guarantee you that and I don't believe that it is fair to attribute anything else to Director Helms.

The CHAIRMAN. I was greatly concerned at the time that I might cause Mr. Helms to be relieved of his responsibilities, and in my own view

Secretary LAIRD. I am sure you were reading into it something

that

The CHAIRMAN.

Secretary LAIRD.

-my own view-listen

-was not in any way of concern to Mr. Helms.

DIFFERENCE IN VIEWS OF WITNESS AND MR. HELMS

The CHAIRMAN. I allowed you to speak without interruption for a minute. Now you might allow me to speak for a minute.

The fact of the matter was there was a difference in your views. Secretary LAIRD. There were no differences as far as the projection of the figures was concerned, and you know that full well. The CHAIRMAN. I know full well

Secretary LAIRD. There was a difference of opinion as far as future intentions were concerned, and that is an entirely different question.

The CHAIRMAN. I know full well that you sought to give the impression to the public and this committee in public session that the Soviets were probably going for a first-strike capability. It scared everybody to death and you got your appropriations. But I know that the intelligence community at that time, after detailed examination, said they had never found, never made an opinion, in any effect that they believed the Soviet Union was going for a first-strike capability; and you remember this went on for a long time.

Secretary LAIRD. Would you want the facts on that? The statement that I made was, of course, that the SS-9 was a weapon system that had, I believe, a first-strike, counterforce, capability. If that particular system were developed and went forward at the rate it was then being deployed, the Soviet Union could possess a first-strike capability against our land-based ICBM's. I stated at that time that I was discussing capabilities and not intentions. The intentions are something different, and the record is crystal clear. I do not believe that it is fair to interpret it in the manner in which you currently are interpreting it, and I cannot sit here as a witness and allow that to go on.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you are entitled to your opinion. I interpreted it that way at that time and I think the record will show you were wrong in your estimate or your opinion.

(The statement referred to follows:)

(Excerpt from "Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of the ABM Systems," Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Part I, March 6, 11, 13, 21, 26 and 28, 1969, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1969.)

Secretary LAIRD. Well, we were and still are going for a second strike capability, as you know. With the large tonnage the Soviets have they are going for our missiles and they are going for a first strike capability. There is no question about that.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I have not—

The CHAIRMAN. They have not gone for a first-strike capability; the very fact we have an ABM treaty is evidence of that and your hunch or whatever you want to call it was not correct. That was 3 years ago.

Secretary LAIRD. I was talking about capabilities and I told you I would not read the Soviets' intentions. I still believe if you went forward on the basis of the present deployment at that time, you would be in a position where that could come about.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you are a genius at semantic confusion.

(Laughter.)

You invent such terms as "protective reaction strikes." The stories which have now come out about General Lavelle, completely demolish your semantic ingenuity. They were not protective reaction strikes. They were plain only bombing strikes.

Why do you do this sort of thing? You are a genius at it.
Secretary LAIRD. I appreciate your compliment.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a genius at it. I never have seen anybody who could think of these semantic terms that confuse the public. You know, you were trying to give the impression, whatever the words you used, that the Soviets represented an enormous danger. We had to react and we did. We gave you the ABM, but, in any case, I will come back to this question of the submarines.

EQUIVALENCY OF Y-CLASS SUBMARINE TO TRIDENT QUESTIONED

As I say, I don't think that what information we have received confirms the view I think you have left that the new USSR sub which is an extended Y class, a little larger-there are no secrets about it is the equivalent of the Trident. If I have understood the Trident, it intends to have a much longer range missile; it is a much larger ship; I think it is 15,000 tons; isn't it? It has all been in public.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I am talking about something that the Soviets have in being today and something that the United States may have in being five or six years from now.

The CHAIRMAN. But the point about it

Secretary LAIRD. The point I was making and you completely missed the point is that they currently have such a submarine launched missile and the United States does not.

TRIGGERING ANOTHER ARMS SPIRAL WITH TRIDENT

The CHAIRMAN. But the point is you want to get this and my point is that if we give it to you—

Secretary LAIRD. I recommend it, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If we give it to you, all you are going to do, in the words of McNamara, is trigger another arms spiral in which they will go all out and spend all their money, which they need for other things for an equivalent of Trident. Then neither of us will have any advantage, except we will be at a great disadvantage by spending so much money on weapons that neither of us need. This is the whole point I am trying to make.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, that is your opinion. It is not mine.
The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Secretary LAIRD. And I respect your opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

SIGNIFICANCE OF SENATE VOTE

What is significant is not your opinion or mine but how many votes we can get in the Senate. That is why I am trying to clarify the record. Hopefully, they will vote without being scared to death by some misinformation that you have been capable of spreading in these hearings. That is all I am trying to do.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I appreciate your very nice interpretation of my testimony, and if you believe it is misinformation

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is because you are testifying from a different point of view. It is the duty of this committee and the Senate to weigh all of these matters, both the military and the others.