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got what a parliament was) or, (which would be a milder and fafer way of proceeding,) it might fo influence the elections of members of the House of Commons as to caufe a great majority of them to be chofen out of fuch perfons as the minilters of itate fhould have recommended for that purpofe; or, if thofe members had been chofen freely, it might influence them, when chofen, to pafs fuch bills, and give their fanction to fuch meafures, (whatever their tendency might Be.) as the Crown fhould think fit to adopt. In either of these three ways it is evident the freedom and excellence of the British conftitution would be greatly impaired, and, in the first way, totally extinguished. You now fee the danger that may arife from this other prerogative of the Crown, "to difpofe of the revenues already legally exifting in conquered and ceded countries in fuch manner as it thall think fit," which is much more generally allowed to belong to the Crown than the former prerogative of impofing laws and taxes on the inhabitants of fuch countries.

FRENCHMAN.

You have made it very plain to me, that this prerogative may become exceeding dangerous to Great Britain; and therefore I join with you most heartily in withing it were put under fome regulation, or restraint, that would remove this danger. But, pray, in what manner would you propole to regulate this dangerous prerogative? For I do not think it would be eafy fo to regulate it as entirely to remove the danger you have been defcribing.

ENGLISHMAN.

I agree with you that it cannot easily be regulated fo as to avoid thofe dangerous confequences we have been fpeaking of. Nay more, I believe it cannot potfibly be fo regulated. And therefore (as we now are fpeculating upon this fubject, and inquiring, not what is most likely to happen, but what is beft,) I do not wifh it to be regulated, but to be wholly given up by the crown, and velted, by act of parliament, in the king and parliament conjointly, "fo that, for the future, the public revenues of all fuch countries as fhall be conquered by the British arms and ceded to the crown of Great Britain, which fhall be found to be legally existing in the faid countries at the time of the conquest and ceilion of them, fhould be difpofed of by act of parliament only;" like the overplus of the taxes granted by parliament in Great-Britain itself, above the fums neceffary to defray the expences of the fervices for which they are granted, which overplus, I am affured, is always referved, by fpecial claufes in the acts by which thofe taxes are granted, for the future difpofal of parliament. FRENCHMAN.

This would undoubtedly be a moft defirable method of preventing the dangers we have been fpeaking of. But, as it would fo greatly diminish his Majefty's perfonal emoluments from all future acquifitions of his crown, it feems hardly reafonable to expect that he thould confent to it: and without fuch confent, I prefume it cannot be taken.

ENGLISHMAN.

It certainly cannot. But there is reafon to think that, if his Majefty were to be folicited by his parliament to give his affent to a bill of this kind, or even if he were to be frongly advised by his

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minifters of state to declare to his parliament before-hand his difpo fition to affent to fuch a bill, (which would be a more decent and proper way of conducting the buiinefs than the other (he would graciously condefcend to facrifice his own perfonal interest to the fafety and fatisfaction of his people. For he has already vouchfafed to do a fimilar act of noble generofity towards his fubjects, in giving up to the public revenue of Great-Britain the fum of feven hundred thousand pounds flerling, which was the produce of the fales of the French fhips which had been taken by the late king's fhips of war in the years 1755 and 1756, in the beginning of the hoftilities of the late war against France, and before the war had been declared in form, and the ufual act of parliament had been paffed for vefting the property of the fhips and goods, that should be taken at sea in the courfe of the war, in the officers and failors of the veffels by which they should be taken. After fuch an act of generofity one can hardly doubt of his Majesty's willingness to confent to fuch an act of parlia ment as I have mentioned, if he were to be advised to such a meafure by his parliament, or by the minifters of state whom he honours with his confidence.

FRENCHMAN.

The inflance you have mentioned of his Majefty's generofity to his fubjects in giving up to them the faid fum of feven hundred thousand pounds fterling, is indeed a very noble one, and warrants you in the opinion you entertain that he would not refufe his royal aflent to an act of parliament of the kind you have fuggefted, if it were properly recommended to him. The probability therefore of fuch an act's being paffed will depend upon the difpofition of the parliament to requeft, or of his Majesty's minifters of late, to advise his Majelly to agree to fuch a meafure. How far they are likely to folicit or recommend fuch a mea fure, I know not: but to me it appears to be a matter of fo much importance, that I fhould think it a good bargain for the British nation to purchafe his Majefty's refignation of this prerogative at the expence of half a million, or even a million, of pounds fterling, which (as the emoluments which his Majefty might derive from this prerogative are distant and uncertain,) might, I fhould imagine, be thought no contemptible compenfation for the lofs of it. And thus both the king and his fubjects would reap benefit from fuch a measure.

ENGLISH MAN.

I have no objection to purchasing fo great a fecurity for the national liberties for what the lawyers call a valuable confideration; more efpecially as it would give the refignation of this prerogative on the part of the Crown the greater appearance of freedom and perfect approbation, and would thereby contribute to make it more binding and permanent. Nor do I think the greater of the fums you have mentioned too great a price for fo important an advantage. But now, if you pleafe, we will go back to the fubject we were before confidering, when this inquiry concerning the danger arifing from the king's right to the legally-existing revenues of conquered countries, called us away; that is, to the right of making new laws for, and impofing new taxes on, the inhabitants of fuch countries; which right Lord Mansfield has declared to be vefted, by the English conftitution,

conftitution, in the king alone, without the concurrence of his parliament."

The reafons affigned by Lord Mansfield in fupport of his opinion, of the legiflative power of the Crown over conquered countries, were chiefly thefe three. First, The King's acknowledged right of making war and peace, which he supposed to include in it the power of making laws and impofing taxes on the conquered people; fecondly, The practice which has taken place, with refpect to the countries which have from time to time been conquered by the Crown of England, fuch as Ireland, Wales, Berwick upon Tweed, and Calais, and more especially, the little territories of Gibraltar, and the Inland of Minorca, which have been conquered from the Crown of Spain, and ceded to, and enjoyed by, the Crown of Great Britain, ever fince the peace of Utrecht. Thirdly, The opinions of former judges and eminent lawyers on this fubject, teftified by occafional and collateral declarations of the judges concerning it, or by the answers given by lawyers out of court, to questions of law upon which they were confulted; there having been no exprefs decifion upon the point before that in the cafe of Campbell and Hall. Our Author is of opinion, that none of these reasons are fatisfactory or conclufive. We fhall endeavour to digeft, methodically, the principal arguments which he has employed to fhew their infufficiency, and to put our readers in poffeffion of the thread of his argument, difentangled from the tedious forms of dialogue-writing.

It is not very evident what connection fubfifts between the right of making war and peace, which is vested in the King, as the executive magiftrate, and as wielding the fword of the ftate, and a permanent legislative authority that is to operate when the sword is returned to the fcabbard. Perhaps it will not be more evident, when we have heard his Lordship's reasoning upon the subject. The intermediate links by which powers, fo wide of each other, are connected, must be found (if they are to be found any where) in the following words:

"The King (fays his Lordship) has a power to grant or refufe a capitulation to the conquered enemy. If he refuses it, and puts the inhabitants of the country to the fword, or extirpates them, as he obtains the country by conqueft, the lands of it are his, and he may grant them to whom he pleases: and. if he plants a colony upon them, the new fettlers will hold the fhares of the faid lands which fhall have been allotted them, fubject to the prerogative of the Conqueror. If, on the other hand, he does not put to the fword, or extirpate the old inhabitants, but receives them into his obedience, and grants them a continuance of their property in their own lands, he has power to impose a tax upon them. He is intrufted with terms of REV. Sept. 1779. making

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making peace at his difcretion; and he may retain the conqueft, or yield it up, on fuch conditions as he fhall think fit to agree to. This is not a matter of difputed right. It has hitherto been uncontroverted, that the King may change a part, or all, of the political government over a conquered dominion."

We agree with our Author, that there is in this paffage a degree of obfcurity and confufion, which we should not have expected from a perfon fo much celebrated for clearness of reafoning and accuracy of diftinction. Affertions and arguments are curiously blended together in one mafs, that we may yield to their joint impreffion a conviction which would not have refulted from their feparate force. No line is drawn, nor is any diftinction marked out, between the temporary (or rather military) powers, intrufted to the King in time of war, as the general of his fubjects, and a regular and peaceable authority to Jevy taxes and make laws. Yet thefe powers are fo diftinct and feparate in their natures, that the first can hardly be faid to involve the last. It is true, the King may, in the moment of conqueft, grant or refufe a capitulation to the vanquished. He may put them to the fword, and feize their property, or grant them their lives, and deprive them of their property, or, in fhort, impofe what terms he pleafes; but who does not fee, that this power over the perfons and property of the conquered is founded on neceffity, in order to enable the conqueror to fecure the advantages he has gained in the war, and to compel the enemy to accept of a reafonable peace? It appears abfurd to contend, that this power fhould fubfift any longer than the neceffity from which it took its birth fubfifts; that is, any longer than the war continues: For, as our Author very cogently argues, the rights of war being founded on neceffity, the power, or prerogative of exercising thofe rights, that is, the prerogative of managing the war, is veiled, by the laws of England, in the king alone for almost the fame reafon, namely, on account of the high expediency, amounting to a kind of neceflity, of entrusting this matter to the direction of one man, arising from the extreme difficulty of carrying on the operations of the war, and of making the fudden and temporary regulations fit to be obferved in conquered Countries immediately upon their firft fubmiffion, by a numerous body of men, and who are not at all times affembled together, fuch as the parliament of Great Britain. This I conceive to be the reafon why the power of making thefe regulations is vefted in the king alone immediately upon the conquest of a country and during the remainder of the war; during all which time the inhabitants of fuch a country, though no longer in arms against their conqueror, mult ftill be fuppofed to be fecretly his enemies, and to be inclined to take the firit opportunity of throwing off his authority and returning to their former mafters, and are, in truth, neither more nor less than prifoners of war, who are permitted to be at large upon their parole of honour. While this violent itate of things continues, the King continues

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to have the fole power of governing the conquered country and its inha. bitants, confequently that of making temporary laws for them according to his difcretion, as being a neceffary part of fuch government. But, when the peace is made, and the country is ceded for ever to the crown of Great Britain by the former fovereign of it, and the old inhabitants of the country are permitted to continue in it as fubjects to the conquering fovereign, and to take the oath of allegiance to him (either with or without a restoration of their lands to them), there feems to me to be an end of the exercife of the king's prerogative of making war in fuch a country, and of all the incidental powers belonging to fuch prerogative. From that moment the laws of peace take place, and, as I should conceive, the legislative au thority with refpect to fuch new part of the British dominions, as well as with refpect to the former parts of them, muft revert to its proper channel, in which it runs in times of tranquillity, that is, to the king and the two houfes of parliament conjointly. And, if it does not then fo revert, it must be owing to fome other cause, or reason, than the king's having the fole prerogative of making war and peace, because at this time both the war and peace are fuppofed to be completely terminated."

But there is a further argument couched in Lord Mansfield's words, above quoted, that remains to be confidered. His Lordship obferves, that "the lands are the King's, and he may grant them to whom he pleafes; and if he plants a colony upon them, the new fettlers will hold the fhares of the faid lands which fhall have been allotted them, fubject to the prerogative of the conqueror." Our Author contents himself with flightly noticing the very palpable petitio principii contained in the clofe of this paragraph; for what lefs is it, to tell us, that the conquered hold their lands fubject to the prerogative of the conqueror, when the whole queftion turns upon, What the prerogative of the conqueror is? He then comes full charged against this argument, and proves, beyond the poffibility of a reply, that the circumftance of the King's being owner of all the lands of a conquered country immediately after the conquest, cannot give him the fhadow of a tight to impofe laws and taxes on the inhabitants. If, indeed, it could, an odd confequence would follow: every rich landholder in England might not only introduce a new fyftem of laws among his tenants, by requiring them to promife obedience to fuch laws as a condition of their leafes, but he might alfo, after the leafes were made to them, change thofe laws for another fyftem, and double the rents whenever he pleased, by imposing a tax upon them. The extravagance of fuch an opinion (fays one of the dramatis perfona) is fo ftriking in the cafe of a private perfon, that no man could, for an inftant, be perfuaded to entertain it.' And yet, if the mere ownership of the land couldcreate a legiflative authority over the perfons who inhabit it, it must be confeffed, that fuch a conclufion might juftly be in

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