DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS/DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE/NATO TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 12, 1986. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2337, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Samuel S. Stratton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. STATEMENT OF HON. SAMUEL S. STRATTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK, CHAIRMAN, PROCUREMENT AND MILITARY NUCLEAR SYSTEMS SUBCOMMITTEE Mr. STRATTON. Unfortunately the democratic caucus was reviewing the defense program in the budget this morning, so we had to try to see if it would be possible for us to defend some of these programs that we are going to get testimony on today, and on the previous days. But as far as the Democratic Caucus is concerned, it doesn't look too good. This morning the subcommittee will review several important issues regarding strategic and theater nuclear systems. Strategic systems will include the MX follow-on program, the Trident II program, and the Tomahawk cruise missile program-which is a theater nuclear program that also has some strategic value. The B-1, ATB, and the advanced cruise missile programs will be discussed, in addition to the bomber study mandated by the Congress last year, when the subcommittee is briefed on other classified programs on Thursday morning. Tactical nuclear forces, including the Pershing II and nuclear artillery rounds will also be discussed today. Our primary witness today is Dr. Lawrence W. Woodruff, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense [Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces]. The Trident II missile enters procurement for the first time in fiscal year 1987. Rear Adm. Kenneth C. Malley, Director of Strategic Systems Project Office, manages that program for the Navy and is present to explain that program and its relationship to Trident II submarines which are now under construction. I understand that the Trident II missile program has been restructured; that the delivery schedules are very tightly matched to submarine delivery schedules, and that delays in the missile program could have severe effects on the operational capability of the Trident II submarine. Also accompanying Dr. Woodruff is Brig. Gen. Charles A. May, Jr., who runs the MX program. By way of review, the Congress has to date funded 54 MX missiles and placed a cap on deployment at 50 missiles until a new basing mode is approved for the additional 50. This year the DOD is requesting procurement of 21 missiles for spares and test missiles, and expects to ask for 48 next year. Rear Adm. Stephen J. Hostettler will review the Tomahawk program which is a mixed conventional and nuclear program. A different aspect of the Tomahawk program is the ground-launched cruise missile which is nearing the end of its procurement period. Col. Richard A. Myers, who is the Deputy Director of the GLCM Planning Group for the Air Force, is present to answer any questions that the members might have concerning that program. We have asked for information on the accident that occurred in Germany to a Pershing II missile last year. Col. Dudley L. Tademy, U.S. Army, Deputy Director of the Nuclear and Chemical Directorate, has detailed information regarding the accident and the subsequent investigation and will supplement Dr. Woodruff's testimony for this purpose. I would hope that Colonel Tademy would also give us some followup details on what has been done with the hardening of the sites and their vulnerability in the German countryside, which I found last year on a quick-look visit to the missile site, the Pershing missile site, and it was my understanding that the general in charge of the program had requested the funds from the Appropriations Committee but they hadn't gotten proposed as of that date, and we would hope that that error has been removed. Mr. Badham, any comments? Mr. BADHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would submit Mrs. Holt's statement for the record and I would just add by saying that I, too, would like to welcome the Secretary here and say that as we know facing Gramm-Rudman, we are going to have to be especially careful and I think we certainly are all on the same team of trying to get that done with the various requirements we have recognizing that a nuclear deterrent is one of the least expensive avenues in deterrence that we have. I think this hasn't been adequately stressed. Mr. STRATTON. Thank you. PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARJORIE S. HOLT, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON PROCUREMENT AND MILITARY NUCLEAR SYSTEMS I would like to join Chairman Stratton in welcoming Secretary Woodruff to this morning's hearing. The subject to be covered this morning strategic and theater nuclear weapons modernization-deserves our careful consideration. While these programs_require significant fiscal commitments, most of them are not new commitments. Progress such as the Trident II and sea-launched cruise missile are closely intertwined with other shipbuilding programs to which we have already committed billions of dollars. With respect to MX procurement, the fiscal year 1987 request is for test missiles and spares. Everyone, including former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, agrees that approximately 123 test missiles will be necessary to sustain a deployed force of 50 to 100 or 400 MX missiles. The difference is in the rate that we buy them and how long we keep the MX production line open-it amounts to either more or less total cost. I would not want to see these programs undermined because of a mindless Gramm-Rudman-Hollings formula. If budget cuts are necessary, it would be my recommendation that we give careful thought before we race pell mell toward making significant reductions in these programs. Mr. STRATTON. Our first witness then will be Dr. Woodruff. STATEMENT OF HON. LAWRENCE W. WOODRUFF, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY COL. DUDLEY L. TADEMY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL DIRECTORATE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; REAR ADM. KENNETH C. MALLEY, DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROJECT OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY; BRIG. GEN. CHARLES A. MAY, JR., DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR ICBM MODERNIZATION, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE; AND COL. RICHARD A. MYERS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE GLCM PLANNING GROUP, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE Mr. WOODRUFF. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. STRATTON. This is an open session and if somebody wants to get into classified material, we will have to go into executive session, and it may be that that would be the appropriate thing to do, but at the moment, we are still in open session. Mr. WOODRUFF. First, I have a written statement that I would like to enter into the record, please. Mr. STRATTON. Without objection, that will be put into the record at this point. PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LAWRENCE W. WOODRUFF INTRODUCTION Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am Dr. Larry Woodruff, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee today to discuss the subject of modernization of our nuclear weapon systems. Your staff suggested I have appropriate respresentatives of the Navy and Air Force here today to provide some detail on specific subjects. These representatives are: Rear Admiral Ken Malley, Director of the Navy's Strategic Systems Program Office, who will address our Trident program; Rear Admiral Steve Hostettler, Director, Joint Cruise Missile Project Office, who will cover our Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) and Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) programs; and Brigadier General Charles May Jr., the Air Force Deputy Director for Operational Requirements and Special Assistant for ICBM Modernization, who will address our ICBM programs. Since this is my first opportunity to appear before the Congress since assuming my new duties, I have a brief prepared statement that I would like to present to the Committee. Let me begin by addressing the major ticket items in our FY87 strategic budget request for both R&D and procurement. I will not include the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or our satellite and other strategic communications systems, since you have already heard from appropriate witnesses on these programs. Instead, I will confine my comments to our major strategic and non-strategic nuclear force programs. Within the R&D category, we are requesting $.48 for bomber force improvements (not including the Advanced Technology Bomber, ATB), $2.38 for development of the small ICBM and other ICBM modernization, and $1.6 for Trident Il ballistic missile development. Within the procurement account, we are requesting $2.48 for bomber force improvements, including KC-135 reengining (but not the ATB), $1.4B for deployment of Peacekeeper, $2.8 for a Trident submarine and the first production of the D-5 missile, and $1.0B for continued deployment of GLCM, Pershing II, and SLCM. Let me underscore one point. Our total strategic forces budget continues to be less than 15% of the total DoD budget funding, as has been the case for the past 20 years -- an important fact to keep in mind when considering the high deterrent value of these forces. In the following, I will summarize the current status of our modernization programs. Since the programs are in direct response to the Soviet threat, I will first briefly describe the continuing buildup of their offensive and defensive military capabilities. Next I will present the status of the modernization of our nuclear weapon systems, with emphasis on progress and issues. THREAT The Soviet modernization of their nuclear forces continues unabated. They are now completing development of or deploying their fifth generation ICBMs, the mobile SS-X-24 and SS-25. It is interesting, in comparison to U.S. forces, that they are now flight-testing and plan to deploy next year their rail mobile SS-X-24 (their Peacekeeper class missile); and most recently they have deployed the SS-25 (a Minuteman-class missile) in a road-mobile mode. In addition, we expect ICBM accuracy improvements, especially on the SS-18, in the near future. They have approximately 1370 ICBMs compared to our 1021, and ours have only about one quarter the throw weight. Throw weight, as you know, is an important comparison factor, since it describes the ability to deliver megatonnage onto the target. The Soviets also enjoy some advantages because of their growing inventory of submarine launched ballistic missiles. They are now deploying their fifth generation ballistic missile, the SS-N-23, which is about the same size as our D-5 missile, and their fifth generation ballistic missile submarine, the Typhoon, which is the largest submarine in existence. On the other hand, the first flight test of our D-5 is about a year away. They outnumber us in ballistic missile submarines 62 to 37, and in submarine launched ballistic missiles 983 to 648. We do have an advantage in heavy bombers, but the Soviets are moving to redress this imbalance. Not counting their Backfire bomber they have approximately 150 long-range bombers compared to our 263 B-52s. Their Blackjack bomber, which has characteristics similar to our B-1B, is approaching Initial Operational Capability (IOC). In addition they are deploying long range cruise missiles on their new Bear H bomber. And finally, a fair comparison of bomber forces must take into account the Soviet Union's formidable air defense capabilities. While we have essentially no strategic air defense, they have deployed over 10,000 air defense radars at about 2400 sites, and over 12,000 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers at approximately 1200 sites. In addition they have as many as 1200 interceptor aircraft dedicated to strategic defense, while an additional 2800 Soviet Air Forces interceptors could also be used. Also consistent with their strong emphasis on strategic defenses, the Soviets have the world's only operational ABM system. A new system is currently being installed to protect Moscow with silo-based, high acceleration endoatmospheric interceptors; silo-based, modified GALOSH exoatmospheric interceptors; and the large, phased array fire control radar at Pushkino. We give them credit for a significant ABM breakout potential using the ABM-X-3 system which has been under development for several years. This system, in conjunction with their new powerful detection and tracking radars, such as Krasnoyarsk, could provide a potential territorial ABM defense capability. Finally, I should mention that the Soviets have had the world's only operational ASAT capability for more than a decade. They have already proven the effectiveness of their system, so they do not require additional testing. STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION We cannot afford to match the Soviet buildup weapon for weapon, nor should we. Our approach continues to be one of exploiting our technological advantages so that we can offset Soviet numerical advantages with more effective weapon systems. For example, with our bombers we obtain force multiplication through our cruise missiles and short range attack missiles (SRAM). In addition, the new low observables technology will enable our bombers and cruise missiles to penetrate Soviet defenses for the foreseeable future. A third example is our ability to field highly accurate guidance systems. This is of course a great advantage in making our ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and short range attack missiles much more capable than the corresponding Soviet systems. I am pleased to report that our efforts to modernize our strategic forces with these and other technologies are on track. In the following I will highlight the significant progress that has been made and the major issues that still face us. In 1981, in order to offset the increasingly capable Soviet air defenses, we said we would follow a two-phase bomber program. We currently are working hard on an updated bomber study, and we expect to finish the report in about 30 days. Our preliminary assessment generally supports the bomber portion of the President's 1981 strategic modernization program. The plan contained in that program remains sound. The B-1B will have its IOC in September of this year with 15 aircraft. The program is proceeding well with 100 aircraft to be delivered by 1988. We are under cost; in fact Congress reduced our |