The United States' strategic offensive forces are composed of a Triad of sea-launched ballistic missiles, land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and manned bombers. These forces perform two vital and interrelated functions which directly support our national security objectives. First, the strategic offensive forces serve as a deterrent to any potential aggressor. The potential aggressor must perceive that we have sufficient forces to retaliate in a conflict and that the United States has the resolve to use those forces. The second function contributes to this perception by ensuring that, if deterrence fails, the United States possesses both the weapons and the resolve to fight and meet our national security objectives. This Triad not only provides the flexibility and capability to discourage a first strike against the United States, but it also complicates Soviet efforts to defend against this retaliatory mix of forces.

The Air Force is responsible for maintaining two-thirds of the Triad, landbased ICBMs and the manned bomber. Within these areas, we have continued the modernization program initiated by the President in 1981. We can see the fruits of our labor and the significant investment. We are modernizing our ICBM fleet through the upgrade of our Minuteman force and the acquisition of a new missile, the Peacekeeper. Our bomber force is also seeing new life. We have upgraded some of the systems on our B-52s which further extends their lifetime and we are seeing the delivery of our new B-1B bombers. The B-1B is the first new strategic bomber in more than twenty-five years. Looking to the future, our programs are progressing on schedule, and we are continuing to provide the mainstay of our nation's defense.

B. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

BACKGROUND

1. Rationale: The United States' intercontinental ballistic missile leg has three central purposes. First, ICBMs help deter Soviet threats of massive conventional or nuclear attack by virtue of their ability to respond promptly and controllably against even the hardest of military targets. Second, ICBMs introduce complexity and uncertainty into Soviet attack plans because different types of attacks are required to defeat our ICBM, submarine, and bomber forces. Third, the ICBM force serves as a hedge against possible vulnerability in our submarine force (e.g., a Soviet breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare).

2. Current Systems: Our present ICBM force is more than two decades old. The Titan II missiles were deployed in the early 1960s and the Minuteman shortly thereafter. As a result of the age and the associated maintainability problems, the Titan Ils are being retired and the Minuteman missiles are undergoing modification to upgrade their capabilities. Our ICBM modernization stems from the need to redress the strategic asymmetry caused by the massive Soviet ICBM build-up which began in the early 1970's. Since then, the Soviet Union has deployed more than 800 SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS-19s that have good to excellent

STRATEGIC OFFENSE

unhardened--with the most reliable and responsive leg of the Strategic Triad. Second, deploying Peacekeeper in existing Minuteman silos helps redress the aging problem of the U.S. ICBM force by reducing the risks of a catastrophic age-related reduction in MM III reliability. Third, Peacekeeper deployment encourages the Soviet Union to negotiate stabilizing arms control agreements by providing a tangible incentive to move toward less valuable deployments. Thus, the Peacekeeper deployment is the first step toward enhanced deterrence, increased strategic stability, and meaningful arms control negotiations.

b. STATUS: The Peacekeeper is a four-stage ICBM configured to deliver up to 10 Mark 21 reentry vehicles to different targets. Peacekeeper uses a state-of-the-art Advanced Inertial Reference Sphere guidance system to attain its high degree of accuracy. Peacekeeper is more accurate, carries more warheads, has greater range, and is more resistant to nuclear effects than other ICBM systems currently in the U.S. inventory.

The Peacekeeper research and development flight-test program, consisting of 20 planned launches, was initiated at Vandenberg AFB, California, in June 1983. Phase I of the flight test program, completed in June 1984, was designed to test missile functional performance. Phase II is designed to test missile/reentry vehicle capabilities and silo integration. Ten launches, all successful, have been completed to date. Flight test 9, the first launch from an operationally configured silo, was successfully completed in August 1985. Flight test 10, the second silo launch, was successfully completed in November 1985. Peacekeeper accuracy is outstanding with demonstrated results considerably better than the design requirement.

STRATEGIC OFFENSE

The Peacekeeper missile deployment in southeastern Wyoming will be supported by the 90th Strategic Missile Wing at F.E. Warren AFB, close to Cheyenne. Fifty Peacekeeper missiles will replace 50 Minuteman missiles in existing silos. Very little silo structural modification will be needed. Initial Operational Capability of ten missiles is scheduled for December 1986. The 50 missiles will be fully deployed in existing silos by December 1988.

Full scale development for basing began in June 1983. A draft Environmental Impact Statement was issued in October 1983. Public hearings were held in early November, and the final statement was released in January 1984. Construction of support facilities began in mid-1984 and above ground silo modifications began in early 1985.

In 1984, the Peacekeeper program began the transition from full scale development to production. Twenty-one production missiles were authorized in Fiscal Year 1984; an additional 21 were authorized in Fiscal Year 85. Fiscal Year 1986 production has been set at 12 missiles will be and a total of 50 missiles deployed in existing Minuteman silos.

Congressional concern in Fiscal Year 1986 with the issue of vulnerability of existing silos resulted in an Fiscal Year 1986 Authorization limitation of 50 Peacekeepers deployed in existing Minuteman silos. While individual existing silos would be vulnerable to large nuclear detonations, the overall retaliatory capability of our strategic TRIAD poses a formidable attack problem for any adversary, thereby assuring the ICBM component has sufficient survivability to carry out its prompt retaliatory deterrent mission. To provide the additional survivability desired by the Congress, we are examining alternative basing modes for the additional Peacekeeper missiles. Eight candidate basing modes are under consideration and include; shallow tunnel (hardened trench), hardened Minuteman silos, superhard silos, superhard silo with transportable launcher, mobile encapsulated (carry hard) basing, rail mobile, ground mobile, and deep underground basing. These basing options were selected for further study previously because of recent advances in basing technology. We do not intend to relook old studies, but plan to answer the question "What's new?". Study of these basing modes will continue in Fiscal Year 87 with a narrowing of alternatives to the most promising candidate in preparation for a potential Fiscal Year 1988 Full Scale Development (FSD) start.

Peacekeeper production, deployment and support activities are on schedule and within cost. Fiscal Year 1987 funding will be used to continue missile production, conduct testing and evaluation, construct support facilities, and plan for deployment of the second 50 Peacekeepers.

6. Small ICBM

a. MISSION: The main purpose of deploying the Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) is to seek improved stability in the ICBM force through reduced target value and improved survivability. By virtue of its improved survivability, single war head characteristics, and prompt hard target kill, the Small ICBM accomplishes several strategic objectives. First, improved survivability improves deterrence by increasing Soviet uncertainty that they could successfully attack the U.S. Second, the Small ICBM is capable of threatening unacceptable damage to those hardened Soviet assets most critical to Soviet war

STRATEGIC OFFENSE

aims. Finally, single reentry vehicle (RV) weapons will fulfill critical missions throughout the conflict spectrum. In conjunction with Peacekeeper, SICBM is an important step forward enhanced deterrence.

The Department of Defense and the Air Force are continuing the development of the Small ICBM and hardened mobile launcher. In July 1983, the Air Force convened the Small Missile Independent Advisory Group (Schriever Commission). The Schriever Commission recommended a three phased program approach which included concept definition, pre-full scale development, and full scale development phases. In July 1984 the Air Force appointed a general officer to direct the Small ICBM Program Office development and acquisition strategies for both the Small ICBM and basing technology programs.

The President's Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission) recommended that the Air Force develop a small single RV missile. This missile will be flexible in terms of basing and potentially more survivable than current systems. The Small ICBM will present a relatively low-value target and require a high exchange ratio from the attacker. Therefore, in addition to hard target capability and responsiveness comparable to Peacekeeper, the Small ICBM will be survivable, stabilizing, and further enhance the arms control process.

STRATEGIC OFFENSE

In order to meet the Small ICBM goals set forth by the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force are directing top-level management attention to the program. The OSD Small Missile Review Panel, the SecDef Periodic Review, and the Small Missile Steering Group were established to ensure an aggressive Small ICBM program which would meet critical milestones and result in a 1992 Initial Operational Capability.

b. STATUS: The concept definition phase began in 1983 and was completed in late 1984. It involved building on Peacekeeper advanced technology as well as assessing alternative technologies. As a result of the concept definition, pre-full scale development began in late 1984. To date, more than 18 Small ICBM competitive contracts have been awarded for this effort. They encompass efforts in propulsion, hard mobile launcher, hard silo, guidance and control, launch control system, and assembly, test, and system support. The propulsion contractors have tested full scale prototype motor stages, exit cones, thrust vector control systems, and internal and external insulations. Full-scale stage testing will continue in 1986. The full scale development phase for the basing mode or modes will begin in Fiscal Year 1987. This program will lead to flight testing in 1989 with IOC in 1992.

To date, we have tested scale models of the hard mobile launcher (HML) at the DNA sponsored Direct Course (9-83) and the Minor Scale (6-85) High Explosive Event as well as in the 20-ft diameter shock tube at the Sandia Blast test facility. The hard mobile launcher hardness validation will continue in 1986. Both Martin Marietta and Boeing have built HML Mobility Test Vehicles (MTV) that replicate HML size, weight, horsepower, and handling characteristics. Both MTV rollouts occurred in September 1985 and the two contractors began MTV testing. The Air Force will begin mobility testing in early 1986 on these two vehicles.

Efforts in the Small ICBM Guidance research and development continue in initial development. To decrease system weight, decrease reaction time without degrading system accuracy, and reduce unit cost, we are evaluating three alternative inertial navigation guidance systems as competitors to the baseline modified Peacekeeper Advanced Inertial Reference Sphere (AIRS). Alternatives include two ring laser gyro and one stellar inertial system. This competitive guidance effort will continue thru Fiscal Year 1988 when a primary guidance system will be selected.

7. Advanced Basing Technologies

a. MISSION: The Scowcroft Commission recognized the need for continuing to evaluate a broad range of candidate basing modes for follow-on missile deployment. We are evaluating several technologies including superhardened silos, deep undergound basing, shallow tunnel, and several mobile modes. These technologies are applicable to Peacekeeper or Small ICBM follow-on deployments.

b. STATUS: The Air Force and Defense Nuclear Agency began a three-year program in 1983 to demonstrate and validate superhard silo technologies through large-scale tests. Testing of silo component materials began in 1983 and continued through 1985 with impressive results. Congressional