fact, this was a major recommendation of Col. Burton after the Phase I tests. The Army agreed to this test procedure. This test has not been done to date. When the Phase II tests resume, will the minimun casualty baseline vehicle be tested side-by-side with the Bradely containing the new reactive armor? In other words, will this be a part of the Phase II test plan the Army has committed to sending Congress by June 6? Isn't such a side-by-side test essential before a final configuration decision--designed to lessen casualties--is made on the Bradley?

Mr. Ambrose. We don't yet know how to build a feasible vehicle of that sort. We have agreed with OSD to undertake an intensive design effort to see if we can come up with an operationally feasible vehicle of that sort. As soon as we can design it we will test it. Therefore, that is not included in what both Dr. Hicks and I are referring to in Phase II

testing. We should not hold the rest of the testing hostage to the eventual devising and testing of that vehicle. We will do that as a further project.

REACTIVE ARMOR

Mr. Levine. The Army seems committed to the reactive armor vehicle. But what do tests of this armor show? Haven't the live-fire tests revealed substantial problems with this concept? Isn't this another example of rushing with a quick fix before the testing is completed?

Mr. Ambrose. The tests have shown the significant protective potential of reactive armor. We have identified areas where we need to make improvements before we incorporate reactive armor into production. The problems of incorporating the active armor do not appear to be major ones, but we will not incorporate such armor until any problems are fixed.

It should be understood that the generic concept of reactive armor for the BFV is one of providing attachments which will allow the reactive armor to be hung on as small plates in a field operation.

This arrangement means that the reactive armor itself can be changed as that technology evolves, independent of modifications to the BFV.

BRADLEY VULNERABILITY IN COMBAT

Mr. Levine. The Phase II testing that has already taken place has generated some controversy, especially regarding to

COL Burton's memos, that the water cans at the center of the
Bradley will "greatly reduce" the vehicle's vulnerability in
combat? Why were so many test shots aimed at the water cans?
Mr. Ambrose. Gunners, U.S. and Soviet, are trained

to fire at the center of visible area of the target. Given the
press of battle and the round to round dispersion associated with
any weapon system, not all rounds hit that aim point, but
nonetheless that's where they are trained to aim. For that
reason, we have chosen to move ammunition as far away from the
aim point as possible. Because of the limited stowage
available, some items must be displaced to accommodate the ammo
move. Moving the water cans makes more survivable room available
for the ammo. The test shots were not aimed specifically at the
water cans, but at the center of visible area because that
reflects the real world training given to gunners.
significance of the water can, per se, was trivial.

COST OF SURVIVABILITY FIXES

The

Mr. Levine. Once the test is complete, what will be the survivability fixes? Does FMC agree? If not, why not?

Mr. Ambrose. The Army has an engineering development program ongoing for improved armor (to include reactive armor) and spall suppression liner. These improvements are scheduled to be introduced into vehicles produced beginning with the FY87 funded delivery period. A review to determine if these improvements are to be cut in is scheduled for Apr 87. Other survivability fixes, i.e., revised fuel circulation, improved fire suppression and unity vision periscope protection have been cut into production with the FY85 funded delivery period (May 86). FMC agrees this schedule is executable.

HASC Staff Inquiry Into The

Bradley Joint Live Fire Test Program

INTRODUCTION

SCOPE

SUMMARY OF REPORT

Lack of Policy Guidance for Joint Live Fire Test Program

Repositioning of Water Cans

Testing Methodology

Minimum Casualty Baseline Vehicle

On April 15, 1986 Col. James G. Burton, Director of the Joint Live Fire Test Program, Office of Director of Defense Test and Evaluation, promulgated a memorandum that alleged a number of irregularities in the testing of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle as part of the Joint Live Fire Test program. Specifically, Colonel Burton charges:

1. Water cans were repositioned on the Bradley so "they were directly behind the impact point and on the shot line for shot 1." He states that "switching of ammunition and water can location changes only the test results, not the actual vulnerability in combat."

2. The Army has ignored guidance that additional Phase II shots be selected by random draw from combat hit distribution to prevent personal or systematic bias from entering the picture.

3. Specific Phase II aim points and shot lines have been intentionally selected to generate specific effects. "Eight of the planned 34 Phase II shots are aimed at the repositioned water cans." So when a round penetrates Bradley armor, it will strike water cans, thereby minimizing behind-armor damage.

4. "Since 1984 there has been a pattern of key BRL (Ballistic Research Laboratory] attempts to reduce the apparent casualties caused by the Bradley during tests...."

On April 17, 1986 that memorandum and several other documents were released during a press conference given by Members of Congress.

One of these documents also raises the issue of the Minimum Casualty Baseline Vehicle. Colonel Burton alleges the Army made a commitment to test his concept of a Bradley that stows ammunition and fuel outside the vehicle. Colonel Burton believes that crew casualties as a result of explosions and fire would be reduced with this vehicle configuration. He believes the Army is purposely delaying the test of this concept because it does not want any competition with one of its Phase II enhancements--the reactive armor concept.

As a result of the concerns expressed by members of the House Armed Services Committee, the staff was directed to conduct an investigation into the allegations described above and to examine the effectiveness of the Joint Live Fire Test Program in overseeing the Bradley tests.

B. Scope of the Investigation

The investigative team was composed of staff members representing the Subcommittees on Research and Development, Procurement, Investigations, and Seapower. The team focused its examination on the results of Phase I tests, testing methodology in the planning and execution of Phase II tests, the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) Minimum Casualty Vehicle, and the Live Fire Test Program policies and procedures as they relate to execution of the Bradley testing program. The team also conducted a preliminary inquiry into the circumstances surrounding Colonel Burton's transfer.

The investigative team interviewed officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Logistics; the Under Secretary of the Army; the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations Research; officials in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition; the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army; the Army Materiel Command; the General Accounting Office; the Institute for Defense Analysis; and a private consultant. A list of all persons interviewed is appended to this report.

SUMMARY

A. Background

The Joint Live Fire Test Program was initiated in 1983 at a modest level with the stated purpose of testing the lethality of U.S. weapons against combat-configured Soviet vehicles and of determining (and of correcting where possible) the vulnerabilities of combat-configured U.S. vehicles to Soviet weapons. Prior to that time, the assessment of vulnerabilities was based, for the most part, on computer analysis with few full-scale test results to support the assessments.

The Army in 1983 nominated the Bradley as one of their candidates for testing. There are two versions of the vehicle--the M-3 scout (5-man) and M-2 infantry (9-man). The Army chose to test the M-3 version.

The testing program was composed of two phases.

The priority test objective for Phase I tests on the Bradley was to quantify the lethality of major caliber anti-armor munitions, often referred to as overmatching weapons (i.e., munitions capable of breaching the vehicle's armor), against the Bradley's armor. In addition, Army officials wanted to collect data to update their predictability models.

In carrying out the Phase I testing program, a building block approach was advocated and used by the Army. Testing commenced with controlled firings at

Bradley components and at production M-3 vehicles containing inert ammunition. These tests focused on individual areas of the vehicle in order to gain a better understanding of the complex interrelationships involved in modeling the effects of weapons on the Bradley and to identify improvements needed in the models used to estimate the overall vulnerability of the weapon system (based on data from selected firings). Phase I testing concluded with 10 firings at M-3 vehicles containing live ammunition. These shots addressed remaining uncertainties--the reaction of fuel and ammunition and other synergistic effects that may occur during full-up tests.

The objective of Phase II was to test the best possible means of reducing the sources of Bradley casualties revealed during the Phase I tests. In Phase II the Army specified a number of enhancements--reactive armor, spall liners, limited movement of ammunition--that would be tested. The outline test plan specified 34 total shots (17 each on 2 test vehicles), of which 14 would be repeats of Phase I shots, and 20 were to be into areas where enhancements were made.

On March 20, 1986 Phase II testing began. Primarily because of Colonel Burton's April 15 memorandum, Phase II testing was suspended on April 18, 1986, after eleven shots had been completed.

The irregularities cited by Colonel Burton are traceable to the beginning of the Bradley Live Fire Test Program. The Army and Colonel Burton have fundamental disagreements over testing methodologies and how the program should be run. Most of the issues on testing methodology raised by Colonel Burton should have been resolved by a higher decision-making level prior to initiation of the testing program. Because the issues were not resolved, the investigative team questions the adequacy of the overall policy regulating the Joint Live Fire Test program and the effectiveness of its management within the framework of developmental testing and evaluation. The team sees broader implications of the failures in the Bradley Joint Live Fire Tests for other testing program areas.

The report addresses the issue of lack of policy guidance as the overarching problem in the conduct of the Bradley Joint Live Fire Tests and then addresses the specific allegations. Because of the interrelationship among some of the allegations, more than one allegation may be discussed in the same section of the report.

B. Findings and Conclusions

1. Lack of Policy Guidance for the Joint Live Fire Test Program

a. Analysis

No specific Department of Defense (DOD) regulations prescribing policy and procedures for the conduct of the Joint Live Fire Test program axist. Although general agreement exists on the overall goals of the program, the understanding of how the program is to be run and what the test methodology is to be varies. DOD Directive 5000.3, specified as the guidance for the tests, makes no mention of the Joint Live Fire Test program. A Detailed Test Plan submitted by the service and approved by OSD is supposed to serve as the formal procedural document for conduct of the test, but no such detailed test plan for the Phase II test of the Bradley was ever approved by OSD.

Because a Detailed Test Plan was never submitted or approved, many contentious issues regarding the test program (such as shot selection and testing methodology, and the requirement to test the Minimum Casualty Vehicle) were never resolved. Phase II tests were begun--in fact, eleven shots were conducted before the program was suspended--without a Detailed Test Plan.

To further complicate policy and procedural problems, in 1984 OSD decided that the Bradley tests would be conducted by the Army outside the framework of the Joint Live Fire Test program, and Colonel Burton was invited to participate in the planning and execution of the tests.