SOVIET HOWITZER PENETRATION OF BRADLEY, M-113, AND M-1 TANK

Mr. Bustamante. At what range will a Soviet 122 mm. howitzer shell fragment penetrate any of the vehicles? At what range will a Soviet 152 mm. shell fragment penetrate the same vehicles?

Mr. Ambrose. For the 152 mm. artillery at ranges of 2 feet or less directly over the vehicle fewer than 15 perforations are expected. At ranges of 3-8 feet from the vehicle less than 5 perforations are expected. Beyond 8-10 feet from the vehicle perforations are not expected. We do not have firing data for the 122mm nor do we have it for the 152mm specifically against the Bradley. The Bradley requirement is against the US 155mm. The assessment given was based on the 155mm firings with the knowledge that the 152mm will be less effective than the 155mm against the Bradley. Computations using the fragment patterns for the 155mm projectiles and the 152mm (OF-540) Soviet projectile have borne out the above assertion and indicate the Bradley is more survivable vs the 152mm than the 155mm. The complete set of computations have not been run for the 122mm but the assertion that the 122mm will be less effective is based on such knowledge as the following:

Average fragment mass
Average fragment vel

152mm
66.5 grain
3370 fps

122mm
45.9 grains
2442 fps

RPG-7 PENETRATION OF BRADLEY, M-113, AND M-1 TANK

Mr. Bustamante. At what range will the RPG-7 penetrate each vehicle? At what range will the RPG-16 penetrate each vehicle? Mr. Ambrose. Because both rounds use the "shaped charge" principle to penetrate their targets, they are almost range independent. Range will primarily affect the gunner's ability to hit the target, not the ability of the round to penetrate the target given a hit. Both RPG-7 and RPG-16 can penetrate each of these vehicles in general, the greatest damage will be to M-113, the least damage to M-1 tank, with the effect on Bradley being between M-113 and the M-1 tank. The specific damage is highly dependent on shot line into the vehicle.

BRADLEY SURVIVABILITY

Mr. Bustamante. If we accept that the RPG-7 is an overmatch weapn against both the Bradley and the M-113, please explain your statement that the Bradley is more survivable than the M-113 in light of the fact that the M-113 does not carry ammunition along its walls while the Bradley carries inside ammunition for the Bushmaster gun and the TOW.

Mr. Ambrose. This is a misconception that the M-113 does not carry ammunition and fuel inside. The vehicle carries fuel, 50 cal. ammo, Dragon rounds and all of the Infantry Squad's ammunition and equipment. Overall, the Bradley has demonstrated a greater capability than either the M113 or ITV to remain functional after being hit by representative threat munitions. The major difference in the three vehicles was in catastrophic kills (K-Kill). A parallel survivability improvement program is also being pursued for M113 and ITV.

BRADLEY TRANSMISSION

Mr. Bustamante. At the hearing several references were made to the effect that the Bradley met all design specifications and requirements. Please explain why no mean miles between failure requirement was established under contract to the manufacturer of the HMP-500 transmission.

Mr. Ambrose. The development contract between GE and FMC, the prime vehicle contractor, did contain a reliability requirement of 6440 Mean Miles Between Failure (MMBF). The transmission exceeded this requirement by a wide margin during Government Operational Testing (OT) and Developmental Testing (DT). GE was a subcontractor to FMC during development as they were for the first three years of production. Our contract with FMC did not impose reliability requirements on the transmission or any other component, but instead imposed a vehicle system reliability requirement. The vehicle system also significantly exceeded this reliability requirement during developmental testing. The reasons that the FMC contract did not contain component reliability requirements are as follows:

a. The user requirement was only established at the system level.

b. It is common practice to not impose reliability requirements at a level lower than necessary, thereby allowing contractors the opportunity to optimize system design by making cost and engineering tradeoffs.

c. Lower level reliability requirements require significantly more testing to demonstrate with statistical confidence. This becomes a program cost consideration.

Recent Government production contracts directly with GE do not contain a reliability requirement because the design of the transmission has been established and the transmission is being procured using a Government controlled Technical Data Package (TDP). GE's obligation is to maintain quality of manufacture and produce a transmission in compliance with the TDP. The production contracts do contain considerable requirements to help ensure that level of quality. Examples of these quality requirements are as follows:

a.

b.

C.

d.

e.

MIL-Q-9858 quality program

880 Hours and 440 Hours dynamometer durability tests.
Product quality audits (PQA)

Supplemental dynamometer control tests.

etc.

BRADLEY WARRANTIES

Mr. Bustamante. What is the cost of the warranty for the Bradley's transmission and what reliability requirements does it cover? Are all HMPT-500 transmissions purchased by the Army covered by the warranty? If not, explain why. Please provide the Committee and my office with a copy of the warranty. Mr Ambrose. Prior to FY83, the HMPT-500 transmission was procured as part of the end item Bradley Vehicle from the FMC Corporation. This contract provided for a "Correction of Deficiencies" clause; no warranty coverage was provided. A

warranty cost of $2,800.00 per unit is applicable to FY83, FYC4, and FYC5 requirements. The warranty is "failure free" in nature, and GE is liable under this warranty for all repairs for a period of one year after acceptance of the end item Bradley Vehicle.

The warranty cost for FYC6 is $C00.00 per unit for the 716 transmissions to support new vehicle production. The warranty will be failure free prior to integration into the vehicle at the Prime Vehicle Production Contractor. A "threshold" provision will hold GE liable for failure threshold based on current performance of recently fielded units and test transmissions. (The warranty will also include lot defect protection of non GS/Depot repairable covered items). The warranty will cover workmanship, material, redesign and essential performance characteristics. Coverage on individual transmissions does not provide for specific reliability requirements, i.e. Mean Miles Between Failure.

A copy of the warranty was provided to your office and the Committee on 6 June.

VULNERABILITY TESTING

Mr. Levine. The GAO report of February, 1986, on the Phase I Bradley testing stated that "Phase I test results do not provide a realistic picture of the vehicle's vulnerability." In fact, the test conditions the Army established--controlled shots, inert fuses, and outdated Soviet weapons--influenced the outcome of the tests in such a manner that the results indicated less vulnerability than should reasonably be expected in combat. Yet the Army's statements upon release of the Phase I results, at its December 11, 1985, press conference, seemed to indicate that all questions on vulnerability had been answered. For example, Lt. Gen. Louis Wagner stated at the press conference that:

--"They (casualties) were much less than we suspected." --"In no case did we lose a crew, a complete crew." --"There were some shots where we did not have any one wounded" (statement made by briefer with General Wagner).

What is the significance of those results in light of the shots being controlled? Would these statements have been true if random impact points had been used? If the shots had been fired into an area with live ammunition? In general, how can the Army

have made those statements with such assurance given the

conditions imposed upon the tests?

Mr. Ambrose. LTG Wagner was not trying to indicate that

all vulnerability questions had been answered; or that the Army considered that sufficient live-fire testing had been done (or was ever considered feasible to accomplish) to reach such a conclusion. What he did comment on, correctly, was the actual observed results. The Army position has been, and is, that the shot lines chosen for the relatively small number of tests should be selected to yield maximum information to calibrate the computer models that are used to estimate vulnerability. Additionally, the Army viewpoint is that overmatched rounds/ missiles deliberately fired into explosives will not contribute much insight other than confirmation of the estimate that a catastrophic kill will result. That estimate is already incorporated into the computer model. After the Phase II tests have been completed and the information gained from these tests has been introduced into the models, computer calculations will

then be made which will provide estimates of the BFV vulnerability before and after the fixes introduced into the Phase II test program. The statistical validity of these estimates will be limited both by the number of test shots and by the applicability of the shot pattern data gathered from past conflicts, such as the Arab-Israeli tank battles. If "random impact" shots had been .fired, we have no way of telling what could have been said about the results, since we obviously do not know what the shots lines might have been. But the limited number of such shots would not allow us statistically significant statement about vulnerability no matter what results might have been obtained.

BRADLEY VULNERABILITY TESTING

Mr. Levine.

Also during the December 11 press conference,

General Wagner stated that:

--"Spall fragments were not significant.

They will cause some

casualties, but they were not a significant producer."

Yet, the GAO report, citing the DoD report, stated that: --"(A) considerable percentage of the crew in these tests would have been wounded, most of them from spalling. The electrical system was also very vulnerable to spalling damage and...this typically caused major degradation in firepower."

How does the Army reconcile these two views of the damage caused by spalling? What changes does the Army plan to make on the M2 to limit spall damage?

General Wickham. The statements do not need to be reconciled because the context for each is different. The GAO report refers to spall damage to electrical components and casualty effects on personnel. LTG Wagner was commenting specifically on the effect of spall on stored ammunition with the potential for violent explosion. If LTG Wagner were asked about spall damage to electronics or personnel, his answer would be similar to the GAO response. The Army is planning to install spall liners in the crew area on all Bradleys beginning May 88. This will significantly decrease spall effects on the crew from overmatching rounds. The Bradley fire suppression electrical cables have been protected from spall.

PHASE II TESTING

Mr. Levine. The Phase II tests were supposed to test a reconfigured vehicle with ammunition and fuel stored on the outside, the so-called "minimum casualty baseline vehicle."

In