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ET TU IN ARCADIA VIXISTI.
Thereon awhile, amazed, he stares, and then In ancient tales, O friend, thy spirit dwelt;
To right and leftward, like a questing dog, There, from of old, thy childhood passed ; and Seeks first the ancestral altars, then the hearth there
Long cold with rains, and where old terror High expectation, high delights and deeds,
lodged, Thy fluttering heart with hope and terror And where the dead. So thee undying Hope, moved.
With all her pack, hunts screaming through
the years : And thou hast heard of yore the Blatant Beast, And Roland's horn, and that war-scattering Here, there, thou feëst ; but nor here nor there shout
The pleasant gods abide, the glory dwells. Of all-unarmed Achilles, ægis-crowned. And perilous lands thou sawest, sounding This'was not Venus, though she Venus seemed
That, that was not Apollo, not the god. shores
A moment. And though fair yon river move, And seas and forests drear, island and dale And mountain dark. For thou with Tristram She, all the way, from disenchanted fount
To seas unhallowed runs; the gods forsook rode Or Bedevere, in farthest Lyonesse.
Long since her trembling rushes; from her
plains Thou badst a booth in Samarcand, whereat
Disconsolate, long since adventure fled : Side-looking Magians trafficked; thence, by night,
And now although the inviting river flows, An Afreet snatched thee, and with wings upbore Or willowy islet, win upon thy soul
And every poplared cape, and every bend Beyond the Aral mount; or, hoping gain, Thou, with a jar of money, didst embark,
And to thy hopeful shallop whisper speed,
Yet hope not thou at all; hope is no more; For Balsorah, by sea. But chiefly thou In that clear air took life, in Arcady
And oh, long since the golden groves are dead,
The faery cities vanished from the land ! The haunted, land of song; and by the wells
R. L. STEVENSON. Where most the gods frequent. There Chiron
old, In a vast mountain antre, taught thee lore: The plants he taught, and by the shining stars In forests dim to steer. There hast thou seen The cow low'd sadly o’er the distant gate, Immortal Pan dance secret in a glade,
In the mid-field and round our garden rail; And, dancing, roll his eyes; these, where they But nought her restless sorrow could abate, fell,
Nor patting hands nor clink of milking-pail; Shed glee, and through the congregated oaks
For she had lost the love she least could spare. A flying horror winged; while all the earth Her little suckling calf, her life of life, To the god's pregnant footing thrilled within. In some far shambles waited for the knife, Or whiles, beside the sobbing stream, he And spent his sweet breath on the murderous breathed,
air. In his clutched pipe, unformed and wizard One single yearning sound, repeated still, strains,
Moan'd from the croft, and wander'd round Divine yet brutal; which the forest heard,
the hill; And thou, with awe; and far upon the plain The heedless train ran brawling down the line; The unthinking ploughman started and
On went the horsemen and the market-cart, gave
But little Rose, who loved the sheep and kine,
Ran home to tell of Cushie's broken heart. Now things there are that, upon him who sees,
CHAS. TENNYSON TURNER. A strong vocation lay; and strains there are That wboso hears shall hear for evermore. Forevermore thou hear'st immortal Pan And those melodious godheads, ever young At dawn he marks the smoke among the trees, And ever quiring, on the mountains old. From hearths to which his daily footsteps go;
And hopes, and fears, and ponders on his What was this earth, child of the gods, to thee? knees, Forth from thy dreamland thou, a dreamer, If his poor sheep will heed his voice or no; cam'st,
What wholesome turn will Ailsie's sorrow And in thine ears the olden music rang,
take? And in thy mind the doings of the dead, Her latest sin will careless Annie rue ? And those heroic ages long forgot.
Will Robin now, at last, bis wiles forsake ? To a so fallen earth, alas ! too late,
Meet his old dupes, yet hold his balance true? Alas! in evil days, thy ps return,
He prays at noon with all the warmth of To list at noon for nightingales, to grow
heaven A dwelier on the beach till Argo come
About his heart, that each may be forgiven; That came long since, a lingerer by the pool He prays at eve; and through the midnight air Where that desired angel bathes no more. Sends holy ventures to the throne above; As when the Indian to Dakota comes,
His very dreams are faithful to his prayer, Or farthest Idaho, and where he dwelt, And follow, with closed eyes, the path of love. He with his clan, a humming city finds;
CHAS. TENNYSON TURNER
BY THE DUKE OF ARGYLL.
ON THE MORAL
From The Contemporary Review. ment of their own maturity. It may
be THE UNITY OF NATURE.
nothing more than the mere impulse and power of opening the mouth for food, as in the case of the chicks of many birds;
or it may be the much more active imCHARACTER OF MAN, pulse and the much more complicated CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF THE power by which the young mammalia seek UNITY OF NATURE.,
and secure their nourishment; or it may The consciousness of unworthiness in be such wonderful special instincts as respect to moral character is a fact as that by which the newly hatched cuckoo, fundamental, and as universal in the hu- although blind and otherwise helpless, is man mind as the consciousness of limita- yet enabled to expel its rivals from the tion in respect to intellectual power. Both nest, and thus secure that undivided supof them may exist in a form so rudimen-ply of food without which it could not tary as to be hardly recognizable. The survive. But whatever the impulse or limits of our intelligence may be felt only the power may be, it is always just enough in a dim sense of unsatisfied curiosity. for the work which is to be done. We The faultiness of our character may be have seen, too, that the amount of prerecognized only in the vaguest emotions vision which is involved in those instincof occasional self-reproach. But as the tive dispositions and actions of animals knowledge of mankind extends, and as is often greatest in those which are low the cultivation of their moral faculties in the scale of life, so that the results for improves, both these great elements of which they work, and which they do actuconsciousness become more and more ally attain, must be completely out of prominent, and occupy a larger and larger sight to them. In the wonderful metaplace in the horizon of their thoughts. morphoses of insect life, the imperfect It is always the men who know most who creature is guided with certainty to the feel most how limited their knowledge is. choice and enjoyment of the conditions And so likewise it is always the loftiest which are necessary to its own developspirits who are most conscious of the ment; and when the time comes it selects infirmities which beset them.
the position, and constructs the cell in But although these two great facts in which its own mysterious transformations human consciousness are parallel facts, are accomplished. there is a profound difference between All this is in conformity with an absothem; and to the nature and bearing of lute and universal law in virtue of which this difference very careful attention must there is established a perfect unity bebe paid.
tween these three things: first, the physiWe have seen in regard to all living cal powers and structure of all living things what the relation is between the creatures; secondly, those dispositions physical powers which they possess and and instinctive appetites which are seated the ability which they have to use them. in that structure to impel and guide its It is a relation of close and perfect cor- powers; and thirdly, the external condirespondence. Everything requisite to be tions in which the creature's life is passed, done for the unfolding and upholding of and in which its faculties find an approtheir life they have impulses universally priate field of exercise. disposing them to do, and faculties fully If man has any place in the unity of enabling them to accomplish. We have nature, this law must prevail with him. seen that in the case of some animals There must be the same correspondence this correspondence is already perfect between his powers and the instincts from the infancy of the creature, and that which incite and direct him in their use. even in the case of those which are born Accordingly it is in this law that we find comparatively helpless, there is always the explanation and the meaning of his given to them just so much of impulse sense of ignorance. For without a sense and of power as is requisite for the attain- of ignorance there could be no desire of
knowledge, and without his desire of things to do that which it is their special knowledge inan would not be man. His i work to do and in the doing of which the whole place in nature depends upon it. highest law of their being is fulfilled. In His curiosity, and his wonder, and his the case of the lower animals, this law, admiration, and his awe — these are all as to the part they have to play and the but the adjuncts and subsidiary allies of ends they have to serve in the economy that supreme affection which incites him of the world, is simple, definite, and alto inquire and know. Nor is this desire ways perfectly attained. No advance is capable of being resolved into his ten- with them possible, no capacity of imdency to seek for an increased command provement, no dormant or undeveloped over the comforts and conveniences of powers leading up to wider and wider life. It is wholly independent of that spheres of action. With man, on the kind of value which consists in the physi- contrary, the law of his being is a law cal utility of things. The application of which demands progress, which endows knowledge comes after the acquisition of him with faculties enabling him to make it, and is not the only, or even the most it, and fills him with aspirations which powerful, inducement to its pursuit. The cause him to desire it. Among the lowreal incitement is an innate appetite of est savages there is some curiosity and the mind — conscious in various degrees some sense of wonder, else even the rude of the mystery, and of the beauty, and of inventions they have achieved would the majesty of the system in which it never have been made, and their degraded lives and moves; conscious, too, that its superstitions would not have kept their own relations to that system are but dimly hold. Man's sense of ignorance is the seen and very imperfectly understood. greatest of his gifts, for it is the secret In a former chapter we have seen that of his wish to know. The whole structhis appetite of knowledge is never satis. ture and the whole furniture of his mind fied, even by the highest and most suc. is adapted to this condition. The highest cessful exertion of those faculties which law of his being is to advance in wisdom are, nevertheless, our only instruments of and knowledge: and his sense of the research. We have seen, too, what is presence and of the power of things which the meaning and significance of that great he can only partially understand is an reserve of power which must exist within abiding witness of this law, and an abidus, seeing that it remains unexhausted ing incentive to its fulfilment. and inexhaustible by the proudest suc. In all these aspects there is an absolute cesses of discovery. In this sense it is contrast between our sense of limitation literally true that the eye is not satisfied in respect to intellectual power (or knowlwith seeing, nor the ear filled with hear-edge) and our sense of unworthiness in ing. Every new advance has its new respect to moral character. It is not of horizon. Every answered question brings ignorance, but of knowledge, that we are into view another question unanswered, conscious here, even the knowledge of and perhaps unanswerable, lying close the distinction between good and evil, behind it. And so we come to see that and of that special sense which in our this sense of ignorance is not only part nature is associated with it, namely, the of our nature, but one of its highest parts sense of moral obligation. Now it is a
necessary to its development, and in- universal fact of consciousness as regards dicative of those unknown and indefinite ourselves, and of observation in regard prospects of attainment which are at once to others, that, knowing evil to be evil, the glory and the burden of humanity. men are nevertheless prone to do it, and
It is impossible to mistake, then, the that, having this sense of moral obligaplace which is occupied among the uni- tion, they are nevertheless prone to disoties of nature by that sense of ignorance bey it. This fact is entirely independent which is universal among men. It be of the particular standard by which men longs to the number of those primary in different stages of society have judged mental conditions which impel all living certain things to be good and other things
- the "
to be evil. It is entirely independent of very circumlocutions by which they prothe infinite variety of rules according to fess to explain its origin; or else they which they recognize the doing of partic- build up a structure which, when comular acts, and the abstention from other pleted, reinains as destitute of the idea of acts, to be obligatory upon them. Under obligation as the separate materials of every variety of circumstance in regard which it is composed. In the one case, to these rules, under every diversity of they first put in the gold, and then they custom, of law, or of religion by which think that by some alchemy they have they are established, the general fact re-made it; in the other case, they do not mains the same that what men them. indeed first put in the gold, but neither in selves recognize as duty they continually the end do they ever get it. No combidisobey, and what according to their own nation of other things will give the idea standard they acknowledge to be wrong of obligation, unless with and among these they continually do.
things there is some concealed or unconThere is unquestionably much difficulty scious admission of itself. But in this, as in finding any place for this fact among in other cases with which we have already the unities of nature. It falls therefore dealt, the ambiguities of language afford in the way of this inquiry to investigate an easy means or an abundant source of how this difficulty arises, and wherein itself-deception. One common phrase is consists.
enough to serve the purpose And here we at once encounter those ciation of ideas.” Under this vague and old fundamental questions on the nature, indefinite form of words all mental operathe origin, and the authority of the moral tions and all mental affections may be sense, which have exercised the human classed. Consequently those which are mind for more than two thousand years; elementary may be included, without being and on which an eminent writer of our expressly named. This is one way of own time has said that no sensible prog- putting in the gold and then of pretendress has been made. This result may ing to find it as a result. Take one of well suggest that the direction which in the simplest cases in which the idea of quiry has taken is a direction in which obligation arises, even in the rudest minds progress is impossible. If men will try - namely, the case of gratitude to those to analyze something which is incapable who have done us good. Beyond all quesof analysis, a perpetual consciousness of tion, this simple form of the sense of obabortive effort will be their only and their ligation is one which involves the associainevitable reward.
ideas. It involves the idea For just as in the physical world there of self as a moral agent and the recipient arc bodies or substances which are (to us) of good. It involves the idea of other elementary, so in the spiritual world there human beings as likewise moral agents, are perceptions, feelings, or emotions, and as related to us by a common nature, which are equally elementary — that is as well as, perhaps, by still more special to say, which resist all attempts to resolve ties. It involves the idea of things good them into a combination of other and for them, and of our having power to consimpler affections of the mind. And offer these things upon them. All these this kind is the idea, or the conception, or ideas are “associated” in the sense of the sentiment of obligation. That which gratitude towards those who have conwe mean when we say, “I ought,” is a ferred upon us any kind of favor. But meaning which is incapable of reduction. the mere word “association " throws no It is a meaning which enters as an ele- light whatever upon the nature of the ment into many other conceptions, and connection. Association ” means nothinto the import of many other forms of ing but grouping or contiguity of any expression, but it is itself uncompounded. kind. It may be the grouping of mere acAll attempts to explain it do one or other cident- the associations of things which of these two things — either they assume happen to lie together, but which have no and include the idea of obligation in the other likeness, relation, or connection,
tion of many
But this, obviously, is not the kind of reduced by analysis, belongs to the bare association which connects together the sense or feeling of obligation, and not at different ideas which are involved in the all, or not generally, to the processes of conception of gratitude to those who have thought by which that feeling may be done us good. What then is the associat-guided in its exercise. The distinction ing tie? What is the link which binds is immense and obvious. The sense of them together, and constitutes the par. rightness and of wrongness is one thing; ticular kind or principle of association ? the way in which we come to attach the It is the sense of obligation. The asso. idea of right or wrong to the doing of ciating or grouping power lies in this certain acts, or to the abstention from
It is the centre round which the certain other acts, is another and a very other perceptions aggregate,
It is the different thing. This is a distinction seat of that force which holds them to which applies equally to many other sim. gether, which keeps them in a definite ple or elementary affections of the mind. and fixed relation, and gives its mental The liking or disliking of certain tastes character to the combination as a whole. or affections of the palate is universal
If we examine closely the language of and elementary. But the particular tastes those who have attempted to analyze the which are the objects of liking or of aver. moral sense, or, in other words, the sense sion are for the most part determined by of obligation, we shall always detect the habits and education. There may be same fallacy namely, the use of words tastes which all men are so constituted as so vague that under cover of them the necessarily to feel disgusting; and in like idea of obligation is assumed as the ex- manner there may be certain acts which planation of itself. Sometimes this fal- all men everywhere must feel to be conlacy is so transparent in the very forms trary to their sense of obligation. In. of expression which are used, that we deed we shall see good reason to believe wonder how men of even ordinary intelli- that this not only may be so, but must be gence, far more men of the highest intel. so. But this is a separate subject of lectual power, can have failed to see and inquiry. The distinction in principle is feel the confusion of their thoughts. manifest between the sense itself and the Thus, for example, we find Mr. Grote laws by which its particular applications expressing himself as follows: “This idea are determined. of the judgment of others upon our con- The second of the two things to be duct and feeling as agents, or the idea of defined — namely, the sense in which any our own judgment as spectators in con- faculty whatever of the mind can really currence with others upon our own con be regarded singly, or as uncombined duct as agents, is the main basis of what with others – is a matter so important is properly called ethical sentiment."* that we must stop to consider it with In this passage the word “judgment greater care. can only mean moral judgment, which is The analogy is not complete, but only an exercise of the moral sense; and this partial, between the analysis of mind and exercise is gravely represented as the the analysis of matter. In the analysis " basis” of itself.
of matter we reach elements which can Two things, however, ought to be care. be wholly separated from each other, so fully considered and remembered in re that each of them can exist and can be spect to this elementary character of the handled by itself. In the analysis of moral sense. The first is, that we must mind we are dealing with one organic clearly define to ourselves what the idea whole; and the operation by which we is of which, and of which alone, we can break it up into separate faculties or affirm that it is elementary; and secondly, powers is an operation purely ideal, since that we must define to ourselves as clearly, there is not one of these faculties which if it be possible to do so, in what sense it can exist alone, or which can exert its is that any faculty whatever of the mind special functions without the help of can really be contemplated as separable others. When we speak, therefore, of a from, or as uncombined with, others. moral sense or of conscience, we do not
As regards the first of these two things speak of it as a separate entity any more to be defined, namely, the idea which we than when we speak of reason or of imaffirm to be simple or elementary, it must agination. Strictly speaking, no faculty be clearly understood that this elemen- of the mind is elementary in the same tary character, this incapability of being sense in which the elements of matter are
(supposed to be) absolutely simple or un* Fragments on Ethical Subjects, pp. 9, 10. combined. Perhaps there is no faculty