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The forms be: you have won this by play, you have not only the water, but you have the receipt, you can make it again if it be lost, &c.
Next, because these properties which we enjoy by the benefit of others, carry with them an obligation, which seemeth a kind of burden; whereas the other, which derive from ourselves, are like the freest parents, "absque aliquo inde reddendo;" and if they proceed from fortune or providence, yet they seem to touch us secretly with the reverence of the divine powers, whose favours we taste, and therefore work a kind of religious fear and restraint whereas in the other kind, that comes to pass which the prophet speaketh, "lætantur et exultant, immolant plagis suis, et sacrificant reti suo."
Thirdly, because that which cometh unto us without our own virtue, yieldeth not that commendation and reputation for actions of great felicity may draw wonder, but praise less; as Cicero said to Cæsar, "Quæ miremur, habemus; quæ laudemus, expectamus."
Fourthly, because the purchases of our own industry are joined commonly with labour and strife, which gives an edge and appetite, and makes the fruition of our desires more pleasant. "Suavis cibus a venatu."
On the other side, there be four countercolours to this colour, rather than reprehensions, because they be as large as the colour itself. First, because felicity seemeth to be a character of the favour and love of the divine powers, and accordingly worketh both confidence in ourselves, and respect and authority from others. And this felicity extendeth to many casual things, whereunto the care or virtue of man cannot extend, and therefore seemeth to be a larger good; as when Cæsar said to the sailor, "Cæsarem portas et fortunam ejus;" if he had said, "et virtutem ejus," it had been small comfort against a tempest, otherwise than if it might seem upon merit to induce fortune.
Next, whatsoever is done by virtue and industry, seems to be done by a kind of habit and art, and
"That which is gotten by our own pains and industry is a greater good; that which comes by another man's courtesy, or the indulgence of fortune, is a lesser good." G 2
therefore open to be imitated and followed; whereas felicity is inimitable: so we generally see that things of nature seem more excellent than things of art, because they be inimitable; for "quod imitabile est, potentia quadam vulgatum est."
Thirdly, felicity commendeth those things which come without our labour; for they seem gifts, and the other seem pennyworths; whereupon Plutarch saith elegantly of the acts of Timoleon, who was so fortunate, compared with the acts of Agesilaus and Epaminondas; that they were like Homer's verses, they ran so easily and so well. And therefore it is the word we give cility seemeth ever to come from happiness. unto poesy, terming it a happy vein, because fa
Fourthly, this same "præter spem, vel præter of many things: and this cannot be incident to ," doth increase the price and pleasure expectatum,"
those things that proceed from our own care and compass.
"Gradus privationis major videtur, quam gradus diminutionis; et rursus gradus inceptionis major videtur, quam gradus incrementii."+
Ir is a position in the mathematics, that there is no proportion between something and nothing. therefore the degree of nullity and quiddity or act, seemeth larger than the degree of increase and decrease; as to a "monoculus" it is more to lose one eye than to a man that hath two eyes. So if one have lost divers children, it is more grief to him to lose the last than all the rest; because he is "spes gregis." And therefore Sibylla, when she brought her three books, and had burned two, did double the whole price of both the other, because the burning of that had been "gradus privationis," and not diminutionis."
This colour is reprehended first in those things, the use and service whereof resteth in sufficiency, competency, or determinate quantity: as if a man be to pay one hundred pounds upon a penalty, it is more to him to want twelve pence, than after that twelve pence supposed to be wanting, to want ten shillings more; so the decay of a man's estate seems to be most touched in the degree, when he first grows behind, more than afterwards, when he proves nothing worth. And hereof the common forms are, "Sera in fundo parsimonia," and, as good never a whit, as never the better, &c. It is reprehended also in respect of that notion, “Corruptio unius, generatio alterius:" so that" gradus privationis" is many times less matter, because it gives the cause and motive to some new course. As when Demosthenes reprehended the people for hearkening to the conditions offered by King Philip, being not honourable nor equal, he saith they were but aliments of their sloth and weakness,
"The degree of privation seems greater than the degree of diminution; and again, the degree of inception (or beginning) seems greater than the degree of increase."
which if they were taken away, necessity would and come to no substance without an iteration; teach them stronger resolutions. So Doctor Hector was wont to say to the dames of London, when they complained they were they could not tell how, but yet they could not endure to take any medicine; he would tell them their way was only to be sick, for then they would be glad to take any medicine.
so as in such cases the second degree seems the worthiest, as the body-horse in the cart that draweth more than the fore-horse. Hereof the common forms are, the second blow makes the fray, the second word makes the bargain: "Alter principium dedit, alter modum abstulit," &c. Another reprehension of this colour is in respect of defatigation, which makes perseverance of greater dignity than inception: for chance or instinct of nature may cause inception: but settled affection or judgment maketh the continuance.
Thirdly, this colour is reprehended in such things, which have a natural course and inclination contrary to an inception. So that the inception is continually evacuated and gets no start: but there behoveth" perpetua inceptio," as in the common form, "Non progredi est regredi, qui non proficit deficit:" running against the hill, rowing against the stream, &c. For if it be with the stream or with the hill, then the degree of inception is more than all the rest.
Fourthly, this colour is to be understood of "gradus inceptionis a potentia ad actum, comparatus cum gradu ab actu ad incrementum." For otherwise "majur videtur gradus ab impotentia ad potentiam, quam a potentia ad actum."
UPON HUMAN PHILOSOPHY.
MR. BACON IN PRAISE OF KNOWLEDGE.
SILENCE were the best celebration of that, | menting, maketh us to stumble upon somewhat which I mean to commend; for who would not which is new: but all the disputation of the use silence, where silence is not made? and what learned never brought to light one effect of nature crier can make silence in such a noise and tumult before unknown. When things are known and of vain and popular opinions? My praise shall found out, then they can descant upon them, they be dedicated to the mind itself. The mind is the can knit them into certain causes, they can reduce man, and the knowledge of the mind. A man is them to their principles. If any instance of exbut what he knoweth. The mind itself is but an perience stand against them, they can range it in accident to knowledge; for knowledge is a double order by some distinctions. But all this is but a of that which is. The truth of being, and the truth web of the wit, it can work nothing. I do not of knowing, is all one: and the pleasures of the doubt but that common notions which we call reaaffections greater than the pleasures of the senses. son, and the knitting of them together, which we And are not the pleasures of the intellect greater call logic, are the art of reason and studies. But than the pleasures of the affections? Is it not a they rather cast obscurity, than gain light to the true and only natural pleasure, whereof there is contemplation of nature. All the philosophy of no satiety? Is it not knowledge that doth alone nature which is now received, is either the philoclear the mind of all perturbations? How many sophy of the Grecians, or that other of the alchethings are there which we imagine not? How mists. That of the Grecians hath the foundations many things do we esteem and value otherwise in words, in ostentation, in confutation, in sects, than they are? This ill-proportioned estimation, in schools, in disputations. The Grecians were, these vain imaginations, these be the clouds of as one of themselves saith, "you Grecians, ever error that turn into the storms of perturbation. Is children." They knew little antiquity; they there any such happiness as for a man's mind to knew, except fables, not much above five hundred be raised above the confusion of things; where years before themselves. They knew but a small he may have the prospect of the order of nature, portion of the world. That of the alchemists and the error of men? Is this but a vein only of hath the foundation in imposture, in auricular tradelight, and not of discovery? of contentment, and ditions and obscurity. It was catching hold of not of benefit? Shall we not as well discern the religion, but the principle of it is," Populus vult riches of nature's warehouse, as the benefit of her decipi." So that I know no great difference shop? Is truth ever barren? Shall he not be between these great philosophers, but that the one able thereby to produce worthy effects, and to is a loud crying folly, and the other is a whisperendow the life of man with infinite commodities? ing folly. The one is gathered out of a few vulBut shall I make this garland to be put upon a gar observations, and the other out of a few exwrong head? Would any body believe me, if I periments of a furnace. The one never faileth to should verify this, upon the knowledge that is multiply words, and the other ever faileth to mulnow in use? Are we the richer by one poor in-tiply gold. Who would not smile at Aristotle, vention, by reason of all the learning that hath been these many hundred years? The industry of artificers maketh some small improvement of things invented; and chance sometimes in experi
when he admireth the eternity and invariableness of the heavens, as there were not the like in the bowels of the earth? Those be the confines and borders of these two kingdoms, where the con
tinued alteration and incursion are. The superficies and upper parts of the earth are full of varieties. The superficies and lower parts of the heavens, which we call the middle region of the air, is full of variety. There is much spirit in the one part, that cannot be brought into mass. There is much massy body in the other place, that cannot be refined to spirit. The common air is as the waste ground between the borders. Who would not smile at the astronomers, I mean not these few carmen which drive the earth about, but the ancient astronomers, which feign the moon to be the swiftest of the planets in motion, and the rest in order, the higher the slower; and so are compelled to imagine a double motion: whercas how evident is it, that that which they call a contrary motion, is but an abatement of motion. The fixed stars overgo Saturn, and so in them and the rest, all is but one motion, and the nearer the earth the slower. A motion also whereof air and water do participate, though much interrupted. But why do I in a conference of pleasure enter these great matters, in sort that pretending to know much, I should forget what is seasonable? Pardon me, it was because all things may be endowed and adorned with speeches, but knowledge itself is more beautiful than any apparel of words that can be put upon it. And let me not seem arrogant without respect to these great reputed authors. Let me so give every man his due, as I give time his due, which is to discover truth. Many of these men had greater wits, far above mine own, and so are
many in the Universities of Europe at this day. But alas, they learn nothing there but to believe: first, to believe that others know that which they know not; and after, themselves know that which they know not. But indeed facility to believe, impatience to doubt, temerity to answer, glory to know, doubt to contradict, end to gain, sloth to search, seeking things in words, resting in part of nature; these and the like, have been the things which have forbidden the happy match between the mind of man and the nature of things; and in place thereof have married it to vain notions and blind experiments: and what the posterity and issue of so honourable a match may be, it is not hard to consider. Printing, a gross invention; artillery, a thing that lay not far out of the way; the needle, a thing partly known before: what a change have these three made in the world in these times; the one in state of learning, the other in state of the war, the third in the state of treasure, commodities, and navigation? those, I say, were but stumbled upon and lighted upon by chance. Therefore, no doubt, the sovereignty of man lieth hid in knowledge; wherein many things are reserved, which kings with their treasure cannot buy, nor with their force command; their spials and intelligencers can give no news of them, their seamen and discoverers cannot sail where they grow: now we govern nature in opinions, but we are thrall unto her in necessity; but if we would be led by her in invention, we should command her in action.
THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE:
ANNOTATIONS OF HERMES STELLA.
A FEW FRAGMENTS OF THE FIRST BOOK.
[None of the Annotations of Stella are set down in these Fragments.]
Of the limits and end of knowledge.
In the divine nature, both religion and philosophy hath acknowledged goodness in perfection, science or providence comprehending all things, and absolute sovereignty or kingdom. In aspiring to the throne of power, the angels transgressed and fell; in presuming to come within the oracle of knowledge, man transgressed and fell; but in pursuit towards the similitude of God's goodness or love, which is one thing, for love is nothing else but goodness put in motion or applied, neither man or spirit ever hath transgressed, or shall transgress.
The angel of light that was, when he presumed before his fall, said within himself, "I will ascend and be like unto the Highest;" not God, but the Highest. To be like to God in goodness, was no part of his emulation: knowledge, being in creation an angel of light, was not the want which did most solicit him; only because he was a minister he aimed at a supremacy; therefore his climbing or ascension was turned into a throwing down or precipitation.
Man, on the other side, when he was tempted before he fell, had offered unto him this suggestion, "that he should be like unto God." But how? not simply, but in this part, "knowing good and evil." For being in his creation invested with sovereignty of all inferior creatures, he was not needy of power or dominion. But again, being a spirit newly enclosed in a body of earth, he was fittest to be allured with appetite of light and liberty of knowledge. Therefore this approaching VOL. 1.-11
and intruding into God's secrets and mysteries, was rewarded with a further removing and estranging from God's presence. But as to the goodness of God, there is no danger in contending or advancing towards a similitude thereof; as that which is open and propounded to our imitation. For that voice, whereof the heathen and all other errors of religion have ever confessed that it sounds not like man, "Love your enemies; be you like unto your heavenly Father, that suffereth his rain to fall both upon the just and the unjust," doth well declare, that we can in that point commit no excess. So again we find it often repeated in the old law, " Be ye holy as I am holy ;" and what is holiness else but goodness, as we consider it separate and guarded from all mixture, and all access of evil!
Wherefore seeing that knowledge is of the number of those things which are to be accepted of with caution and distinction; being now to open a fountain, such as it is not easy to discern where the issues and streams thereof will take and fall; I thought it good and necessary in the first place, to make a strong and sound head or bank to rule and guide the course of the waters; by setting down this position or firmament, namely, "That all knowledge is to be limited by religion, and to be referred to use and action."
For if any man shall think, by view and inquiry into these sensible and material things, to attain to any light for the revealing of the nature or will of God, he shall dangerously abuse himself. It is true, that the contemplation of the creatures of God hath for end, as to the natures of the creatures themselves, knowledge; but as to the nature of