discover them: And I will not difpute with Mr. 2. Since then there are eternal unmade Ideas, they must fubfift somewhere: Now we all know that Ideas and Notions can fubfift only in a Mind, juft as Knowledge only can. There is no Idea in the whole World, but either in the eternal, or in created Minds. That there are eternal Truths, is a good Argument that there is an eternal Mind; for no Truths can be eternal, Intelle- which had no eternal Being; and they can have &tual Sy. ftem, Ch. no eternal Being, but in an eternal Mind. 4. p. 733, all that I intend at prefent, is only this; That St. if there be no Ideas, but only in a Mind, we Cud worth's But can find thefe Ideas only in our Minds; and if they they are to be found there, and no where elfe, they must be innate. Such eternal Ideas cannot be made, but only feen, and they can be feen only where they are, and they can be no where but in a Mind; and therefore at leaft all these eternal Ideas, which always were, and always will be true, must be originally in the Mind, and muft be found there, whenever they are found, because they are no where else.!. This is fuch plain felf-evident Reafon, as, whether it will fatisfy Men or not, I am fure can never be answered: But yet I appeal, as Mr. Lock often does, to all thinking Men, who observe the Actings of their own Minds, whether they make, or find their Notions and Ideas. This may be thought very hard to difcover; but. I may appeal as well as he, and let every thinking Man judge which fide has the faireft Indications. As for Mr. Lock's way of forming Ideas, I fhall confider it prefently; but every› Man finds that he contemplates Truth in his own Mind, without any regard to material or fenfible Images: That he fearches for Truth in his own Mind, and never feels it, or never has a clear Perception of it, till he fees the bright Ideas of it there: That by long thinking, Truth discovers it felf of a fudden, without any artificial Train of Thoughts to lead us to it: We may often obferve that a fudden Chance-Thought, as we may call it, which had no vifible Caufe, no Dependance or Connexion on any thing else, opens a new furprizing Scene, and vaft Treafure of Knowledge, which we had no Intimations of before: Nay, many times, when all that can be faid to us cannot imprint that Notion and Idea on our Minds which the Speaker. intends, a Chance-Thought explains it all; and when we have got the Notion, we understand his his Words; but could not learn the Notion from his Words. And to obferve but one thing. more, the Notions and Ideas of Things which we fee in our Minds, are much more perfect, and have more exact Truth in them, than there is in the Things whose Ideas they are, as they exift without us; which is impoffible to be, were our Ideas only a Copy of Nature, and not an Original, or at leaft not a Copy of a more perfect Original than Nature is. This is true of all abftracted Ideas; we have more perfect and exact Notions of Virtue and Vice, than ever we faw practifed in the World; the Idea of a Line, of a Superficies, of a Triangle, of a Square, a Circle, are much more exact than any thing is in Nature; and all the Demomstrations relating to thefe Matters are true only of the Ideas, which are therefore the only Objects of Science. And let any Man, who puts all these things together, tell me whether this looks moft like making, or finding Ideas, Nay, when we know that the Divine Mind is the Archetypal Image of the World, by which all things were made, is it not reafonable to think, that created Minds, which were made. to know and to contemplate God's Works, fhould be furnish'd with natural connate Ideas to know them by? For it seems as impoffible to me to know a World, without the Ideas of Things which are to be known, as it is to make a World, without having the Ideas of fuch Creatures as are to be made. It is certain we know nothing in this World which we never faw before, without fome Marks and Characters to know it by; and how then should we know every thing that we do know, without any internal Notices and Ideas of Things? Knowledge is an internal Principle, and an internal Principle of Knowledge muft have fome internal Marks and Characters of Things to be known. 3. For in the next Place, unless thefe Ideas were Innate, we could never have them; they could never enter into our Minds, if they were not born with us. The contrary to this, Mr. Lock undertakes to demonftrate throughout his Book, and accounts this the greatest Strength of his Cause, That there is no Reafon to have Recourse to Innate Ideas, because he can fhew whence the Book 2. Understanding may get all the Ideas it has, and by Ch. 1. p. what Ways and Degrees they may come into the Mind 37. for which he appeals to every Man's own Obfervation and Experience. It is not confiftent with my prefent Design, particularly to examine fo large a Book. And I believe what I have already faid, is fufficient to prove, that Experience and Obfervation cannot determine this Point against Innate Ideas: For all that Obfe vation can prove, is only this, That our Knowledge increases gradually, and that the external Impreffions, which are made on us by external Ob-` jects, are helps to us in understanding the Nature and Ideas of Things; and that we have no Knowledge of any Ideas, which we never had any Hints` or Intimations of from without: But our Obfer vation and Experience, that is, what we feel within us, cannot prove, whether the Mind, upon thefe external Notices, finds thefe Ideas in it felf, or forms them anew; for which way foever it be, the workings of our Minds, either in framing Ideas, or in finding and fearching them out, must be fo near the fame, that our Experience can't certainly diftinguish them; though, as I obferv'd above, the faireft Indications are on the Side of Natural and Innate Ideas. But what is that Mr. Lock would prove by Experience and Obfervation? That all the Ideas we have, are made by the Mind in that very way which he has defcribed? I alfo appeal to all Man kind, kind, whether his Obfervation be not falfe. If this be the plain and known Method, in which Men and Children form their Ideas, I wonder he was at the trouble to write a great Book about it; when every Child who has any Ideas, must know how he came by them, if he made his own Ideas. And if Men and Children form'd their Ideas Mr. Lock's way, all Mankind knew this way from the beginning, and Mr. Lock has made no new Difcoveries: And yet I believe both he and his Friends think that he has ranged his Ideas, and found out a more Artificial Way of framing them, than was commonly known: And that is a moft certain Demonftration, That Mankind did not make their Ideas this way; for if they had, they must certainly have known it. And this feems to me a very good Argument againft making Ideas at all; because if they were made, all Mankind would know how they were made; and it would admit of no Difpute, Whether they were Innate, or Made. Mr. Lock indeed has in many Instances, with great Art and Truth, analyzed our Ideas, and refolved them into fuch Principles and Caufes, as fhew their Correspondence with the Natures of Things, and what Natural Indications there are, not fufficient to make, but fufficient to excite fuch Ideas in us, if they be in the Mind: Which may confirm us that our Ideas are true, or may correct them if they be not. But what Mr. Lock objects against Innate Ideas, That Children and Savages, who were never inftructed in fuch Matters, are ignorant of them, which they could not be, were thefe Ideas Innate; the fame I object against his making Ideas: How plain foever he may imagine his way to be, Children and Savages cannot make them, without being Taught; though their Senfes do as truly reprefent external Objects to them, |