Minds of Brutes, which they do in Men; for they have Sense and Perception, and external Objects make the fame Impreffions upon them. And if the Soul of Man have no more innate Knowledge than the Soul of a Beaft, but all Notions and Ideas come from without, and the Beast receives the fame Impreffions from without, that Men do; why should not the fame Impreffions convey the fame Notions to Souls equally void of all natural Ideas?

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Whoever obferves the Workings of his own Mind, finds that all Notions and Ideas come by Reflection; that is, by turning our Eyes and Thoughts inward upon ourselves. But why fhould we confult our own Minds, if there be no Characters of Truth, no Ideas of Things to be found there? If our Notions and Ideas came from without, they would be as immediately printed upon the Mind, as the Objects of Senfe are; the Soul would be wholly paffive in Knowledge, as it is in Senfe; and all Mens Notions must be as exactly alike as their Senfations are. Whereas we know, that Truth is not difcover'd without difficult and laborious Searches: Men turn over their Minds, and examine all the Ideas that they find there, till they hit on fuch a Train of Thoughts, as like a Clue leads them into thofe private and fecret Receffes where fuch Ideas are to be found: Which is the Reafon why Men differ fo much in their Notions of Things; that fome Men are wholly ignorant of the moft ufeful Truths; others fee but a little Part of them; others have diftinct and clear Notions, which they affent to without any doubt. . And therefore no Man truly understands any thing, nor is easy and satisfied with any Notions which he reads or hears, till he feels them in his own Mind: And the moft perfect and fatisfactory Knowledge we have is Intuition; when the Mind

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fees Truth bright and clear, as the Eye fees Light and Colours; Sees it, I fay, in it felf, not newly put in there, but fees it to be old and eternal Truth. Now if to know and to understand, be to fee and to feel Truth, and to fee and to feel it in our Minds, not as we fee new Fictions, and the Imagery of Fancy, which we know to be our own Creatures; but to fee and know them to be old and neceffary Truths, which we only fee, but do not make to be Truths; then it is certain these Notions and Ideas must be connate, and inbred, and interwoven in the very Frame and Contexture, if I may fo fpeak, of a rational Soul.

I fhall add but one Thing more; Whether these. Men will allow our Paffions to be innate? Such as Love and Hatred, Hope and Fear,. Defire and Averfation. Thefe Paffions are the internal Sense of the Soul; and I fuppofe they will grant exter nal Objects cannot create Senfation, where there is no inward innate Principle of Senfe; for that is to create Life by external Impreffions; and it is certain these internal Paffions are not immediately raised by external Objects, but by our own Imaginations and Opinions of Things. And now let: any Man judge, whether it be reasonable to think that God has implanted in us natural Paffions, which have Good and Evil for their Objects, but has implanted no natural Ideas in us of Good and Evil. We may, I think, as reasonably fuppofe, that God has made Eyes, but made no Light; that when. there is a natural Proportion between the Paffion and the Object, and a natural Relation and Connexion between them, one should be the Work of Nature, but not the other,


But the better to understand, and to confirm this, let us now briefly examine Mr. Lock's Arguments against all innate Ideas. And the firft, and I think the only general Argument he has against G 2


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them, is, That all Children and Idiots have not the leaft Apprehenfion or Thought of them ( innate Ideas). As for Idiots he might have fpared them, becaufe he will hardly allow them buman Souls. But the Sum of his Argument is this: That to imprint any thing on the Mind, is to make it perceived; if therefore Children and Idiots have Souls, have Minds, with thofe Impreffions upon them; they must unavoidably perceive them, and neceffarily know and affent to thefe Truths; which fince they do not, it is evident there are no fuch Impreffions.

I fhould not have expected fuch an Argument as this from a Man who pretends to be fo intimately acquainted with human Understanding: For there is nothing more notoriously falfe, than that whatever is imprinted in the Mind, is actually perceived. How many Things are there in every Man's Mind, which he does not actually perceive; that is, which he does not always actually think of? For nothing is actually perceived, but what is actually in the Thoughts; and no Man can think of more than one Thing at a time; and therefore, it feems, has but one Thing in his Mind at a time. Are there no Impreffions on the Mind, when we are in found undisturbed Sleep, and perceive nothing? Has that Man no Impreffions on his Mind, who was once admirably skill'd in all Parts of Knowledge and Learning, but either by means of fome accidental Distemper, or of old Age, has loft all the Notes and Images of Things, and perceives no more than a Child?

Human Underftanding, Cb. 2. P. 5.


Mr. Lock feems to have been aware of this Objection; for it is fo obvious, that no thinking Man can mifs it: And therefore in what follows, he changes this Affirmative Propofition, That whatever is imprinted on the Mind is perceived, into this Negative one, That no Propofition can be faid to be in the Mind, which it never yet knew, which

it was never yet conscious of. But these are two very different Things; and his altering the State of the Question, without feeming to alter it, has fome Art, but no Plain-dealing in it.

The first Question between us, is, Whether any Notion or Idea can be in the Mind, which the Mind does not actually perceive. That this may be, is plain in Fact; for no Man actually perceives any Thing, but what he actually thinks of; yet every Man, every Day he lives, has a thoufand Things in his Mind, which he does not actually think of, and fo many Ideas he has in his Mind, which he does not perceive. And if at any time we can have Ideas in our Mind, which we do not actually perceive; it can never be a good Argument, that any Ideas are not in our Minds, because we do not perceive them.

But the fecond State of the Question is, Whether we can fay, that any Ideas are in our Minds, which we did never perceive? I afk, Why not, if they may be there and not be perceiv'd? Why may not a Child have fuch Ideas as he never did perceive, as well as a Man have Ideas which he has no actual Perception of? What difference is there between a Child who never had a Perception of his Ideas, and a Man who once had fuch Perception, but by Sickness or old Age has now utterly loft all Perception of them? Has this old Man, who was once an admirable Scholar, no Ideas left in his Mind? Is his Soul become a Rafa Tabula again? If not, why may not a Child have Ideas which it never perceiv'd yet, as well as a Man have Ideas which he has loft the Perception of? If there may be Ideas in the Mind without Perception, they may as well be there before they are perceiv'd, as after their Perception is loft.

I fuppofe Mr. Lock will grant, that fuch a learned Man, who lofes his Understanding by Sickness G 3


or Age, as foon as he is delivered from this Body, will recover all his Notions or Ideas again in the next World with Advantage; which proves that his Soul was not ftripp'd of its Ideas when it loft the Perception of them, no more than a Man is when he falls afleep.

But I would gladly know what his Opinion is about the Souls of Infants, who die in a State of Infancy. They, as he fays, brought no Ideas into this World with them, and did not live long enough here to get any; do they then go without all Notions and Ideas into the other World, as perfect Infants as they came into this? Are there then Infant Spirits too? Spirits ftripp'd of Body, which must learn to think and to form Ideas of Things? Or do the Souls of Infants, as foon as they are difentangled from thefe Bodies, exercife their rational Powers, with the Liberty and Freedom of unbodied Spirits? This it is certain they can never do, unlefs they carry fome Ideas into the next World with them: And this they cannot do, except they brought them into this World with them, for they learnt nothing here; and yet an Infant Spirit is fomewhat harder to conceive, than Innate Ideas.

I fhould have expected from fo great a Philofopher, that he would have confidered the Soul in its State of Union to an Earthly Body; if he believes the Soul to be an immaterial Spirit, and not mere thinking Matter, (for he does not feem throughly refolv'd as to this Point:) But if the Soul and Body are two diftinct Beings, it is evident that the vital Union of the Soul to Matter, muft confine its Operations to Bodily Inftruments; and then its native Powers may lie conceal'd, or exert themselves by weak and flow Degrees, as the Body will enable them to act; and therefore we must not conclude that there is nothing in the Soul but what appears through the Body.


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