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them, as the Senfes of the moft Learned and Thinking Men: Which proves that Ideas do not enter in at the Eyes or Fingers Ends; and that the Mind has no immediate Power upon external Impreffions, of making its Ideas, no more than of feeing them, without Instruction.
This, I fuppofe, Mr. Lock will not pretend,' That our Ideas enter in from without: For he knows very well, that there are no Ideas out of a Mind; and that the external Impreffions which are made from without, which can be nothing else but Motion and Figure, have nothing in them like those Ideas which are raised in our Minds: But then he thinks, that a Knowing and Reafoning Faculty, without any Connate Ideas, can form its own Ideas from fuch external Impreffions, though they can convey no Ideas into the Mind, because they have none.
Now befides what I have already discoursed of this Matter, I muft obferve, That no Faculty makes its Object, but only perceives it; and then the Knowing Faculty muft not make its Ideas, but only fee and know them. A Knowing Faculty fuppofes that there are Ideas to be known; as a Seeing Faculty fuppofes that there is Light and Colours to be feen; and if thefe Ideas cannot come from without, and the Mind can't make them, the Mind can contemplate only fuch Ideas as it finds in its felf, and which fome external Impreffions do not make, but only bring into View.
I think Mr. Lock will allow it as credible and intelligible, that we fhould know by Innate Ideas, as that all our Senfations fhould be Innate Phantafms: And yet this he muft allow, according to his own Principles; for he grants, that ? 59, 60. fuch Secondary Qualities, as he calls them, Light and Colours, and Sounds, and Heat, and
Cold, Sweet and Bitter, &c. are no real Qualities in the Things without us, but only a Power to operate in a peculiar Manner on any of our Senfes. Now if there be no fuch Qualities as Light, or Colour, or Sounds, Heat or Cold, &c. without us, then thefe Ideas of Light and Colours must be Innate to the Vifive Faculty, and the Ideas of all other Qualities must be Innate to our other Senfes ; for if they be not without us, they must be within, for we have very real and fenfible Ideas of them. There is nothing in the Things without us, like thofe Ideas we have of Light and Colours, and other fenfible Qualities, and therefore they cannot paint those Ideas and Phantafms on our Minds; the most they can do is, by the wonderful and unaccountable Order of Nature, by fome certain kind of Motions, to raise fuch fenfible Ideas in us, of Light and Colours, &c. which they could not raife in the Soul, if they were not in it. It is the Soul only that fees, and hears, and feels, as well as underftands; and as Senfe is, and can be nothing else, but Innate Senfible Ideas put into Act by external Impreffions; fo Understanding is nothing else but the Perception of its Innate Ideas, excited alfo, and brought into View, by external Objects. This reprefents the Soul, as a true Microcofm, or Intellectual Image of the World, imprefs'd with all thofe Marks and Signatures, which are not actual Knowledge, but a Capacity of know ing, because they are capable of being brought
Plato called Knowledge Reminiscence; for being fenfible that the Soul could not get its Ideas merely from external Impreffions, he supposed that it had an actual Knowledge of them in a former State, and by degrees recover'd that Knowledge again in this State, as Men recollect fuch Matters as they had forgot. And to bring thofe Ideas in
to Act, which were originally imprinted on the Mind, but not known before, is not unlike to Plato's Reminifcence; for it is a Discovery and Recollection of fuch Ideas as were in the Mind, but not actually perceived. It is certain, all those ancient Philofophers, who believed Præexistence, who were both the greatest Numbers, and the wifeft Men, whether Jews or Heathens, could not believe that the Soul came into the World stript of all Ideas: Nor did any Philofophers of old teach this, but those who niade the whole World, and the Souls of Men, nothing but Matter; and then there could be no higher Principle of Knowledge, than external Impreffions. Mr. Lock will not own that all Knowledge is owing to external Impreffions, but requires a Knowing Intelligent Principle to form its Ideas; but fuch a Knowing Principle, as has no Innate Ideas, or Seeds of Knowledge: And let this be either Spirit or Matter, if it have nothing within, it must have it from without. And thus all the Objections against the Old Atheistick Hypothefis, are chargeable upon him; though I will not charge them upon him, because he difowns thofe Atheistick Principles, for the fake of which this Hypothefis was originally invented, and without which, it is worth nothing, and ferves no End. And I am afraid our modern Atheists will own and magnify his Hypothefis; and whether he will or no, make ufe of his Hypothefis, or as much of it as they please, to confute thofe Principles of Religion and Virtue which he owns. For after all, there is not a more formidable Objection against Religion, than to teach, That Mankind is made without any Connate Natural Impreffions and Ideas of a God, and of Good and Evil: For if all the Knowledge we have of God, and of Good and Evil, be made by our felves, ́ Atheists will eafily conclude, that it is only the Effect
Effect of Education, and Superftitious Fears; and fatisfy themselves, that they can make other Notions, more for the Eafe and Security of Life. This is certain, no Man who believes that the Ideas of God, and of Good and Evil, were originally imprefs'd on our Minds when they were firft made, can doubt whether there be a God, or an effential Difference between Good and Evil. Those who believe thefe Notions were made, and not born with us, are more at Liberty to question their Truth. And the general Reason why Men are so zealous against these Ideas being Innate, is to deliver themfelves from the Neceffity of Believing any Thing of God or Religion.
This may be thought a very long Digreffion, and very improper for common Readers: And I grant it is fo; and those who are not accustomed to fuch Philofophical Speculations, may easily pafs it by; but it was neceffary to make good my prefent Argument against fuch Pretences. For if the Soul of Man has no Inbred Knowledge, it is in vain to talk of the Light, and Voice, and Senfe of Nature; if it has, then the universal Confent of Mankind can be reasonably attributed to no other Caufe; and then the Immortality of the Soul must be the Voice and Sense of Nature. There have been indeed a great many wicked and abfurd Practices that have prevail'd in the World; fuch as Polytheifin and Idolatry, and the idle and fabulous Stories concerning the different States of good and bad Men in the next Life. But these are manifeft Corruptions of our Natural Notions. of God, and Religion, and another Life: And therefore when all the World, excepting the Jews, were Idolaters, yet they did not agree in the Gods they worshipped, nor in the Rites and Ceremo
nies of their Worship, nor in their Accounts of the other World: And therefore fuch corrupt Do&trines and Practices cannot pretend to fuch an Univerfal Confent, as the Being of a God, and a Future State, and therefore cannot pretend neither, to be the Voice of Nature.
3. And now I need add but a very few Words, to prove that the Voice of Nature is a Natural Proof of Immortality. For if Nature teaches the Immortality of the Soul, that is certainly a Natural Proof. And if we believe that God made us,. that he is the Author of our Nature, and of all Natural Impreffions and Notions, this gives great Strength to this Argument: For we cannot believe that God, who is Eternal Truth, would deceive us, by any fuch Natural Impreffion, into the Belief of our Immortality, had he made us Mortal. I'm fure this ought to be a very perfuafive Argument to those who talk fo much and fo highly of Natural Reafon : For if they will act agreeably with themselves, they muft believe and difbelieve, chuse and refuse with Nature. To believe against Nature, is to put off Nature; and when they cease to reason and believe as Men, it is Time to. leave difputing with them, for we have no common Principles to Reafon on.
The Immortality of the Soul prov'd, from the Natural Defires of Immortality, and the Justice of the Divine Providence.
Nother Natural and Moral Argument for the Immortality of the Soul, is that DeH 3