A second factor which covaries with short-term and long-term spying is recruitment and volunteering to commit espionage. Duration of espionage and whether the individual volunteered or was recruited is known for 105 of the 131 cases. Table 7 shows there are 81 short-term spies and 24 long-term spies. Of the 81 short-term spies, 78% volunteered while 22% were recruited. Of the 24 long-term spies, 54% volunteered while 46% were recruited. So spies appear to do less well when they volunteer than if they are recruited.

Perhaps being recruited gives new spies the immediate attention of experienced foreign intelligence service personnel to provide training in techniques in the first activities of espionage, and this may account for the greater survival rate of recruits (46% long-term vs. 22% short-term).

Table 7

Short-term and Long-Term Spies by Volunteer or Recruit

Motives vary somewhat between short-term and long-term spies. A crosstabulation of the variables motive for espionage 39 and duration of espionage is illustrated in Table 8. Unfortunately, the sample size for long-term spies is rather small, so we have to be cautious about making generalizations. However, money is still the dominant motive, followed by disgruntlement/revenge (16%) for the short-term spies and ideology (19%) for the long-term ones. Overall, the patterns of motives appear fairly similar for both groups.

39 The stated motive was recoded into the six most common motives (derived motive) to simplify the analysis.

• For eight cases where ideology was the motive and for one case each where money and revenge
were motives, there was no information on duration of espionage.

Geographical Concentrations of Espionage

A picture of the geographical concentrations of espionage can be drawn when we know where the 131 incidents of espionage occurred. Of the 72 cases in which the U.S. location is known, Washington, DC, with 15% of the cases is the most popular city for espionage; New York City and Norfolk, VA, are next with 7% of the cases each. Given the concentration of Defense Department facilities, intelligence agencies, and other agencies of the federal government in these three areas, it is not surprising that more cases would occur there.

Aggregating the locations of espionage into regions and localities yields a more general picture. Figure 14 shows that the Mid-Atlantic region, defined to include New York, Maryland, Washington, DC, and northern Virginia, had the most espionage cases (44%). California is next with 24%, reflecting that state's increasing importance as a center for defense industries. These two regions also represent the areas where Soviet diplomats are permitted to operate: at the United Nations in New York, at the embassy in Washington, and at the large consulate in San Francisco. It is also possible that more espionage cases are discovered in these regions simply because more counterintelligence resources are directed toward these lucrative areas.

Figure 15 shows the 37 known locations of espionage by Americans outside the United States. West Germany, with its large contingent of Americans with military duties, had the most instances of Americans betraying American secrets, with 32% of the cases; Japan with 11% was next.

Figure 16 lists the countries receiving information through espionage against the United States. Not surprisingly during the Cold War period, the country receiving the most information from espionage by Americans has been the Soviet Union; 63% of the cases directed information to the USSR. In another 11% of the cases information was sent to Warsaw Pact countries, from which it most likely was shared with the USSR. Thus 74% of the cases ultimately benefited the USSR. In 14% of the cases there was no recipient, usually because the person was apprehended before he or she could make the transfer. The remainder of cases are a miscellany: three Arab countries and China benefited from one case each, and South Africa from two. Five

close allies of the United States gained information from espionage in at least one instance: Great Britain, Israel, Holland, and the Philippines.40

Table 9 shows how the pattern of recruitment and volunteering has changed over time. For the 107 cases where we have information, recruitment and volunteering were equal during the the 1940s, and there is even a slight shift toward recruitment in the 50s. However, the three decades since 1960 have seen a dramatic shift towards volunteering, culminating in the 80s with almost 90% of the cases volunteering.

40 The three Arab countries were Egypt (Mrs. Ahadi, pseudonym), Syria (Richard Hughes Barrett), and Libya (Waldo H. Dubberstein). The spies who provided information to South Africa were Stephen Anthony Baba and Thomas Joseph Dolce and to China, Larry Wu-Tai Chin, Great Britain received classified materials from Samual Loring Morison, Israel from Jonathan J. Pollard, Holland from Joseph S. Petersen, and the Philippines from Michael N. Allen.