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the Committee is now just beginning. Senator Cohen and I will, as we always do, seek to generate consensus and to see what can be realistically done. We will consult with our colleagues on the Judiciary Committee. As I have indicated, Senator Biden, Senato Thurmond, Senator Leahy and several others indicated they hoped they would be here today. They are following our progress with interest. We have already had some discussions with them as well as with Members of the House Intelligence Committee.

We will make changes. Undoubtedly we will change some of the ideas presented to us. And above all, we will ensure that the Committee's final views preserve and protect the First Amendment Rights of every American including those who choose to work in some of our Nation's most sensitive national security positions.

We understand that our responsibility is not only to guard against espionage, protect against it, deter it, but also to make sure that the legitimate constitutional rights of Americans are not infringed and that we do not take actions that are unnecessarily intrusive into the lives of others. The Panel has shown very great sensitivity to those values and we appreciate that very much.

Let me say also, since we've commenced, our colleagues Congressman Dornan and Congressman Livingston, have arrived from the House of Representatives. We welcome you and are very glad that you could be with us today.

I'll turn now to Senator Cohen for any remarks that he might like to make before we hear from the Panel.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to echo your words of praise. This Panel has taken its charge very seriously. Taking time out of their busy days-and weekends I might add, especially in the case of the Acting Chairman Eli Jacobs, they have come to grips with a complicated subject, and I think have come up with a number of good ideas in an area which needed some fresh thinking. I was privileged to sit in on a number of their weekday and weekend sessions, and was impressed by the seriousness with which they went about their work, and the caliber of the discussion.

I think it demonstrates that it is still possible to draw upon a council of wise men, unencumbered by bureaucracies or partisanship, who can produce results that we would never see emerge from the government itself.

And let me just follow up on a point you alluded to, Mr. Chairman. To those who would say, this is all well and good, but, your timing is off. The Cold War is over. Why now? To which we must respond-if not now, when? After the next Felix Bloch? Or the next Craig Kunkle or Henry Otto Spade?

In the past, people betrayed their country out of ideological zeal. But the days of Philby, Burgess, MacLean, Blount, and the Rosenbergs are over. Now our Nation's secrets are sold at the espionage bazaar to the most generous buyer.

More spies have been named during the last 10 years than ever before in our history. They have been clerks, analysts, counterespionage specialists, cryptanalysts, officers and enlisted personnel from every one of our military services. They are not high-profile, derring-do agents of spy fiction fame, but faceless, unglamorous individuals who have access to our most important secrets. They are

what authors Tom Allen and Norman Polmar call our Merchants of Treason. And we seem to be capable of detecting them when some family member turns them in, they surrender or when a Soviet defector discloses their identities.

John Walker, a Navy radioman, operated a spy ring for 17 years before his former wife-no femme fatale out of Robert Ludlum or Len Deighton's novels-but a woman who worked for a time at a local shoe factory in Maine for $2.65 an hour, turned him in. Without Barbara Walker's phone call to the FBI, John Walker would in all probability still be jeopardizing the lives of every American so that he could profit.

I might note parenthetically that Walker equates himself with the skullduggery of certain Wall Street traders. He did no more than Ivan Boesky-trade a little inside information. What Walker, Whitworth, Howard, Pelton and others did was strike a Faustian bargain of sorts-they traded our lives for cash, undermining our deterrent against war, enabling our adversaries to neutralize the very heart of our strength.

And again, it is suggested that this is all behind us. The Cold War is over. John LeCarre has written that the days of George Smiley and Karla are history. It is time to face new enemiesdrugs, terrorism, poverty, brush fire wars, and the pollution of our planet. Many spies will indeed come in from the cold, but unfortunately many more will bask and flourish in the warm sun of our new relationship with the USSR and East European nations-not to mention some of our closest allies.

The Era of the Cloak and Dagger may be over, but the cloaks are likely to multiply and become even more pervasive in their effort to procure military, industrial and commercial secrets.

The proposals recommended by the Jacobs Panel will not put an end to espionage. They are designed to do three things. Deter U.S. citizens from spying. Detect those who are not deterred. Help prosecute those who trade our security for their own enrichment.

There are legitimate questions that have been raised about rights of privacy. The subject is not a trivial one and we must always remain sensitive to the fact that we do not want to Stalinize our Intelligence Community in the name of national security. Access to our Nation's secrets is a privilege-one that must be more carefully granted and more carefully guarded. It is our responsibility to seek and strike the appropriate balance between guarding the right of privacy against those who would betray our Nation. I believe that balance has been struck.

And so as I join in commending the Panel. I think you've done an outstanding public service. And I believe that this Committee and other committees who share jurisdiction are going to be very, very indebted to the work product that you have brought before us. Chairman BOREN. Thank you very much, Senator Cohen.

Let me ask Senator Warner, do you have any opening comments that you would like to make?

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I compliment the Chair and the Ranking Member for, I think, very accurately characterizing the sentiment of gratitude that this Committee has towards these outstanding men.

Like a great chain, America can be no stronger than its weakest link. And one of those weak links is the ability to cope with espionage.

And as Senator Cohen said, we are fortunate to have seven of the wisest men bring to bear their collective experience and judgment to help the Congress solve this problem.

Thank you, gentlemen.

I have a statement for the record.

[The statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED Statement of SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Today, we welcome Mr. Eli Jacobs, Chairman of the Committee's Counterintelligence Advisory Panel, to provide the Panel's recommendations on strengthening our country's counterintelligence laws. Joining Mr. Jacobs at the table are two other distinguished members of the Panel-Admiral Bobby Inman, who needs no introduction, and Professor Harold Edgar, a specialist in counterintelligence law at Columbia University.

I welcome these witnesses and the other distinguished members of the Panel sitting behind them-Lloyd Cutler, Warren Christopher, Sol Linowitz, A.B. Culvahouse, and Seymour Weiss. I thank all of you for the excellent service which you have performed in preparing these 13 recommendations for our consideration.

I also wish to thank my Chairman and Vice Chairman for constituting this Panel. Given the flood of espionage cases we have experienced over the recent years, reviewing the adequacy of current laws is the right thing to do at the right time. As the committee has noted, critical damage has been done by American spies who have sold military, intelligence, and diplomatic information to foreign countries. So much information has been passed to foreign countries it could fill a good size room, and it has covered every conceivable category of information--strategic and tactical reconnaissance systems, human sources, advanced weapon systems, and military war plans.

Simply put, Mr. Chairman, we need to insure that our laws provide for effective counterintelligence, and the Panel's recommendations seek to insure that they do. At the same time, I understand that as they selected and crafted the 13 recommendations, the Panel paid particular attention to insuring that the liberties to which our American citizens who hold government positions are entitled will be protected. This is important, because the vast, vast majority of these people are honest, patriotic Americans who would never dream of betraying their country.

With these opening remarks, I look forward to hearing from the witnesses and working with the members of this committee to draft legislation which meets the twin goals of strengthening our counterintelligence laws while maintaining the basic rights of our government employees.

Chairman BOREN. Thank you very much.

Senator Danforth?

Senator DANFORTH. Mr. Chairman, you and Senator Cohen have spoken very well for me. And I just want to express also my appreciation for the work of these people. We seem to go back to the same wells over and over again for public service. And these are very good wells and we appreciate what you produced. Thank you. Chairman BOREN. Thank you very much, Senator Danforth. Well, again, I express my appreciation to the Panel.

Mr. Jacobs, you served as Chairman and coordinator of this Panel for which we are very grateful. We'd welcome your opening remarks and I understand you may want to then turn to Admiral Inman and Professor Edgar to give more of a detailed summary of the recommendations. We welcome you.

TESTIMONY OF ELI JACOBS

Mr. JACOBS. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman it is a pleasure to be with you today.

At the request of Senators Boren and Cohen, our Panel began approximately 6 months ago to review the laws and policies affecting the counterespionage activities of the United States. This effort was motivated by the large number of very serious espionage cases that have damaged virtually every area of our national security over the last 20 years. We sought to determine whether new legislation might improve our ability to deter, detect and prosecute such cases in the future. Today we present to you the initial results of our review.

It is important that the Committee understand at the outset how we defined our role.

First, we addressed the counterintelligence problem within the existing organizational framework. We did not examine the need for changes to that framework.

Second, we determined at the outset that we would not address the problem of unauthorized disclosure of classified information to the media. We do not deny that leaks are a problem, but attempts to deal with them inevitably raise special constitutional concerns that we hoped to avoid by limiting the scope of our efforts to dealing with classical espionage.

Third, our focus has been on legislative remedies, and we have approached that subject cautiously. We recommend no changes to the basic espionage statutes set forth in Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798. These are now old statutes whose clarity in some respects leaves something to be desired. But given the large amount of existing case law interpreting these statutes, there is no compelling reason to amend them.

Instead, we've taken the approach that such statutes should be supplemented by additional laws that address shortcomings identified by experience. The recommendations we are presenting today are largely based on a study of cases that have occurred since 1970. They are designed to tackle some of the problems in deterrence, detection and prosecution that were identified by our study.

Finally, we have attempted to craft proposals that avoid serious civil liberties concerns. Clearly, there is a balance to be struck in this area between the need of the Government to protect national security information and the need to protect the constitutional rights of all of our citizens, including those who choose to work for the Government in sensitive positions. We believe that it is possible to do so.

The post-World War II security and counterintelligence establishment always assumed that there would be hostile penetration of our national security system, and that Communist ideology was the principal motive for betrayal.

The past 20 years indicate that the main threat is not the ideologically motivated agent but rather the volunteer spy, the insider who betrays his country not from belief, but for money or revenge.

Some of our proposals are aimed at deterring such conduct before it occurs. Others are designed to detect such conduct as it occurs, for example, by identifying employees with access to TOP SECRET data who experience either sudden wealth or face financial ruin. As the world continues to grow more complex, so must our responses in order to meet the espionage challenge.

The question that is raised is why, at this juncture in history, when relations with the Soviet Union are undergoing a significant change and democracy seems to be sweeping across Eastern Europe, must we energize our effort against the counterespionage threat.

First, there is no indication of a decrease in the espionage activities directed against the United States by the Soviets. Second, other traditional intelligence adversaries, such as China and Cuba, will continue to pose serious counterintelligence threats to our national security. Third, there are increasing indications that new forms of economic espionage may be joining classical espionage as a necessary object of our concern. In short, there appears to be no abatement in espionage either now or on the horizon.

Admiral Inman will describe the process our Panel went through in analyzing the post-1970 espionage cases. The cumulative damage assessment demonstrates that intelligence activities against the United States caused grievous damage during this period. Espionage losses have affected a full range of U.S. national security interests, including strategic and tactical reconnaissance programs, human and signals intelligence sources and methods, advanced weapons systems and technology, and military war plans and capabilities. We believe this history provides a compelling set of reasons for the proposed legislation. It is our hope that changes in the legislative framework dealing with counterintelligence will deter such crimes in the future.

Professor Harold Edgar will then explain where the cases have led us and summarize each of the 13 legislative proposals. Upon Professor Edgar's conclusion, we will turn to the Committee's questions and all Panel members are urged to participate in the re

sponses.

Admiral Inman?

Admiral INMAN. Thank you, Mr. Jacobs. And, Mr. Chairman, if I may submit my statement for the record to be included. [The prepared statement of Admiral Inman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL INMAN

Mr. Chairman, the purpose of my statement is to present the results of a review of the major espionage cases which have occurred since 1975. That review was a principal basis for the legislative proposals we are making to the Committee.

Before beginning a discussion of the cases, let me make two introductory points. First, as we looked at how the government has dealt with counterintelligence, we found a process that was oriented toward trying to detect individuals who were either ideologically sympathetic with our principal adversaries or who were susceptible to being blackmailed into committing espionage. We set out to go through the cases and determine whether that was, in fact, the basis upon which people became involved in espionage.

Second, we looked at how the government tried to deal with each of the cases in four specific areas-deterrence of individuals who might be inclined to engage in espionage, detection of them if they did become engaged, assessment of the damage done from their espionage, and finally prosecution.

As we approached the agencies, we received truly great cooperation and candor. It turned out that they had not gone through all the past cases in this systematic way with the objective of trying to understand the lessons to be learned and detecting patterns of activity where legislation might have made a difference. The agencies did a first-rate job in working with us, and they will tell you that they have now begun thinking about these problems in a very different way. In analyzing the cases we tried to concentrate on the largest problems. The question was not how to detect

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