tions to earnings from other sources which cannot be described as "contracts of service" must not be included. Consequently, military service has to be viewed in the same light as a "contract. of service" before pay in respect thereof can be taken into consideration. Were it not, therefore, for the decision of the Court of Appeal, which was affirmed by the House of Lords, in Brandy v. Owners of Steamship Raphael (105 L. T. Rep. 116; (1911) A. C. (413), more difficulty might have been experienced in coming to a conclusion as to how military pay ought to be treated. But that decision was that a retainer paid to a workman as a member of the Royal Naval Reserve must be regarded as "earnings" under a "concurrent contract of service," the reason being that in return for such payment the services of the workman may be required at any time. A fortiori, military pay comes within the statutory language. In Thomson v. John Watson, Limited (1916, S. C. 23; 53 Sc. L. Rep. 55; 9 B. W. C. C. 428), however, it was held by the Court of Session in Scotland that suitability of employment implies an industrial or commercial employment, and, if an injured workman in receipt of compensation enlists in the army, the arbitrator on an application to review the weekly payment payable ought to determine what suitable employment in the industrial sphere the workman could engage in having regard to his health. That authority was relied on by the learned County Court judge in the present case in support of his decision in favor of the workman. But the Court of Appeal declined to accept that case as governing the question which they had to determine. It afforded really, said the Master of the Rolls (Swinfen Eady), no ground for the conclusion to which the learned County Court judge came, and the reasons for distinguishing it seem quite incapable of being taken exception to.

HIRE-PURCHASE AND "TRUE OWNER" OF CHATTELS.-The circumstances which gave rise to the question that was argued in the recent case of Lewis v. Thomas (118 L. T. Rep. 689) are, from their nature, probably of frequent occurrence. Personal chattels have been comprised in a bill of sale which are the subject-matter of a hire-purchase agreement from the very time that such instruments ever came into usage. And the consequences of that proceeding must constantly have created difficulty. It is certainly remarkable, therefore, that no authority directly in point was capable of being cited to assist the learned judges of the Divisional Court, Justices Avory and Shearman, in arriving at their decision on that question. The nearest case, seemingly, was Lee v. Butler (69 L. T. Rep. 370; (1893) 2 Q. B. 318), decided by the Court of Appeal. But inasmuch as in that case there was an absolute agreement to purchase-as appears from what was said concerning it in Helby v. Matthews (72 L. T. Rep. 841; (1895) A. C. 471) when it was distinguished by the House of Lords-whereas in the present case there was merely an option to purchase by the hirer of the chattels, Mr. Justice Avery did not consider that the principle of Lee v. Butler (ubi sup.) governed the present case. The hirer was in effect, therefore, a bailee with an option to purchase the chattels. Was he the "true owner" of the chattels, within the meaning of sect. 5 of the Bills of Sale Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 19), so as to entitle him to grant a bill of sale over them which would be valid, not only as against the grantor, but also as against other individuals likewise? The argument in support of that view, founded on Re Field; Ex parte Pratt (7 Mor. 132) as an authority for the proposition that "true owner" includes equitable owner, and on Woodall v. Clifton (93 L. T. Rep. 257; (1905) 2 Ch. 257), as showing that a mere option to purchase is a form of property, did not find any favor with the learned judges of the Divisional Court. Indeed, their Lordships were not quite satisfied that even

the grantor of a bill of sale, who has entered into an agreement resembling that discussed in Lee v. Butler (ubi sup.), is the "true owner" of the chattels described in the schedule thereto. In any event, they regarded a person who has a mere option to purchase as entirely outside the definition of "true owner." As was remarked by Mr. Justice Shearman, there is no case which goes so far as to say that a bailee with an option of that description is the "true owner" of the chattels to which his contract of bailment relates. "He merely has the right to call for the property from the true owner," added his Lordship. There undoubtedly seems to be every reason for treating such a bailee as standing upon an utterly different footing from a trustee who, in Re Sarl; Ex parte Williams (67 L. T. Rep. 597; (1892) 2 Q. B. 591), because he was the legal owner of chattels, was held to be the "true owner" thereof. Similarly, with regard to a person who has a beneficial interest, as in Re Tamplin; Ex parte Barnett (62 L. T. Rep. 264). Cases like those tend to emphasize the impropriety that there would be in placing a bailee with a mere option to purchase in the same category as the persons there dealt with.

THE ABSENCE OF THE SOVEREIGN FROM THE REALM.-The visit of President Wilson to Europe will break the record as the first occasion on which a President of the United States during his term of office has left America, although in two instances Presidents on national business have left the United States during their terms of office. Both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft, as Presidents of the United States, visited Panama. There is no provision in the Constitution of the United States by which a President is precluded from leaving the country. By one of the articles of the English Act of Settlement it is provided "that no person who shall hereafter come to the possession of this Crown shall go out of the dominions of England, Scotland, or Ireland without consent of Parliament.". This article was, however, repealed very soon after the accession of George I. (1 Geo. 1, c. 51), whose frequent journeys to Hanover were an abuse of the graciousness with which the Parliament consented to cancel the restriction. President Wilson, in his address to Congress before his departure for Europe, promised that he would not be inaccessible in domestic matters while he was absent. Mr. George Wickersham, a former Attorney-General for the United States, argued that it might be necessary, if President Wilson absented himself from Washington, to intrust the Vice-President with the duties of the President. `Modern facilities of communication will, however, in all probability render such a step, were it feasible, unnecessary, if we may take by way of analogy the constitutional practice of England in the case of the absence of the Sovereign. The absence of the King until recent times was met by the appointment of one or more persons to transact the formal business of government in his absence. The appointment of Lords Justices under the Great Seal began with the absence of William III. after the death of Mary, who during her short reign had been given power by statute to exercise the Royal prerogative whenever William was out of England. This, however, did not disentitle William from exercising Royal powers when abroad: (2 Will. & Mary, st. 1, c. 6.) The last instances of an appointment of a Regent for this purpose were in 1716, when the Prince of Wales, and in 1732, when Queen Caroline occupied that position. On other occasions Lords Justices have been appointed under the Great Seal, with powers specified in the letters patent which gave them their commission. This has not been done since 1821, on the occasion of a short visit of George IV. to the Continent. The fact that the Sovereign is absent from the realm does not impair the validity of an executive act done during such absence, and modern facilities of com

munication have enabled the King to give the Royal Assent to Bills by commission, and to transact other business without inconvenience to the conduct of government during his absence. On August 7, 1845, it was stated by Lord Lyndhurst, who was then Lord Chancellor, in reply to a criticism by Lord Campbell on the neglect of the appointment of Lords Justices on the occasion of the visit of Queen Victoria to Germany, that "any act which her Majesty could do as Sovereign would have as much validity and effect if done on the continent of Europe as if done in her own dominions"; while Lord Chancellor Cairns, in 1876, gave it as his opinion privately, as recorded by Sir Erskine May, that Her Majesty would be able to give the Royal Assent to Bills while absent from the Realm, and that course has been followed whenever the necessity arose.

Obiter Dicta

A BACKSLIDER.-Went v. Methodist Church, 80 Hun 266. NOT A FASHIONABLE CHURCH.-Church v. Stiles, 59 Vt. 642. THE KAISER'S VAIN PRAYER.-State ex rel. Pray v. Yankee, 129 Wis. 662.

CORPORATE EUGENICS.-"Clearly the law does not permit the stockholders to create a sterilized board of directors."-Per Collin, J., in Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313.

THE CY PRÈS DOCTRINE.-In Foye v. Southard, 64 Me. 389, a witness testified: "He said, 'You take what you have got and go to hell with it.' I did not know the way to hell and so I went to Boston with it."

BY NAME BUT NOT BY NATURE.-Being not at all influenced by his odd name, the plaintiff in Shirk v. Adams, 130 Fed. 441, did not hesitate to hale the defendant into court for attempting to shirk the payment of Shirk's rent.

A VOICE IN THE NIGHT.-In Com. v. Williams, 105 Mass. 62, a witness testified that one Ball "had a very interesting, manly, pleasant, smooth, gentle, handsome voice," and that by it he recognized him as the person who entered his room at midnight and said: "Keep still or you are a dead man."

BLACKSTONE IN COMIC OPERA.-The lilting collocation of relationships in Pinafore, "And so do his sisters, and his cousins and his aunts," may be found ipsissimis verbis in Blackstone's chapter on Coparcenary. Was Gilbert, the lawyer-librettist, guilty of conscious cribbing or of unconscious cerebration?

IN DISGRACE.-A "constant reader" protests to us against the perpetuation of the detested word "Hun" by continuing to use it in citing a certain set of New York reports. His criticism, however, as is usual in such cases, is purely destructive. Can any of our readers suggest a suitable appellation as a substitute?

SIC TRANSIT GLORIA MUNDI.-The Altoona, Pa., Times of December 12, 1918, contained the following item: "The District Attorney of the city of New York is going to emulate the actions of his famous-for-a-season predecessor, Jerome T. Jerome, and get his name in the newspapers in connection with the world's most famous lunatic, Harry K. Thaw."

BY WAY OF SUGGESTION?-"It is possibly not beyond comprehension that pictures of slop sinks, washbowls, and bath tubs

may, in localities where such conveniences are not in common use, be the means of instruction and of advancement in

knowledge of the arts."-Per Jenkins, J., in J. L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 82 Fed. 316.

STARTING LIFE WITH A SLIGHT HANDICAP.-In Kathreiner's Malzkaffee Fabriken, etc., v. Pastor Kneipp Medicine Co., 82 Fed. 321, the court remarked by way of introduction: "Upon the record, we are constrained to believe that the Pastor Kneipp Medicine Company, the appellee, was 'conceived in sin and brought forth in iniquity,' that Wrong attended at its birth, and that Fraud stood sponsor at its christening, imposing upon the corporate child a name to which it was not entitled, and which it had no right to bear."

"THE WIND BLOWETH," ETC.-In Matter of Adams v. New York, etc., R. Co., 220 N. Y. 579, Pound, J., is reported to have said: "In the present perfect stage of vital statistics the probable number of widows of a given age out of a given number who will remarry in a given period may be determined with essential accuracy." We dissent. Quite apart from the fact that the learned judge seems to have overlooked the dogma that it takes two to make a bargain, we beg to remind him that nothing even approximately certain can be foretold respecting any living woman, widow or otherwise.

IS HE RIGHT?-In Bell v. Burlington, 34 Ont. L. Rep. 622, Mr. Justice Riddell of the Supreme Court of Ontario says: "We must carefully distinguish the meaning of the word 'unconstitutional' in British and in American usage. In our usage, that

is unconstitutional which is opposed to the principles, more or less vaguely and generally stated, upon which we think the people should be governed; in the American sense, it is that which transgresses the written document called the 'Constitution.' With us, anything unconstitutional is wrong, though it may be legal; with them, it is illegal, though it may be right."

DID HE MEAN IT?-In Seaver v. Ransom, 180 N. Y. App. Div. 736, a will was involved whereby the testatrix left the bulk of her property to a society for the prevention of cruelty to animals. Commenting thereon, Kellogg, P. J., said: "It does not appear that a dog, a cat, a bird or any animal at any time had a home in the Beman house, or that she ever showed any particular interest in animals. Unexplained, we cannot understand why she should disinherit her sisters and practically overlook her favorite niece, who for many years had been treated by her and her husband as their daughter, and throw her property to the dogs."

MONKEYING WITH THE LAW.-At the last regular session of the Washington State Bar Association, the Chairman of the Committee on Code Revision, Mr. Lee C. Delle, called attention to a most remarkable and amusing illustration of the need of revision in the laws of that state. Referring to the Index to the Session Laws for 1917, he said:

"Turning over to page 865, under the heading of 'Crimes and Punishments,' sub-heading 'Coal Mines,' we find this reference: 'Monkeying with credit slips,' Chap. 36, Sec. 201, page 176. In turning to the aforesaid section we read that it is made a misdemeanor for any person to change, exchange, alter or move any number or other device or sign used to indicate or identify the person to whom credit is due for mining or loading coal, etc. Now, just why such an incongruous and zqölogical term as 'monkeying' should be used in connection with 'slips' is not at all apparent."

With which conclusion, we are inclined to believe every one of our readers will agree.

THE LAW AS IT IS NOT.-Doubtless many of us have, on occasion, wondered just what "standing in court," so to speak, the

so-called unreported case has. There does not seem ever to have been a clear elucidation of the doctrine of unreported cases. And we must confess, with all due respect, that a recent pronunciamento of the Tennessee Supreme Court, though probably intended as an explanation, leaves us still wandering in the dark. In the case of Phoenix Cotton, Oil Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 205 S. W. 128, the court said with reference to a case which counsel had cited for its consideration: "The opinion was not ordered published in our reports. It remained, therefore, under the rule of this court, only the opinion of the judge who filed it, and valuable merely for its reasoning, although the judgment rendered in the case was the judgment of the whole court. The court does not encourage the citing of the unpublished opinions of its members, and never refers to them unless compelled to do so by a reference of counsel thereto." Suffice it to say with respect to the doctrine thus promulgated that the correspondent to whom we are indebted for a citation of the case declares that he is reminded thereby of the following story: "It is related of Senator E. W. Carmack, who practised law at Columbia, Tennessee, that a country darky once came to his office and said: 'Mr. Carmack, there is a nigger named Sam Webster who I told to keep away from my home. Last Friday I came to town and when I went home about dark there he was setting in my house by the fire talking to my wife Mandy. What can I do wid him?' 'Shoot him,' replied Mr. Carmack. 'And if I shoots him, Mr. Carmack, what can dey do wid me?' 'Hang you," said Carmack. Fo God, Mr. Carmack, what kind of a lawyer is you?' said Henry as he left the office."

Correspondence

TWO-THIRDS OF CONGRESS.

To the Editor of LAW NOTES.

SIR: Tuesday, January 7th, Chief Justice White, speaking for the Supreme Court, handed down a sweeping decision on what constitutes two-thirds of Congress. United States District Judge Howard C. Hollister, of Cincinnati, had rendered an opinion on the same question on Saturday, January 4th. The opinion was so complete and logical that it convinced everyone who read it as to what the ultimate decision would be when it reached the United States Supreme Court. Inasmuch as the Court of Last Resort had never passed on the question directly, Judge Hollister's decision will be one of the judicial landmarks. Both the District and the Supreme Courts refused to decide the case on the well recognized authority, that a resolution or bill properly certified imports absolute verity. The court was possibly influenced to decide the case on its merits because of the importance of the question now before the people. Chief Justice White in a characteristic, convincing opinion said:

"The identity between the provision of Article V of the Constitution, giving the power by a two-thirds vote to submit amendments, and the requirements we are considering as to the twothirds vote necessary to override a veto, makes the practice as to the one applicable to the other.

"At the first session of the first Congress in 1789 a consideration of the provision authorizing the submission of amendments necessarily arose in the submission by Congress of the first ten amendments to the Constitution enbodying a bill of rights. They were all adopted and submitted by each House organized as a legislative body pursuant to the Constitution, by less than the

vote which would have been necessary had the constitutional provision been given the significance now attributed to it. . . . "The construction which was thus given to the Constitution in dealing with a matter of such vast importance, and which was necessarily sanctioned by the States and all the people, has governed as to every amendment to the Constitution submitted from that day to this. This is not disputed and we need not stop to refer to the precedents demonstrating its accuracy. . . . "In consequence of the identity in principle between the rule applicable to amendments to the Constitution and that controlling in passing a bill over a veto, the rule of two-thirds of a quorum has been universally applied as to the two-thirds vote essential to pass a bill over a veto. In passing from the subject, however, we again direct attention to the fact that in both cases the continued application of the rule was the result of no mere formal following of what had gone before but came from conviction expressed, after deliberation, as to its correctness by many illustrious men."

This case disposed of the last legal objection to the action of the states in ratifying the Federal Prohibition Amendment. The day the decision was rendered, three states ratified the amendment, and enough other states to make the necessary 36 states will doubtless act favorably within the next ten days. The day after Chief Justice White rendered his opinion on the Webb Kenyon Act in the first hearing, the United States Senate passed the District of Columbia Prohibition Bill and then followed a long list of victories for Prohibition. It is a coincident that this decision came on the day that the last great drive started to complete ratification of National Prohibition.

Washington, D. C.

WAYNE B. WHEELER.

"It is part of the American creed-expressed in the chart of our liberties that all men are created equal before the law. In the administration of justice, neither race, rank, nor riches confers any advantage on its possessor over any other person. These accidents are not permitted to mar the wisdom and purity of laws made for the equal protection of every human being. Upon this principle we have builded, on this continent, the fairest fabric of freedom which has met the eye of Time."-Per Bond, J., in Whirlwind v. Von der Ahe, 67 Mo. App. 630.

"In this country every man is equal before the law, and in our courts the rich man, or the man of power and influence, stands on the same level as the friendless and impoverished man. If he does not, our courts do not measure up to the high standard required by the people who have created them and invested them with power."-Per Roberts, C. J., in Gurule v. Duran, 20 N. Mex. 355.

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Amendments

If We Break Faith
Americanization

"The Likes of They"

Conscientious Scruples
Military Sentences

Rehabilitation and Work

men's Compensation

Marriage by Letter

CONTENTS

PAGE

ARTICLES:

PAGE

Shipping Laws 225 Naturalization after the War 227 Confiscation of Private Prop

221

221

222

Color of a Changed Constitution

223

CASES OF INTEREST

223

224

224

ENGLISH NOTES

OBITER DICTA

HERE are few Americans who have not been moved by that verse which depicts the dying soldiers of our allies passing on to us the torch of world freedom with the injunction that if we fail they will not sleep "though poppies bloom in Flanders fields." We did not fail; at Chateau Thierry and Sedan we kept faith with the heroes of Ypres and Verdun. Are we keeping equal faith with the heroes of Lexington and Bunker Hill? Has blood no claim upon us because for a century the flowers have bloomed on the soil where it was spilled? soldiers of the revolution made possible a "new order of the ages," a government "of the people, for the people, and by the people." Dying they left the world's first great republic in trust to the generations to follow. They looked forward to the day when it would be a place of

The

Ratification of Constitutional Amendments.

W HATEVER may eventually be ruled on the point that the ratification of a federal constitutional amendment must be submitted to a popular vote in states where the referendum exists, it is to be hoped that the next constitutional amendment will be one requiring all such amendments to be ratified by popular vote. A marked distrust of the popular vote pervaded the constitution as originally written. The electoral college the people speed ily forced into a reflection of the popular will. The election of United States Senators was taken from the state legislatures by constitutional amendment. Were amendments of the constitution more frequent, the legislative power to ratify would long since have been abrogated in favor of a popular vote. We have recently had the spectacle of a constitutional amendment being ratified by the legislatures in states where it would never have commanded a popular majority-for instance in California where, shortly before, prohibition was defeated by an overwhelming majority. The acceptance of the decision of the majority of the people is the very foundation of a republic. But to secure that acceptance the decision must be that of a majority, and not a minority decision read into the law of the land by a manipulation of machinery. Had the latest amendment been ratified by popular vote there would be no talk of a nationwide strike against prohibition. The American people have always acquiesced in the decision of a majority, even after a heated and bitter campaign, and will always do so. This time, when our Bolsheviki are clamoring that we have no genuine popular government, is poorly chosen for an

would they have thought had they known that men who fled to our shores from foreign oppression would find their first use of our language in vilifying our government and that Americans would tolerate it? To-day there are men of foreign birth in our land calling their organizations "soviets" because there is no word in our language to describe the kind of institution which they hope to see displace our constitution. Our government was not perfect at its foundation; it has developed and must continue to develop. But in its structure and essence it is the best that the world has seen within the memory of man, and nothing but the example of a better government in actual operation can justify a fundamental change. The present generation of Americans are trustees for the preservation of the republic. We have defended it abroad against the criminals who are the froth of autocracy; we must defend it on our own shores against the criminals who are the dregs of autocracy. We have repelled an audacious attempt to make the world into a greater Germany; now we are confronted with an attempt to make it into another Russia. Any measure which the majority of the American people want can be secured without the intervention of any "soviet" or "verein.” any "soviet" or "verein." Whenever methods outside the constitution are resorted to, it is for the purpose of effectuating the will of a minority. We may have pity for the Bolshevik and the anarchist; those poor creatures with stunted bodies and disordered minds who are the legitimate spawn of foreign tyranny. But we have a government which for over a century has been, with all its faults, the best under the sun. If we let them lay their ignorant hands upon its foundations we are traitors to our sires by whose blood those foundations were cemented.

are and must be educational in their nature. There is, There is, however, one measure of a legal nature which can not fail to have a good effect. The right of suffrage should be limited to persons who have for say five years been able to read and write the English language and who have during that time habitually read some paper or periodical published in that language. Certainly this is a minimum requirement for participation in the affairs of state. Certainly no one can with less effort acquire sufficient knowledge of American institutions to entitle him to vote. No man is bound to read papers or magazines, but certainly a man who can not or will not is not a fit elector. One value of the proposed measure is that it invokes some measure of self interest to make it effective. Educational measures for Americanization must depend largely on altruistic effort, which is habitually somewhat spasmodic and short lived. But given a group of voters inclined toward a particular political faith, and no pains will be spared to see that they become qualified to support that faith at the polls. The tendency of the times is strongly toward greater directness in popular rule. The referendum seems to be steadily growing in favor. If this tendency is to be a source of strength and not of weakness, the standard of the electorate must be raised. The theory of representative government is that the chosen representatives will be the best and wisest men of the community. While it has not always attained that ideal, it is still true that the representative is more intelligent than a large part of his constituency. Certainly no man who could not read and write English and did not read a paper or magazine in the English language would be a fit holder of any office. If we enlarge, as we doubtless shall, the functions of the electorate, the qualifications of the voter must be raised to what would be an irreducible minimum for an office holder. Otherwise the step toward more perfect democracy will be a step backward and not forward.

"The Likes of They."

"P

The

RISONER at the bar," said the judge, "you are by your own admission guilty of unnumbered crimes. You have murdered, ravished and burned. You have spared neither age nor childhood. Before this court women have sobbed out the tale of the dishonor they have endured at your hands; little children have exhibited the mutilations you have inflicted on them. This once fair country side has been made desolate by you. But I understand you are now going to lead a better life." prisoner looked down at his manacled hands and sidewise at the burly guards around him and forced his evil face into the semblance of a smile. "Yes, your honor," he responded. "In that case," said the judge, "you are discharged. We have formed in this county a law and order league, to membership in which you have been admitted, and some of our best citizens will be glad to let you rest in their homes until you recover from the fatigue caused by your resisting arrest." This never happened in a court of law, even in moving picture land where courts do strange things. But through the veil of the censorship have come repeated suggestions that it should be done in the Court of Civilization. The league of nations is an experiment; many and grave doubts have been expressed as to its efficacy. It will require the utmost of confidence and good will to carry it through the experimental stage. Is there any surer method of destroying

those factors than by admitting the Hun to membership in the league? The leopard can not change his spots nor the Ethiopian his skin. In the league of nations Germany will continue to regard a treaty as a scrap of paper. Her diplomatic representatives will continue to be spies in the states to which they are accredited. If a decision is made on any subject by the league, will not the suspicion arise in every mind that German methods and German ends are in some manner involved? The usefulness of a league whose acts are open to the slightest suspicion of German domination will be absolutely nil. If it is sought to justify the inclusion of the Hun on broad grounds of human brotherhood, civilization will promptly paraphrase the doughboy song which said of the Filipino:

"He may be a brother of William H. Taft,
But he ain't no brother of mine."

The exclusion of Germany from all participation in the world league until she has brought forth "fruits meet for repentance" is dictated not only by policy but by self respect. The organizations which have standing among us owe that standing to the fact that they never knowingly admit an unworthy man to their membership. An association whose roster is open to criminals speedily becomes an association of criminals. We may abstain from vengeance on the Hun; we may even mitigate something of the strict demands of justice, though that is of very doubtful policy. But we want no association or partnership

with him.

Conscientious Scruples.

CCASIONAL Conflict between the edicts of government O and the conscience of a citizen is as old as human society. The scriptural injunctions "swear not at all" and "judge not" have in particular led many well-meaning literalists to refuse to testify on oath or to serve as jurors. Fidelity to the dictates of conscience is of course a good thing in the main. On the other hand it is obvious that individual self determination may be carried to the point where it is destructive of all government. The conflict is therefore inherent, arising from the fundamental principle that men surrender certain of the rights which pertain to a state of nature in order to obtain the benefits of organized society. Viewed from this standpoint, the question is not difficult of practical solution. The individual surrenders so much of his natural liberty as is necessary to secure the continued existence of society and to give to every member of that society equal liberty. Within those limits his individual rights, whether he calls them whims or conscientious scruples, are given up in return for the benefits which he receives. No conscientious scruple may rightfully be asserted against the performance by any person of his share in the support and defense of the government. A man who buys groceries and refuses to pay, or one who marries and refuses to support his wife, cannot justify his dishonesty by dubbing it "conscience.' The same considerations apply to a man who receives the benefits of an organized civilization and refuses to pay taxes or to render military service for the national defense. In so obvious a matter of common honesty, the individual who receives the benefit and develops scruples against the duty is of course in some measure degenerate. A psychosociological examination of three thousand "conscientious objectors" now in confinement is said to